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The important topic of loyalist privateering during the American 
Revolution has remained unaddressed. The intention of this study is to 
examine the activity's developmental period between 1775-1778. Relying 
predominantly on primary source materials such as newspapers, admi- 
ralty court records, shipsf papers, correspondence, memorials, dia- 
ries, journals, and minute, account, and log books, this work analyzes 
the participants and assesses their role in the war. 
There are three key focuses. The first is on the activities of 
loyalist mariners during the war's first half, prior to official rec- 
ognition of privateering by the British. Loyalist service on various 
types of vessels is examined to view the growth of maritime involve- 
ment, analyze crews and vessels, and ascertain levels of success. Also 
discussed are the obstacles imposed by the British which loyalist pri- 
vateers were forced to overcome to gain acceptance. To explain the de- 
veloping situation within the scope of the North Atlantic world, re- 
lated events in East Florida, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, and the West In- 
dies are also examined. Ultimately, the study shows that privateering 
was strongly supported loyalists, and their activities at sea during 
the early part of the conflict resulted in significant contributions 
to the British war effort. 
The second focus is on the development of the participants, 
themselves, as loyalists and privateers. Individuals from different 
maritime regions are identified and profiled according to social, eco- 
nomic, occupational, ethnic, and racial backgrounds, experiences, and 
motivating factors. The regional groups are then compared to discern 
similarities and differences. The third key theme is closely associ- 
ated. Considerable attention is paid to the situation and activities 
of one family, the Goodriches, who became leaders in the privateering 
enterprise. Interrelated is the issue of how British trade restric- 
tions negatively affected loyalists, prompting them to become priva- 
teers. The work shows that loyalist Americans involved in privateer- 
ing, though dominated by the merchant/mariner classes, reflected a 
cross-section of the populace, were generally motivated by legitimate, 
honorable factors, and constituted a previously unrecognized, signifi- 
cant, highly unified sub-community within the loyalist community. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Historians have generated a fair amount of literature concerning 
the loyalists of the American Revolution. Much has also been written 
about the numerous naval and maritime aspects of the war. Yet, a key 
element of both the loyalist community and the conflict at sea has 
been ignored: the loyalist privateersmen. If one finds a reference to 
these individuals in the secondary literature, it is usually only a 
passing acknowledgment of their existence. Rare indeed are accounts 
offering much substance, and when encountered, they are usually brief, 
relative asides in a broader study where the real emphasis lies else- 
where. As long ago as 1942, no less a historian than Robert Greenhalgh 
1 Albion remarked on the lack of a study on these people. In 1948, Tho- 
mas Jefferson Wertenbaker called loyalist privateering "the most im- 
portant activity of New York," but he devoted less than three pages to 
2 the topic. In the lengthy interim since then, no one has seen fit to 
pursue the matter. Several factors may account for this lack of atten- 
tion. As an unaddresed topic, historians may simply have failed to 
recognize the significance of loyalist privateering. Various biases 
may have played a part. Traditionally, land campaigns have been viewed 
as more important than those conducted at sea. Also, a bias against 
loyalists in general, often perceived as the enemy, may account, in 
part for the neglect. Bias against naval and military studies, which 
has prevailed in the historical community until recently, may also 
have precluded tackling such a study. Simple research logistical prob- 
lems were undoubtedly a factor for anyone who may have attempted work 
on this topic. Pertinent material is widely scattered in numerous ar- 
chives around the North Atlantic rim. Finally, the state of loyalist 
literature has only just progressed enough to establish a data base of 
information and ideas to allow researchers to advance and investigate 
more specific topics in depth. The Provincial Corps and the loyalist 
militia system also await detailed examinations. Given this lack of 
historical treatment, it is of primary importance to ascertain not 
only just what these individuals accomplished, but simply who they 
were. 
The loyalist privateering enterprise was ultimately popular, 
widespread, and conducted on a large scale. The story of this activity 
can be divided neatly into two consecutive periods. The first, the de- 
velopmental stage, lasted until October, 1778, when the British gov- 
ernment finally granted authorization to loyalists for general priva- 
3 teering operations. With acceptance, the second period began, en- 
tailing extensive unrestricted activity and continuing until the end 
of the war. A key historical objective found in secondary loyalist 
literature involves ascertaining the various roles of loyalists in the 
British war effort and assessing their significance. Although the 
first era did not witness privateering on the same level as the sec- 
ond, loyalist activity at sea during the earlier phase was still sig- 
nificant, and examining the evolutionary phase is key to our under- 
standing the whole story. Only by doing this can we become aware of 
why the participants opted for this means of involving themselves in 
the conflict, and why the British, who were initially opposed to the 
activity, ultimately decided to recognize it and rely on it as a major 
part of their war effort. More importantly, during this time, loyalist 
mariners, though acting in a limited capacity under major restraints, 
nevertheless, continued to push for and develop privateering, signifi- 
cantly aiding the British war effort as they did so. These mariners 
not only caused considerable disruption and losses to rebel trade, 
they provided other important services, acting as naval auxiliaries, 
performing convoy duty, gathering intelligence, and supplying belea- 
guered areas with much needed provisions and materials. At the same 
time, these loyalists negatively affected the focus of rebel war aims 
by forcing the revolutionaries to acknowledge their threat and take 
considerable steps to counter it. Consequently, examining the role 
played by loyalists at sea and assessing the results they achieved 
during this first period constitute the primary goal of this study, 
and consequently, this is largely a study of a series of maritime cam- 
paigns. 
Three additional objectives have been germane to loyalist stud- 
ies. Two simply entail identifying who the loyalists were and defining 
their unique experience. In turn, collective analysis of established 
identities and experiences has resulted in achieving the remaining 
goal, creating group profiles based on background, degree of involve- 
ment, and motivation. In terms of background, the overall loyalist 
composition (used here synonymously with profile) reflected a cross- 
section of colonial social class, occupation, economic status, ethnic- 
ity, race, gender, and region. At the same time, however, regional 
variations in the general profile existed. Levels of involvement for 
loyalists as a whole ranged from neutral to equivocal to extremely ac- 
tive. A variety of motivational factors prompted their decision to 
side with the crown. In general, loyalists were a varied and complex 
4 group. 
Coinciding with and integral to the development of loyalist pri- 
vateering as an activity was the evolution of the participants, them- 
selves, first as loyalists, then as privateersmen. A second, parallel 
objective for this study, is to profile loyalist privateers with the 
intention of determining who they were and why they became what they 
did. As a ground-breaking work, simply identifying individuals is of 
primary importance. This will not only tell us who was involved, it 
will also help convey the widespread level of participation. Of 
course, not everyone can be identified and included, but the sample 
presented in the course of this paper, consisting of 265 men and 
women, is representative of the much larger group. While fitting the 
broader, inter-colonial profile, loyalist mariners also alter it by 
adding a previously unacknowledged, but numerically, and thus so- 
cially, significant element to the intricate composition of the loyal- 
ist community. In fact, they formed a large, distinct maritime sub- 
community. Using the broader, established historical view as a point 
of reference, profiling will also allow regional differences in compo- 
sition to be discerned among privateers. More importantly, the exami- 
nation of the background and experience of this whole group of loyal- 
ists allows their general collective character to be assessed; we then 
can arrive at an understanding of why these individuals chose the 
course they did. This is essential, because rebel contemporaries often 
viewed loyalist privateersmen as little better than ruthless, plunder- 
ing pirates, and this view has sometimes carried over into the secon- 
dary literature on those rare instances when historians have acknowl- 
5 
edged the existence of these people. In reality, for the most part, 
loyalist privateers, with merchants and mariners serving as a large 
core element, were simply everyday, moderate, responsible, respectable 
people, motivated by generally acceptable, honorable reasons, who 
acted, or more appropriately, reacted, as consciences and circum- 
stances dictated. Forced on the defensive, these Americans were trans- 
formed into extremely aggressive participants in the war against their 
once fellow countrymen. 
Of course certain loyalists stand out as exemplary or signifi- 
cant for various reasons. As such, they warrant greater attention. In 
the annals of loyalist privateering, one name, Goodrich, stands out 
above all others. The activities of this Virginia family, consisting 
of a father, five sons, and a son-in-law, were integral to the devel- 
opmental period of loyalist privateering, during which they estab- 
lished themselves as without peers in the activity. Furthermore, the 
experiences which caused them to become loyalists in the first place, 
though clearly extreme, never-the-less involved many elements reflec- 
tive of other loyalists' situations. Much of the story of the early 
period focuses on the Goodriches. 
It is necessary at this point to elaborate on an aspect of moti- 
vation which is pertinent to establishing the collective character of 
loyalist privateersmen and will be a major sub-theme in this work. As 
noted, motivation is a key profile element that historians have worked 
hard to isolate and define because it is essential to our understand- 
ing the loyalist stance. As varied as loyalist backgrounds were their 
reasons for casting their lot with the British. Often cited and empha- 
sized by historians, in what is tantamount to a stock in trade discus- 
sion in loyalist studies, is one specific motivating factor. Loyal- 
ists, in particular the merchant class, are perceived as having been 
opportunistic and self-interested, and so, chose the side they did for 
6 reasons of personal gain. At the same time, almost all privateering 
studies address the issue of personal profit as a motivational factor. 
Commonly encountered in the secondary literature on privateersmen, re- 
gardless of time period, is the belief that they operated with the 
7 primary intention of enhancing their wealth. To illustrate how deeply 
this view has permeated the popular perception, on numerous occasions 
during the course of preparing this study people would ask what my re- 
search involved. When they were told it concerned privateers, the re- 
sponse of those who knew what a privateer was inevitably replied, 'Oh! 
Legalized piracy." This clearly indicates that a cloud of profit ori- 
ented unrespectability has come to shroud the activity in the minds of 
many. Because these negative views are so prevalent with historians 
working in both fields, and because loyalist privateering revolved 
around the merchant/mariner class, it is doubly important to explore 
this issue in the course of this study. If left unaddressed, the 
reader might conclude that merchant/mariners, if motivated by reasons 
of personal enhancement to become loyalists in the first place, would 
logically pursue privateering as a matter of course to attain their 
goals. This would have the affect of casting an even greater pall over 
the participants, making them appear truly disreputable . 
On the other hand, in addressing the issue of self-interest in a 
couple of recent studies on privateering, writers have displayed a 
more enlightened understanding of the activity with regards to profit- 
ability. They have effectively shown that not only were privateersmen 
generally patriotic, but also, while acknowledging that money was a 
consideration, within the context of eighteenth century mercantile be- 
liefs, that waging war while attempting to fill one's coffers was com- 
8 pletely acceptable behavior. To paraphrase Carl E. Swanson, what today 
would be considered "private viceN was then equated with "public vir- 
t u e . ~ ~  Consequently, the negative view that privateersmen, at least, 
were prompted by the lure of filthy lucre becomes moot. Other studies 
have taken a different tack by showing that the merchant/mariner class 
often entered into the activity because they had little alternative. 
With their normal trade regimen disrupted by war, privateering offered 
the only logical and viable alternative venture allowing the continua- 
tion of some form of business. 10 
A key purpose of this study, which is part and parcel to ex- 
plaining the development of the enterprise and incorporates the two 
views just outlined is to show that in the first place, that these 
loyalists were motivated by a high level of their own brand of public 
virtue. In turn, their degree of commitment carried over prompting 
them to become privateersmen. While the motivation of many can, in a 
limited, qualified degree, be defined as self-interested, it was jus- 
tifiably so and free of negative implications. Specifically, the deci- 
sions of these individuals to become either loyalists or privateers- 
men, were not governed by speculative dreams of personal financial en- 
hancement. The situation was simply not conducive to this. 
Belying self-interest and prompting involvement in privateering 
was the extremely disrupted trade situation that loyalist mechant/ 
mariners found themselves in. This was brought on not only by the war 
itself, but by the trade restrictions imposed by the British that 
negatively affected loyalists as well as rebels. Discussion of this 
topic, constituting another major sub-theme, will crop up throughout 
the study. Disruption of trade was a key factor in turning many to 
privateering. 
Another topic supports the generally honorable character of 
these men. For many, privateering was not the only means of showing 
their commitment. A significant number served in other military or na- 
val capacities, often as unpaid volunteers. Others acted as public of- 
ficials and performed civic and humanitarian roles. For many priva- 
teering was only one way of showing their commitment. 
Examination of loyalist experience has led some historians to 
assert that in most cases the effects of the war on loyalists was gen- 
erally mild and that even accounts of their persecution have been 
over-stated. While they acknowledge that selected individuals and even 
certain populations in specific locales did suffer serious abuse, the 
11 treatment of most loyalists is said to have been quite lenient. As a 
group, a comparatively high proportion of loyalist privateers suffered 
severely in one way or another for their stance. Persecution was both 
a motivating and reinforcing agent for involvement. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the developmental phase 
concerns the place of loyalist privateers in early British policy and 
strategy. Simply put, officially, it had none. Loyalist privateersmen 
were persona non grata. Despite the fact that they were increasingly 
eager, as the war progressed, to act in the capacity of privateersmen, 
there was considerable opposition to the idea of their doing so. Their 
efforts to attain the official sanction necessary to conduct legiti- 
mate operations at sea met with a very negative response from factions 
holding sway in the British Government and the Royal Navy. In an ef- 
fort to maintain control of a deteriorating situation, these two 
groups, for diplomatic, legal, professional, and personal reasons, in 
conjunction with their implementation and enforcement of restrictive 
legislative acts and general policy, refused to acknowledge the ac- 
tivity and seriously retarded its development. In general, members of 
government and the navy held loyalist privateers to be a potentially 
serious liability for a number of reasons. In addition, in Bermuda, 
loyalist privateersmen met with severe resistance from a civil popu- 
lace. Despite the lack of official recognition and support, the activ- 
ity continued to evolve. Proponents of privateering persevered in 
their efforts for acceptance, often conducting operations without the 
necessary proper authority. As the situation required, loyalist priva- 
teersmen learned to circumvent and even openly defy the restraints in 
the shadow of which they functioned. Still, gaining acceptance was a 
long and sometimes difficult process with expanding levels of quali- 
fied recognition achieved in sporadic stages. By 1778, however, coin- 
ciding with France entering the fray and the resulting necessity on 
the part of the British to reassess their war aims and the roles loy- 
alists would play in them, loyalists had proven themselves effective 
privateersmen and thus, important assets to the British war effort. In 
the face of opposition, loyalist mariners had achieved a significant 
record of success. They could no longer be ignored, and they got what 
they desired, official widespread sanction to independently wage war 
at sea with the freedom normally accorded privateers. Loyalist re- 
sponse to the news that the British would finally officially allow 
them to go privateering was incredibly enthusiastic, constituting an 
uncommon feverish rage. 
During the course of previous imperialistic struggles in the 
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, warfare at sea had come to 
be equated with mercantile trade war, and consequently, privateering 
fit in well with the scheme of things. The nature of the conflict dur- 
ing the early stages of the American Revolution, however, was new and 
different. Despite the efforts of the British to bring the rebels into 
line by imposing severe trade restrictions, as witnessed with the Re- 
straining and Prohibitory Acts of 1775 and 1776, this was not a trade 
war like previous colonial conflicts. In trying to put down the rebel- 
lion, the British were not attempting to acquire and control new ter- 
ritories, markets, and resources, but rather to maintain a grip on ex- 
isting ones by hitting the rebels where it would hurt most. The target 
was the same, but the object and the means of achieving it were dif- 
ferent. In light of this situation, British resistance to legitimizing 
privatizing reflected valid concerns. Employing commissioned vessels 
was not really appropriate at this early stage, and if allowed, the 
activity could backfire and prove an embarrassing liability. 
Despite privateering's popularity, some individuals feared that 
men, waging war independently, free from the controls and discipline 
of established military and naval forces, would act without regard to 
the rules of civilized warfare, commit heinous atrocities, and so, be- 
come little better than, if not actually, pirates. When these beliefs 
were applied to the specific situation in North America, there was 
fear that rather than aid the war effort, privateers would only serve 
to make a bad situation worse. Prior to 1779, while the British were 
actively fighting the rebels, they also strove for reconciliation with 
them. Unleashing privateers of any sort, be it loyalist or British, 
would have had the effect of creating a civil war with all the real 
and potential horrors inherent to such a conflict. Privateers would 
only serve to anger and alienate the rebels further, and so, nega- 
tively affect the negotiations for a peaceful settlement. 
There was a second major reason for Britain's reluctance in 
authorizing privateering. The activity was governed by international 
laws and conducted between established, legitimate nations. To sanc- 
tion privateering against the rebels would have been tantamount to ac- 
knowledging them as independent. 12 
Britons who opposed privateering harbored yet another legitimate 
fear. In accordance with the Prohibitory Act leveled against the re- 
bels on December 2, 1775, foreign vessels found carrying supplies to 
them were subject to seizure by the Royal Navy. Were the British to 
sanction privateers, the same foreign bottoms would become fair game 
for them as well. Again, in light of the opinion that held privateers 
to be an uncontrollable entity, there was serious concern they would 
be less scrupulous then the navy in their selection of prizes, and so, 
they might provoke an international incident drawing another opponent 
into the war. Needless to say, this was something the British hoped to 
avoid at all costs. With France's entry into the war and the collapse 
of the peace negotiations, the nature of the conflict and views on em- 
ploying loyalist privateers changed radically. 
The Royal Navy maintained other self-serving and less justifi- 
able reasons for opposing privateers. The primary concern of that 
august body was that privateering would prove such an attractive al- 
ternative to naval service, it would not only make it even more diffi- 
cult to acquire crews, it would also cause desertions and deplete ex- 
isting ones. Even less legitimate was the fear on the part of some na- 
val officers that privateering would negatively affect the opportunity 
for prize money. Prize money was the traditional means by which impov- 
erished officers achieved wealth, and they guarded the perquisite 
against interlopers who might diminish opportunities for reward. 
Lest the reader think that loyalist privateersmen were singled 
out for repressive treatment by the British, it need be noted the 
British response to them was in keeping with a broader policy towards 
loyalists in general. The British simply did not want to rely on them. 
Paralleling the development of loyalist privateering was the evolution 
of the loyalist Provincial Corps within the Army. Early in the war as 
stopgap measures to meet immediate crises, the Crown had resorted to 
using loyalist soldiers as well as mariners, and just as there would 
be an outcry for the recognition of privateering, there was one for 
allowing the formation of provincial military units. In fact, ini- 
tially, the clamor for such commands seems to have greatly surpassed 
that for letters of marque, and the British responded to a degree. 
Provincial battalions were formed. As troops, however, they came under 
direct British military command, and so, a great deal of control could 
be exerted over them. This led to problems. Use of provincial troops 
was limited and the nature of the service was not what the loyalists 
had in mind. Often, these units, comprised of men who volunteered to 
ardently do their part, were deemed as second rate and not trusted by 
British superiors. As a result, they were generally relegated to per- 
forming menial, inferior, less than glamorous duties. In part, this 
less than enthusiastic response to the employment of loyalist troops 
was a result of the peace effort. The British feared that their use 
would also create the ugly situation of civil war and so, jeopardize 
hopes for reconciliation. In any case, the loyalists became disheart- 
ened with their lot, and enthusiasm for raising and joining provincial 
commands waned to the point that by the time the policy was reversed 
in 1778 and a major effort was made to enlist loyalist support, the 
British were sadly disappointed in the response. Loyalists were tired 
and fed up with what they felt was unappreciative neglect and ill- 
usage and they were disillusioned by what they deemed the half- 
hearted, irresolute manner in which the British had prosecuted the war 
to date. Potential troops had grown somewhat wary of the British and 
appeasement was too late. 13 
The course of loyalist privateering was just the opposite of 
that of the Provincial Corps. While the initial demands for letters of 
marque seem to have been much less than for military commands, as will 
be seen, the outcry for them grew and continued to grow steadily, de- 
spite opposition, until the restrictions on their issue were removed. 
At that point, in September and October, 1778, there was a consider- 
able outpouring of support for the activity. 
Not all British officials and naval officers held the idea of 
loyalist privateering in such low regard. At the senior government 
level, no less a figure than Lord George Germain, Viscount Sackville, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, and his Under-Secretary, William 
Knox, strongly advocated the activity. In the navy, Vice Admiral Mar- 
riot Arbuthnot was certainly not averse to the idea, and lesser offi- 
cers of distinction, such as Captain Andrew Snape Hammond, actually 
declared their support of it. A number of colonial officials were 
quick to assess the situation and realize the value of relying on loy- 
alist mariners, sometimes taking matters into their own hands and 
transcending the limits of their authority. Such included Governors 
John Murray, Earl Dunmore, of Virginia, Josiah Martin of North Caro- 
lina, William Campbell of South Carolina, Patrick Tonyn of East Flor- 
ida, William Tryon of New York, and Lieutenant Governor Thomas Oliver 
of Massachusetts. 
A final technical problem confronting evolving loyalist priva- 
teers was that in order for the undertaking to be conducted effi- 
ciently, effectively, successfully, and most importantly, legally, 
certain administrative and legal machinery, in the form of the powers 
granted colonial governors and vice admiralty courts, needed to be in 
place. They were not. Earlier, colonial governors had been granted the 
courtesy title of vice-admiral and empowered with the considerable 
rights accorded such. A significant aspect of their role was the 
right, when sanctioned (as it always had been in the past) to author- 
ize letters of marque for individuals desirous of becoming privateers- 
men. The governors also supervised the vice admiralty courts which had 
been authorized in 1696 and had existed in most colonies. These courts 
served three main functions. They mediated in such matters as disputes 
between captains and crews, they enforced the navigation acts, and 
most significantly with regard to this study, in time of war, they 
heard prize cases. Also, while it was the governors who authorized 
letters of marque, it was the court that actually issued them. Al- 
though the court's judges were subject to Royal approval, they were 
selected by the governors, thus giving them effective control over the 
system. Of course, for reasons too obvious and numerous to mention, 
the presence of an admiralty court in a colony was lucrative for all 
associated. More importantly, however, a governor's ability to issue 
letters of marque and the immediate presence of a vice-admiralty court 
were essential for effective, efficient, and successful privateering. 
Without them, there was no place conveniently close to acquire 
authorization to cruise or to send prizes to be libeled and con- 
demned. l4 
At the end of the Seven Years War there were eleven vice adrni- 
ralty courts in North America. In 1764, however, the system was radi- 
cally altered. The governors lost their right to grant commissions, 
and the courts were restructured to include only four, strategically 
located at Halifax, Boston, Philadelphia, and Charlestown. A fifth 
court was established at St. Augustine, East Florida, in 1771. Of 
course, for most if not all of the period in question, Boston, Phila- 
delphia, and Charlestown were under rebel control, leaving only re- 
mote, inconveniently located Halifax and St. Augustine as the only le- 
gitimate, officially recognized vice-admiralty courts on the conti- 
nent. This proved problematic not only for privateers, but for the 
Royal Navy as well. The problem lay primarily in the fact that for 
every vessel seized, a detachment of experienced sailors from the cap- 
tor had to be detached to sail the prize to the nearest port with a 
vice-admiralty court. The negative results were two-fold with one com- 
pounding the other. First, the potential efficiency and effectiveness 
of the captor was steadily reduced through the loss of manpower every 
time a capture was made. In fact, this was simply the nature of the 
business and acceptable. It became increasingly problematic, however, 
the further away the court. The farther the distance, the longer the 
men would be away and the greater the inconvenience in retrieving 
them. Other factors, to be discussed later, appear to have negatively 
affected the viability of using the St. Augustine court even more. 
Yet, despite these issues, the British resisted efforts to reinstate 
the prerogatives of the governors and establish new courts. In fact, 
the Prohibitory Act directly addressed the prize court situation, de- 
claring that captured rebel vessels could not be brought into any of 
the thirteen rebellious colonies for court proceedings. As such, the 
act had a negative effect on loyalists. A decree of this nature was 
hardly conducive to pursuing privateering. The issue of the court sys- 
tem plays an important part in this story. 15 
Another sub-theme reoccurring throughout the work concerns the 
examination of the types of vessels employed, their ordnance, and 
crews. The intent is to show the continued increase in the size of 
privateers, their armaments, and compliments. This, in turn, will re- 
flect the escalating degree of commitment and participation. 
A final, highly significant theme concerns the geographic scope 
of this study. The intention is to view the early period of loyalist 
privateering comprehensively within the context of the North Atlantic 
world. Consequently, in addition to viewing the activities of the 
mainland loyalists from the thirteen rebellious colonies, the situa- 
tion and operations in East Florida, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, the Baha- 
mas, the West Indies, and Britain will also be examined. Of course, 
the Bahamas are part of the West Indies, but they were somewhat of a 
fringe element, and in terms of privateering and their place in the 
colonial/revolutionary world, they constitute a separate entity to be 
discussed apart from the rest. 
This "big picture" view was necessitated by the nature of the 
historical situation dictating an all or nothing approach. The issues, 
events, and personalities of one region were often closely tied with 
those elsewhere, with affairs in one locale often affecting those in 
another. Therefore, to fully explain matters in one area, it is often 
necessary to discuss related events in other regions. Also, privateer- 
ing was an extremely dynamic activity unrestricted by artificial ter- 
ritorial boundaries. Vessels based in one port often conducted opera- 
tions in other remote areas inter-mingling with craft from other 
ports. The majority of loyalists, themselves, were dispossessed refu- 
gees who relocated to far-flung locales coming into contact with oth- 
ers in the same situation and establishing new affiliations as they 
did so. This makes it impossible to effectively isolate the partici- 
pants from a given colony or even region and focus specifically on 
them and their activities. Adopting this broader scope serves to en- 
hance the over-all meaningfulness to the topic. It will place person- 
alities, issues, and events separated by time and space in context 
with each other, while at the same time showing the homogeneity of the 
enterprise. It will also allow a better assessment of operations and 
their significance. This, in turn, will further enhance our under- 
standing of the significance of the war at sea during the revolution 
and its affects on other aspects of the conflict. 
During the pre-war era, the same merchant/mariners who would in- 
stigate privateering conducted business amid an intricate inter- 
colonial trade network encompassing the North Atlantic world. Effec- 
tive business required an intimate knowledge of commodities, tides, 
winds, weather conditions, navigational hazards, and the economics of 
remote areas, and was reliant on a complex infra-structure of estab- 
lished routes, ports, supply and repair facilities, and personal con- 
nections. This knowledge and infra-structure was easily adapted and 
essential to privateering and served as the foundation for operations 
in that enterprise. In essence, as merchant/mariners and consequently, 
privateers, these individuals functioned in a much larger and more 
complex world than other loyalists. This sets them apart as distinc- 
tive. The means they chose to wage war was a logical extension of 
their peacetime occupation, based on a specific knowledge of that 
larger world which they used to their advantage. 
In establishing this North Atlantic scope a somewhat contradic- 
tory fact becomes apparent. Despite the regional expanse, the world of 
the loyalist privateersman was really a small one. A number of these 
men were already known to each other through pre-war business ven- 
tures. More would come into contact with each other as a result of the 
conflict and be further linked by privateering. As such, the loyalist 
maritime community was reinforced and unified to an even greater de- 
gree. They possessed a level of inter-colonial cohesiveness setting 
them apart from other segments of the loyalist population. 
To summarize, there are three main objectives to this study, the 
third of which is closely related to the second. First, the work will 
strive to explain the development of loyalist privateering, examine 
loyalist maritime operations during the early period, show the affect 
of activities, and establish their significance. In assessing effec- 
tiveness much will be achieved by employing the time-honored naval 
history method of simply relying on numbers. The number of prizes and 
cargoes seized in conjunction with estimates of tonnage will be estab- 
lished and presented in relation to the number of loyalist vessels and 
their losses. Additional assessments of effectiveness will be based on 
the significance of captured cargoes, their value, and the measures 
the rebels were forced to take in response to the situation. 
The second objective is to identify the participants and analyze 
their backgrounds, experiences, and motivations collectively to ex- 
plain who was involved, their character, and why they were involved as 
both loyalists and as privateersmen. Going hand-in-hand with this will 
be a detailed discourse on the rise of the Goodrich family as the 
leading element in the loyalist privateering world. It needs to be 
noted that not all of the individuals discussed were actually involved 
in the early phase. They are introduced here, because they reflect, 
and so help establish, the overall composition of the loyalist priva- 
teering community. 
There is a reason for adopting this three-focus coverage. While 
each topic could be dealt with individually and stand on its own 
merit, it is better to discuss them in association, because the exami- 
nation of any one would still require delving into the other two to a 
considerable degree. In essence, they are closely related, so a com- 
plete exploration of all three in combination is warranted. This will 
result in a more complete coverage of the story, making it more mean- 
ingful. 
Interrelated with the above topics are several important sub- 
themes. Discussion of the trade situation, British opposition to pri- 
vateering, and the vice-admiralty court situation are essential to our 
understanding the development of the activity. Another theme involves 
analyzing vessel, armament, and crew size with an eye to explaining 
the related technology and showing scale in development. Finally, all 
of these topics will be explored within the context of the North At- 
lantic world. 
There are certain topics that the reader might expect to be ad- 
dressed in a study of this nature which are not. For instance, apart 
from the occasional passing reference, no effort will be made to com- 
pare these loyalists with others such back-country groups or the Pro- 
vincial Corps. As to privateers, there is not detailed coverage of 
topics like life at sea, crew organization, investment structure, vice 
admiralty court procedures, or whether or not the activity was profit- 
able. All these topics await further work. 
As to general organization, the method effectively employed by 
N. A. M. Rogers in his The Safequard of the Sea was adopted. This in- 
volves an over-all chronological approach with lateral excursions to 
explore key issues as they arise. Generally, chapters dealing with 
personalities and specific topics are interspersed among those dis- 
cussing operations. Due to necessity, however, there is an occasional 
intermingling of the two in a given chapter. Within this framework, 
the materials are organized by maritime region. 
In those chapters in which participants are identified and exam- 
ined in terms of composition and experience, the traditional approach 
used in loyalist studies involving discussion by individual colony has 
been modified. This structure was considered too unwieldy and for rea- 
sons about to be discussed, inappropriate. Instead, loyalist mariners 
are examined in accordance with six maritime regions, the upper and 
lower New England regions, the Delaware Bay and New Jersey coast re- 
gion, the Chesapeake Bay region, the southern coastal region, and New 
York. The traditional regional divisions of New England, the Middle 
Colonies, and the South, while still valid, will only serve to define 
the broad parameters of the more defined regions within them. Of 
course, it could easily be argued that New York should be included 
with New Jersey, but for several reasons, it stands apart and needs to 
be viewed separately. It was actually located directly between two of 
the other regions, and as a port, it serviced its own large, specific 
hinterland. Furthermore, because it became the primary refuge for loy- 
alists, the center for their privateering operations, and the bastion 
of British presence in North America, it needs to be viewed as a dis- 
tinct entity. 
This format has been adopted for the following reasons. Because 
maritime trade was dynamic, it was not confined by provincial borders. 
Each region was defined by a key port serving the entire area's com- 
merce. The merchants and mariners of a given region operated in accor- 
dance with a number of shared affinities linking them together, creat- 
ing a common identity, and establishing a sense of unity. Of course, 
they shared the same occupation, life-style, and socio-economic back- 
ground. More specifically, the men of a particular region functioned 
under the same meteorological and navigational conditions, dealt in 
regionally specific trade commodities, conducted transactions with 
specific markets, and were associated with each other through their 
business dealings. This required a degree of specialization in ves- 
sels, sailing skills, and business knowledge. Also, this format, is 
more in keeping with the broader, inter-colonial North Atlantic scope 
of the study. 
Chapter 1 offers background information on privateering in gen- 
eral plus material on rebel privateering activities so that informa- 
tion supplied later on loyalists can be viewed in context. Chapter 2 
consists first of a general historiographical overview of loyalist 
background, experience, stance, and motivation, and then of an in- 
depth discussion of opportunism and self-interest as a motivating fac- 
tor. Chapters 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9 serve to identify various loyalists by 
region,, establish their composite, relate their early experiences, 
define their character, and examine their early war maritime activi- 
ties. Chapter 4 deals almost exclusively with the Goodrich family's 
situation early in the conflict, although there are references to re- 
lated activities by other loyalist mariners. In Chapters 5, 10, 11, 
and 13, operations in different regions are discussed. Chapters 12 and 
14 explore the privateering and trade situation in New York during 
1778. Chapter 14 also presents information on specific operations dur- 
ing September and October, 1778. 
Before continuing, it is necessary to define privateer and other 
synonymous or related terms. Basically, a privateer was a privately 
owned warship granted a written commission, or Letter of Marque and 
Reprisal, by a government authorizing it to attack and capture, or de- 
stroy, the shipping of a specific enemy country in time of war. Pos- 
session of such a document gave the aggressive action legal sanction 
and distinguished it from piracy. Depending on circumstances and the 
abilities and tenacity of the opponent's officers and crew, seizing a 
prize could involve a lengthy chase in which the sailing skills of 
both parties were tested, and occasionally an engagement of varying 
degrees of intensity once the pursuer closed with the quarry. Upon 
seizure, a prize crew under the command of a prize master was dele- 
gated to sail the captured vessel to a port with an admiralty or vice 
admiralty court. There, after a review of the prize's paperwork, the 
taking of depositions, and allowing time for anyone to come forward to 
contest the matter, the court ruled on the legitimacy of the capture. 
If the prize was judged righteous, then the vessel and cargo would be 
sold at public vendue. After deducting various expenses, such as court 
costs, auction fees, and the overhead for the voyage, the proceeds 
from the sale were divided among the owners, officers, and crew of the 
captor according to a preestablished schedule of percentage based 
shares. The immediate purpose was two-fold and mutually gratifying for 
the parties involved. The privateersman aided his country's war effort 
by at least disrupting, if not destroying, enemy trade, and if fortune 
smiled, he made a profit, occasionally a handsome one. 
In fact, there were two distinct types of commissioned vessel, 
and the terms distinguishing them have often been used without discre- 
tion, causing some confusion. The main difference was in purpose. 
First, there were vessels specifically called letters of marque. These 
were commissioned, armed merchantmen whose primary function was to 
carry cargo between predetermined ports of call. Technically, such a 
vessel was not allowed to deviate from her designated route to search 
for enemy vessels. If, however, one should appear during the course of 
her planned voyage, she possessed the authority to attack and attempt 
to seize it. The second type was the privateer. Although she carried a 
virtually identical commission (differing only in statement of in- 
tent), unlike the letter of marque, she did not carry cargo, nor were 
her activities confined to a specific route. A privateer's primary 
purpose was to attack and capture or destroy enemy shipping, and she 
was free to go wherever it was thought the hunting would be best. Re- 
flecting the basic difference between the two types is the fact that 
crews on letters of marque received regular pay while those on priva- 
teers served without. (For illustrations of specific vessel types, 
ordnance, and weapons, please see Appendices A and B.) 
Throughout this study, the term letter of marque will be used 
specifically to refer to the first type of vessel or the commissions 
carried by both types. The term privateer will specifically denote a 
vessel of the second category. In fact, until the very end of the pe- 
riod covered in this study, letters of marque were the only officially 
sanctioned commissioned vessels. There were, however, some letters of 
marque that circumvented or ignored the restrictions governing their 
activity and operated more in the manner of true privateers. Other 
vessels acted in the same capacity under the authority of commissions 
granted without official approval or simply without commissions at 
all. Because of the nature of their conduct, these will be called pri- 
vateers as well. The same word will be employed as a general term when 
referring to both types of vessel collectively. The term privateering, 
denoting the activity, will also be used to describe the actions of 
both types of vessel. Finally, in an effort to avoid the awkward term 
privateersmen in reference to owners and crews, when suitable for con- 
veying the correct meaning without confusion, the term privateer will 
also denote individuals involved in the activity as well as their ves- 
sels. 
There was another type of privateer employed by loyalists that 
departed somewhat from the norm. These were the vessels operated by a 
group known as the Associated Loyalists. Although the establishment of 
this organization post-dates the period covered here, it will be ref- 
erenced occasionally because a number of the individuals to be dis- 
cussed joined it. Consequently, some explanation is in order. Raised 
in New York, the Associators were a combined force employing both 
troops and ships to launch attacks on the Connecticut and New Jersey 
coasts, distress rebel trade, and help defend the city. Governed by a 
Board of Directors, the organization of this independent force was 
said to be "a kind of corporation or body politic." Although independ- 
ent, they were to receive their ordnance, small arms, ammunition, eq- 
uipage, provisions when conducting operations, and even their vessels 
from the British. There were, however, problems procuring vessels in 
the prescribed manner, and so, they resorted to other means as yet not 
fully researched. Regardless, the structural organization of the Asso- 
ciators combined with British assistance means that technically, their 
vessels were not the result of private investment like other priva- 
teers. Still, they were commissioned and the Associators were entitled 
to the proceeds from prizes they took. Furthermore, contemporaries 
considered them to be privateers. 16 
Other terms can also cause confusion. Frequently, cruiser and 
armed vessel, or variations of the latter, such as armed sloop and 
armed schooner, were applied to private, commissioned warships. In the 
case of cruiser, while it was frequently used to mean a privateer, it 
could also indicate a small, patrolling Royal Navy vessel. For the 
purpose of this study, the term cruiser will specifically indicate a 
privateer unless otherwise stated. 
The term armed vessel is even more confusing. It was often used 
to refer to privateers, letters of marque, small Royal Navy warships, 
transports in government service carrying cannon, and simply any armed 
merchantman, which, of course, a great many merchantmen were in time 
of war. For the purpose of this study, unless otherwise noted, the 
term armed vessel will only be used to refer to letters of marque and 
privateers. Even then, it will only be employed when a synonym is re- 
quired for the more usual terms, privateer or letter of marque. 
Tenders constitute another type of vessel to discuss. These were 
small, armed auxiliary craft that generally acted in consort with 
specified naval men-of-war. As such, they were not privateers. They 
were, however, often privately owned and frequently manned with loyal- 
ist personnel. Furthermore, as vessels of war sanctioned by the Navy 
or a colonial governor, they were justified in attacking and seizing 
rebel shipping. This they did, sometimes while acting quite independ- 
ently of their parent naval vessel. Tender crews were also entitled to 
shares of the prize money. Consequently, in a qualified sense, their 
conduct could be considered similar to that of a true privateer. Loy- 
alist tender activity in conjunction with the Royal Navy was important 
to the development of loyalist privateering. A number of key partici- 
pants began their careers serving aboard this type of vessel. Then 
again, later in the period, there were actually privateer tenders, 
some of which were independently commissioned, that sailed in consort 
with larger privateers to assist them. 
Finally, there were provincial vessels. These were warships fit- 
ted out in the colonies, manned with local personnel, and taken into 
government service, usually on the authority of a colonial governor. 
Their primary purpose was local defense, and as did tenders, they of- 
ten acted as naval auxiliaries. 
The terms loyal i s t  and loyal i s t  privateer also require defini- 
tion. As to what constituted a loyalist, historians have offered vari- 
ous polarized opinions ranging from the very broad and all-encompass- 
ing to the narrower and more restrictive. Of course there is a myriad 
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of qualified levels in between. For the purpose of this study, a 
rather basic definition will suffice. A loyalist was any individual 
who was, by birth or residency, affiliated with the thirteen re- 
bellious colonies, and who, for whatever reason, supported the king 
during the revolution. 
It is possible to argue, however, on a certain qualified level, 
that the pro-British residents of East Florida, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, 
and the Bahamas, can also be considered loyalists. These were people 
who produced their own share of privateers, as well. In the case of 
East Florida and Nova Scotia, both were contiguous to colonies in a 
state of rebellion. Their close proximity at either end of the line of 
troublesome colonies, their shared social, cultural, and economic af- 
finities with those areas, and the fact that a considerable number of 
residents in both were directly involved in the war and active against 
their neighbors to the north and south, respectively, justifies view- 
ing the populaces as loyalist even though neither colony was in re- 
volt. strengthening this view is the fact that in Nova Scotia there 
was a faction, although relatively subdued in nature, sympathetic to 
the rebels. Furthermore, there are those who consider Nova Scotian 
privateers to be loyalist. At the same time, historically, because of 
the influx of refugees, East Florida is often considered a loyalist 
domain, regardless. 18 
With Bermuda and the Bahamas, again, there existed strong social 
and economic ties to the North American continent. In their case, how- 
ever, the association was not just with the mainland in general but 
specifically with the rebels themselves. Furthermore, though not in 
open rebellion, both colonies, especially Bermuda, suffered their own 
political and social unrest, relative to the situation on the main- 
land, with opposing factions identifying with and supporting the re- 
bels or the Crown. 19 
Due to the unique situation in these four colonies, their pro- 
British residents might be defined as peripheral loyalists. Regardless 
of classification, because the activities of these people were inte- 
gral to the development of loyalist privateering, they will be exam- 
ined in some depth. At the same time, however, these people were re- 
moved from mainstream loyalism, and so, the nature of their experience 
and reasons for their involvement were different. Consequently, this 
study will not profile them. 
Next, there is the question of what constituted a loyalist pri- 
vateer. A definition involving certain specific criteria is necessary 
so loyalist privateers can be distinguished as such from British and 
other colonial privateers and categorized accordingly. Logically, the 
nature of such a vessel is defined by affiliations. So, in a perfect 
world, the ideal definition for such would be any vessel which re- 
ceived its letter of marque, was registered, and was based in a Brit- 
ish-held port in one of the thirteen colonies, and whose owners, offi- 
cers, and crew emanated from the same. Unfortunately, this characteri- 
zation is unrealistic and limiting. The nature of the historical 
situation and the activity does not allow such a tight and tidy defi- 
nition. 
As noted, a large number of the loyalists in question were dis- 
possessed. Most of these refugees ultimately came to be associated 
with the port of New York, but a fair number based themselves in Ber- 
muda, and others worked out of East Florida, Nova Scotia, the Bahamas, 
the West Indies, and even Britain itself. Reflecting the dynamics of 
the activity, a fair number of vessels, owned and manned by true main- 
land loyalists, were fitted out, commissioned, and based in various 
far flung ports to cruise in yet other far removed areas. Also, loyal- 
ist activities constituted only a part of the whole of British priva- 
teering operations. In addition to loyalist craft, other British colo- 
nial privateers and purely British ones, as well, operated from the 
same bases and worked the same sea lanes. As a result, the activities 
of one group of privateers was sometimes closely intertwined with 
those of another. More significantly, the regional backgrounds of the 
personnel associated with any given privateer could be mixed. 
All this could result in a variety of interesting scenarios. For 
instance, some vessels owned in New York were sent to Antigua to be 
20 fitted out. Other New York craft went to St. Augustine for their com- 
2 1 
missions. Privateers fitted out, manned and commissioned in Britain 
were owned by loyalists residing there who sent them to the Western 
22 Hemisphere to cruise. An Irishman was captain and part owner of a 
privateer fitted out, manned, commissioned and otherwise owned in New 
~ork.'~ Yet another privateer, in all other ways associated with New 
York and loyalists, picked up a large part of her crew at a West In- 
24 dian island which served as her base of operations. Other vessels, 
2 5 commissioned in New York, were owned in London or the islands. Theo- 
retically, it was possible for a privateer to be owned by loyalist 
refugees in London, be commissioned in New York, have a Scottish cap- 
tain, and receive a large part of her crew while conducting extended 
operations in the West Indies. In essence, the affiliations of any 
given privateer could be varied and complex comprising elements of the 
entire North Atlantic world. As such, many vessels with solid loyalist 
ties, that would escape notice if the more stringent defining criteria 
were applied. 
For the reasons just outlined, a more realistic, less restric- 
tive definition is necessary. Vessels will be defined as loyalist if 
they meet any one of four criteria. In fact, these are the same crite- 
ria already discussed. They are simply applied separately rather than 
collectively. As to the first three, any vessel owned, commanded, OR 
in large part manned by individuals from the thirteen colonies in re- 
bellion, regardless of her port of registry, base of operations, and 
place commissioned will merit classification as loyalist. As control- 
ling factors, owners and captains, in particular, define the nature of 
vessels. A few vessels, though owned and commanded by British indi- 
viduals and fitted out and commissioned there as well, will neverthe- 
less be considered loyalist on the premise that significant portions 
of their crews were undoubtedly colonials. The vessels in question, 
despite their pedigree, spent lengthy periods associated with North 
American bases of operation. Consequently, it stands to reason that 
locals signed on as replacement and additional crew members in those 
ports, and as will be seen, there is evidence of this occurring. The 
fourth criteria is that any privateer for which the background of the 
owners, commander, or crew can not be established, but which is known 
to have received its commission and have been registered or based in a 
British held port in the thirteen colonies, East Florida, Nova Scotia, 
Bermuda, or the Bahamas, will be considered a loyalist vessel as well. 
Granted, this last criteria is not absolutely fool-proof. Still, with 
regard to New York, Newport, and later, Charlestown, Savannah, and the 
Penobscot, because the vast majority of privateers associated with 
these ports can be identified as loyalist, it stands to reason that in 
all probability, the occasional vessel failing to meet the other cri- 
teria was loyalist as well. In the case of East Florida, Nova Scotia, 
Bermuda, and the Bahamas, given the number of true loyalist priva- 
teersmen operating from those colonies, and the fact that confirmed 
vessels are known to have had personnel of mixed backgrounds, there is 
a very good chance the odd, unidentified vessel from those colonies 
had at least some loyalist association. Even if not, because the local 
privateersmen, themselves, can be viewed as loyalist in a sense, their 
vessels warrant the same classification. 
A final word is in order with regard to terminology. Throughout 
this study, the terms loyalist and rebel have been used to distinguish 
the opposing factions. These might be interpreted by the reader as 
positive and negative terms conveying a degree of bias. Loyalist is, 
in fact, a positive term used instead of Tory, which during the period 
was considered extremely derogative. While some might view rebel as a 
negative term, this is what they were in the eyes of at least many of 
their contemporaries. Furthermore, the argument can be made that 
Americans past and present revel in the term rebel and flaunt it like 
a badge of honor rather than a scarlet letter. Thus, in our usage, it 
is positive. At the same time, this study is intended to present the 
loyalist perspective, therefore, terminology they would have under- 
stood is used, and it is hoped that understanding is not confused with 
bias. To put this another way, had this work dealt with the revolu- 
tionaries' privateers, the same terminology would have been used. 
A few words are also in order on research methodology. The lack 
of historical attention this topic has received negated following a 
deductive approach. There was simply nothing on which to base any pre- 
conceived ideas to test and so focus investigation on a specific 
topic. At the same time, there was little indication of what informa- 
tion potential sources might offer. The problem was further compounded 
by the widely varied and scattered nature of the materials being 
sought. Consequently, research involved a purely inductive approach, 
as it logically must be when delving into the complete unknown, and a 
very large net was cast to ensnare all potentially relevant sources. 
With the aid of hindsight, the end justified the means. Because of the 
problems just outlined, a more focused research effort would have been 
extremely unrewarding in that relevant materials would have been 
missed. 
Initial research progressed along five parallel lines. One of 
these involved going through the biographical encyclopedias of loyal- 
ists compiled by Lorenzo Sabine and Gregory Palmer looking for infor- 
mation on individuals involved in privateering. References found there 
would then serve as a springboard for examining the Loyalist Claims 
Commission records of the British Public Records Office. While offer- 
ing some data, this effort was initially disappointing, because direct 
references were relatively few. At the same time, believing newspapers 
potentially offered a wealth of information, a survey was undertaken 
of the many extant loyalists editions, and some key rebel ones as 
well, with the intention of identifying participants and vessels. The 
newspapers provided a wealth of information allowing the creation of a 
data bank of individuals' and privateers' names to be investigated. 
Also, all the pertinent secondary literature on both loyalists and 
privateering was read for insights, background, and specific refer- 
ences. Simultaneously, work commenced with the collection of naval and 
maritime documents compiled by the Naval History Center, Naval Docu- 
ments of the Revolution. This proved an invaluable source in many 
ways. Finally, numerous archival guides were canvassed for all the ma- 
jor and many minor repositories throughout the United States, Canada, 
Great Britain and the West Indies with the intent of locating admi- 
ralty court records as well as other relevant collections of personal, 
official, and maritime papers. Combined, these five approaches ulti- 
mately supplied a considerable amount of information and clues on 
which to base further research. 
From this point, research consisted of cross-referencing between 
the sources already consulted and running down the leads they offered. 
For instance, the names acquired from the newspapers allowed a return 
to Sabine and Palmer enabling additional information to be obtained on 
many individuals, now identified as privateers, who would have other- 
wise gone unnoticed. In turn, armed with a lengthy list of confirmed 
privateersmen, an examination of the voluminous Loyalist Claims Com- 
missions records could be undertaken with the intent of locating even 
more information. In many cases, continued research was a matter of 
one source shedding light on the possible existence of another to be 
sought, resulting in a series of inter-twined chain reactions. Work 
followed numerous exploratory paths until they either started to turn 
inward on themselves and each other or came to a dead end. 
This comprehensive research approach was necessary to acquire 
the materials to complete the story as fully as possible. As is appar- 
ent from the compound nature of many of the notes, frequently, data 
needed to establish even the smallest of facts came from a variety of 
documents from widely scattered archival collections. For instance, 
the data required to confirm a specific vessel as a privateer, iden- 
tify her captain, and supply her technical specifics often required 
piecing together information from multiple sources such as several ar- 
ticles and advertisements in different newspapers, vice admiralty 
court records, and correspondence. The same was also true when con- 
firming that a Virginia captain, John Doe, was the same John Doe who 
later commanded a privateer out of New York when more direct links 
were not forthcoming. 
Perseverance in turning over every research stone led to some 
wonderful discoveries that might otherwise have been missed. For in- 
stance, brief references in a couple of secondary sources indicated a 
significant link between privateering and the New York Chamber of Com- 
merce. This led to a search for existing records from that organiza- 
tion, and two quite obscure, but extremely important volumes of 
printed primary material were ultimately uncovered. Another example 
concerns the Frederick Rhinelander Letter Book. Rhinelander had al- 
ready been confirmed as a major investor in privateers, so despite the 
fact the catalogue description of the volume said it contained corre- 
spondence relating to his import business, it was though best to exam- 
ine it anyway. While the letter book did contain materials pertaining 
to Rhinelander's trade activities, there was also a large number of 
letters pertaining to his privateers. 
The result of these efforts is that this study is based on a 
wide variety of source materials with those of a primary nature domi- 
nating. Included and encompassing loyalist, British, and rebel sources 
were newspapers, personal and official correspondence and journals, 
log, account, receipt, and minute books, diaries, proclamations, offi- 
cial acts of Parliament and Congress, petitions, records of sales, 
ships1 papers consisting of commissions, bonds, articles of agreement, 
crew rosters, bills of lading, invoices, registers, and clearances, 
and vice admiralty court records involving libels, affidavits, deposi- 
tions, monitions, answers and claims, replications, appeals, answers 
and decrees, and registers. All of these sources supplied data on both 
participants and activities. Still, despite the amount of material 
collected, gaps remain, resulting in sketchy treatment of some indi- 
viduals, issues, and events. Ultimately, the search for these docu- 
ments led to inquiries at over seventy archives, libraries, museums, 
and other repositories, and work was conducted at or material was ac- 
quired from thirty-three. 
While all of these materials supplied significant information, 
those supplying the most were the newspapers, the vice admiralty court 
records, correspondence, and the loyalist memorials. The Rosetta stone 
for this study was the series of lists prepared by Governor William 
Tryon of New York in 1778 and 1779, notating the principle information 
on many privateers such as technical data, name, captain, owners, and 
dates. These lists served as lynch pins establishing the connections 
between references in numerous other sources. It is impossible to de- 
termine how much correspondence was read in preparing this study. As 
to newspapers, every extant copy from the ten loyalist presses was 
read from cover to cover. In addition, every extant copy of nine major 
rebel papers from key ports were read as well. In total, over 2,500 
newspapers were examined. Over three-hundred loyalist memorials and 
their supporting paperwork were relied on. Finally, all the available 
materials relating to over 1,500 loyalist, Royal Navy, and rebel vice 
admiralty court cases were read in depth. 
The necessity of relying on multiple sources to establish even 
the simplest of facts combined with efforts to keep this lengthy study 
as short as possible, seriously affected much of the writing style. 
Simply put, the reader might find it wordy. This is the result of fre- 
quent efforts to compress data from several sources while conveying 
their specific meanings in an effort to save space. Doing this se- 
verely limited options for basic phrasing, sentence structure, and 
even word choice. 
Readers may balk at the number of names of individuals and ves- 
sels and other specific details presented throughout. They are cer- 
tainly not expected to remember them all. There are, however, several 
reasons for their inclusion. As stated, as an introductory study it is 
simply essential to establish who the participants and their vessels 
were, thus confirming their existence either as privateers or prizes. 
In turn, these identifications should help any future researchers who 
might chose to pursue the topic further. When the identifications are 
viewed in combination, their numbers will reflect levels of involve- 
ment and the significance of activities. Most significantly, however, 
because the primary intent of this work is to relate and analyze a se- 
ries of loyalist campaigns within the framework of a large regional 
scope, it is essential to establish who was where at what time and do- 
ing what to whom. The reader might feel that this type of data would 
have been better placed in a table, but to do so would negate being 
able show the movement and interaction through time and space of mul- 
tiple individuals and vessels which is essential to establishing the 
North Atlantic scope of the loyalist privateering. Tables would also 
have the effect of dehumanizing the events discussed. In addition, the 
data they would convey is too sketchy in many cases to correlate in a 
table format. Finally, the presentation of such details is in keeping 
with the current trends in naval and maritime history. For instance, 
in recent battle studies in which four, five and even six-hundred 
pages are devoted to events sometimes encompassing only a single day, 
the reader becomes acquainted with not only the senior commanders, but 
a host of company grade officers and numerous enlisted men as well. 
Their movements over the hours are traced with such precision that the 
reader becomes familiar with every field, wood lot, fence-line, farm 
lane, ditch, rivulet, and structure encountered during the action. Na- 
val and Military studies generally involve a large cast of players 
representing many levels of involvement. To ignore the lesser people 
and their experience would be to deny them their moment in history. 
This type of detail is what the readership has come to expect and de- 
mand. 
As indicated, prior to October, 1778, the scale of loyalist pri- 
vateering operations did not approach the level it did later. Yet, 
loyalist mariners, serving on tenders, letters of marque, and priva- 
teers, proved their value by aiding the war effort in a number of ca- 
pacities. Of course the most obvious way in which they helped was as 
commerce raiders. In that role, they caused considerable damage to the 
enemy merchant fleet, disrupting their commerce, and thus their econ- 
omy. In fact, in certain areas they were integral in bringing rebel 
trade to occasional standstills. Such activity deprived the rebels of 
much needed supplies, provisions, and materials, which, in turn, were 
often redistributed to beleaguered, needy regions of the empire. Loy- 
alist presence at sea also served to tie up rebel troops, ships and 
materials that could have been better used elsewhere, and forced the 
enemy to spend considerable time, effort, and money in efforts to sup- 
press them. Also, they assisted the Royal Navy, not only by taking 
some of the pressure off them and freeing them for other duties, but 
also by acting as auxiliaries and guides. Another important function 
loyalists performed involved acting as intelligence gatherers and car- 
rying dispatches. By combating rebel and French warships and priva- 
teers, loyalists did their part in the defense of British trade. They 
also showed they could and would fight. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PRIVATEERING: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
Although privateering dates from at least the thirteenth cen- 
tury, and was practiced in variant forms with regularity over the en- 
suing years, it was not until the late seventeenth century with the 
accumulation of colonial empires and the emergence of mercantile the- 
ory that the activity really began to develop as a major means of wag- 
ing war. From that time to the eve of the Revolution, privateering 
grew in popularity in the colonies to such a degree that it was £re- 
quently said there was a rage or fever for it. The increase in the 
number of privateers at New York during the eighteenth century illus- 
trates this. There, between 1703 and 1712, during The War of the Span- 
ish Succession, or Queen Anne's War, eighteen privateers were fitted 
1 
out. During the War of the Austrian Succession, or King George's War, 
2 thirty-three called New York their home port. During the Seven Years, 
or French and Indian War, at least eighty-three cruisers operated from 
New York, making it the privateering capitol of the North American 
colonies. Newport, Rhode Island, also emerged as a major privateering 
center and for the period of 1739-1744, more cruisers sailed out of 
4 that port than any other in the colonies. The activity was also under- 
taken with regularity in Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston, and 
during the last two Anglo-French conflicts the Chesapeake Bay area 
witnessed its own development of privateering. 5 
Privateering was popular because it was advantageous to all in- 
volved. For the government, privateers constituted an additional mari- 
time force acting as auxiliaries to over-extended naval resources in 
defense of trade. At the same time, the activity was without risk or 
cost to the Crown. Of course, merchants were equally happy to have ad- 
ditional security for their commerce. 
For owners and crews, there was the chance of making a profit. 
Still, while the prospect of making money was undoubtedly a key at- 
traction motivating individuals to engage in privateering, there were 
other reasons for becoming involved. Most importantly, given that a 
large part of eighteenth-century warfare focused on matters of trade, 
merchants and mariners frequently found themselves in the forefront of 
the conflict facing the threat of serious physical and financial loss. 
Thus, involved as they already were, in light of their background as 
merchants and mariners, they found privateering to be the perfect and 
logical venue by which to participate and express their patriotism. In 
so doing they acted in support of their country as well as in defense 
of their own trade. 
As to making a profit, for many merchants in time of war, priva- 
teering was not simply an opportunity to make additional money. It 
might be the only means. With trading vessels often confined to port 
because of blockade or fear of their loss to the enemy while negotiat- 
ing the sea lanes, commerce was often greatly reduced if not brought 
to a standstill. Privateering offered an alternative form of business 
opportunity that allowed one to keep some form of operation going. The 
activity also provided a means of keeping ships employed which other- 
wise would have sat idle, rotting at their moorings. Of course, ships 
b 
require crews which meant employment opportunities for excess officers 
and men whose only other options, service in the navy or inactivity, 
were far less attractive. 6 
Furthermore, the nature of the employment held its appeals. On a 
personal level, it allowed a greater sense of freedom and independence 
of action, a wider latitude of discretion, and perhaps, a somewhat 
less rigid and harsh lifestyle than would be found in service with the 
army or navy. A privateer's captain and crew were generally not under 
government orders, and even in those instances in which they were, it 
was usually voluntary. For the most part, a captain and crew were only 
responsible to the owners' directives, and could do pretty much as 
they pleased within the limits of the prescribed rules and regula- 
tions. 
The activity also served the good of the community by stimulat- 
ing a port's economy in two ways. Support businesses certainly re- 
ceived a boost, with victualers, ship chandlers, smiths, auctioneers, 
lawyers, and shipbuilders all acquiring income for their services. At 
the same time, the influx of prize goods and occasional specie cer- 
tainly brought economic benefits to the community in general. Prize 
foodstuffs could also help sustain a community whose normal trade was 
negatively affected by the war. Historian James Lydon has done an ad- 
mirable job of showing how privateering in the eighteenth century was 
a significant factor in the development of New York as a major port. 
Liverpool, England, was another port for which privateering generated 
great rewards prompting growth. 7 
With regard to economic growth in the broader terms of the em- 
pire, as historian Carl E. Swanson has effectively argued, priva- 
teering, as a method of waging war, dovetailed perfectly with the pre- 
dominant economic theory of the age, mercantilism. This further ac- 
counts for the activity's popularity with both populace and govern- 
ment. There were four basic tenets to mercantile theory, the first 
three of which were as follows. The controllable wealth in the world 
was finite, therefore it was necessary for a country to maintain a fa- 
vorable balance of trade, and the accumulation of precious metals was 
imperative. The idea was that a country should export more than it im- 
ported (so more money came in than went out), control as much of the 
world's finite wealth as possible, and amass all the gold, silver and 
specie it could. The belief was that a country which adhered to these 
principles could not help but enhance its economic status, and thus, 
its power, prestige, and position among European nations. 8 
Keeping in mind that the main purpose of privateering was to 
seize or destroy enemy shipping and so disrupt an opponent's commerce, 
the potential existed for the activity to be extremely beneficial in 
achieving mercantile goals. Privateering could assist in establishing 
or enhancing a favorable balance of trade, and greater control over 
more of the world's finite wealth could be achieved through the cap- 
ture or destruction of enemy vessels and cargoes. The possibility also 
existed that the contents of both private and national coffers would 
be increased with precious metals in one form or another. While priva- 
teering produced such positive results for a country, its effect on an 
opponent would be exactly the opposite. The bottom line is that priva- 
teering offered a means of enlarging a country's wealth while decreas- 
ing, and thus hurting, that of an opponent. 9 
The intents and goals of privateering place it in a rather 
unique light in the annals of warfare. The basic idea was to seize an 
opponent's property intact. On the theoretical level, at least, it was 
not meant to evoke bloodshed or destruction in the manner of armies 
and navies. As such, privateering might be viewed, oxymoronic as it 
may sound, as the most civilized form of warfare devised by western 
man. In reality, matters could get quite nasty. 
The fourth basic tenet of mercantile theory was that a govern- 
ment should do all it could to help advance its trade. Because priva- 
teering helped trade, governments, in terms of keeping with the tenet, 
promoted privateering. Although there was little incentive to go pri- 
vateering at the end of the seventeenth century, throughout the eight- 
eenth, the British government instigated a number of changes in the 
system. For instance, from 1708, court costs were cut and regulated, 
bonuses were instigated, customs duties on prize goods were reduced, 
the Crown waved its right to the Royal Droit, and to a degree, crews 
were exempt from impressment. At the same time, the rules of priva- 
teering were continually being refined. These changes served to in- 
crease government control over the activity while making it more lu- 
crative for the participants. As privateering became potentially more 
profitable, so it became more popular. James Lydon has done an admira- 
ble job of showing this progression in his study of the activity. 10 
In accordance with the original plan for this study, a detailed 
comparison was to be made between the numbers of rebel privateers, 
crewmen, losses, and prizes and those of their loyalist counterparts 
in an effort to better ascertain the relative strength and effective- 
ness of the latter. Unfortunately, after considerable effort, given 
the state of the secondary historical material on rebel privateering, 
attempting such correlations proved to be a true study in futility. 
Simply put, as will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs, there 
is little reliable information on these aspects of rebel privateering 
on which to base comparisons. There is considerable debate on the 
topic, and historical assertions as to rebel numbers are incredibly 
varied to the point of being irreconcilable. Furthermore, the figures 
given often reflect poor or insufficient research and faulty interpre- 
tation. Of course, this renders the proffered estimates suspect and 
so, valueless. Still some comments are warranted with the hope that at 
least a generalized comparison, in terms of basic scale, can be made 
later and loyalist activities can be seen in some degree of perspec- 
tive with regards to the levels of activity. 
With the commencement of hostilities in 1775, the rebels, lack- 
ing a naval force, made early preparations for a war at sea. In addi- 
tion to promoting state navies which were beginning to be organized by 
the end of the year, in keeping with the times, the rebels were also 
quick to realize the importance of employing privateers. On November 
1, 1775, Massachusetts authorized the issue of letters of marque on 
the state level, and New Hampshire followed suit in January, 1776. On 
March 23, 1776, the Continental Congress enacted legislation authoriz- 
ing the issue of commissions. With this system, Congress sent out 
signed, blank commissions to the various states which were authorized 
to issue them at that level. By May, Connecticut rebels began to pri- 
vateer. Marylanders started soon after in June, and the remaining 
colonies followed. l1 
As to the number of rebel privateers in operation during the 
12 
war, a commonly quoted figure is about 2,000 plus. This estimate, 
however is bracketed by a wide spread of other calculations. One be- 
13 lief is that there were as few as 792 rebel privateers. Another cal- 
1 4  culates there were between 1,500 and 2,000. A third speculates there 
15 
may have been as many as 3,000. Yet another offers the phenomenal 
16 figure of over 3,500. Finally, evidence has been presented that Mas- 
17 sachusetts alone issued 1,554 letters of marque. All of these fig- 
ures, however, reflect problems in calculation. 
Most are based on lists of commissions issued and bonds posted 
during the war. As such they reflect the number of commissions granted 
and the number of bonds given rather than the actual number of ships 
involved. With every change of ownership or command, and with the com- 
pletion of every cruise for a true letter of marque, a new commission 
was required. The result is that over the course of an eight year war, 
numerous vessels received two if not more commissions and are there- 
fore at least duplicated in the lists. At the same time, however, the 
lists are known to be incomplete. A list compiled by Charles Henry 
Lincoln in 1906 records 1,697 commissions issued, but there are no 
vessels included from North Carolina, and only one from South Carolina 
is mentioned. In the same compilation, only 626 are recorded for Mas- 
sachusetts, most of which date from August, 1780. The bottom line is 
that the various estimates are too low, too vague, or especially, too 
high. Even accepting an incredible output from rebel shipyards and the 
possibility that the vast majority of rebel vessels carried letters of 
marque, figures of 3,000 or more simply seem too great. 18 
As to the number of men who served on Continental privateers, 
again, the figures are irreconcilable with each other and the facts, 
and they are clearly way too high. The most commonly quoted estimate 
19 is that there were about 70,000 rebel privateersmen. Another calcula- 
tion is that there were over 58,400.~' Like the number of privateers, 
the number of associated personnel is tallied from the number of bonds 
21 and commissions. Consequently, just as the vessels themselves are 
counted more than once, so are the crews. Furthermore, there is the 
implication in these calculations that every rebel privateer that put 
to sea had its own specific crew completely different from any other 
vessel at any point in the war. In fact, vessels were not all in com- 
mission and at sea at the same time. They came and went, and at any 
given point in the war only a fraction of the total were active. So, 
many crew members on a vessel completing a cruise undoubtedly selected 
berths on another about to put out, making it likely that many priva- 
teersmen served on at least two different vessels in the course of any 
year. When this calculation is extrapolated for the period of the en- 
tire war, a professional rebel privateersmen undoubtedly served on a 
number of different craft during the conflict. Of course, the result 
is that not only do historical estimates reflect duplications, they 
show multiple representations for the same individual. 
Most writers agree that the Continental privateers aided the re- 
bel war effort. The degree of aid, however, is seriously debated. Some 
would have us believe that rebel privateers saved the cause and won 
22 the war single-handedly. Others argue they certainly did serious dam- 
23 age to the British merchant fleet and trade. Offering a worst case 
scenario are those who view the Continental privateers as only a major 
nuisance to the British, but still nuisance enough to force them to 
allocate considerable time, money, effort, manpower, and materials in 
efforts to suppress them. 24 
Of course the logical way to assess the effectiveness of rebel 
privateers would be to examine the number of prizes they took, but the 
existing estimates are again problematic. Some writers maintain as few 
as 600 prizes were taken by rebel cruisers, while others offer the po- 
larized figure of about 3,000.~~ A more focused regional study esti- 
mates they sent 2,106 prizes into the New England and middle colonies 
during the war, and another claims 1,200 seizures were made by Massa- 
26 chusetts privateers alone. Two separate groups of figures that are 
somewhat solid as far they go have been compiled from Lloyd's data. 
Again, however, there are discrepancies between them. According to one 
set complied by the secretary of Lloyd's for historian William Laird 
Clowes, a total of 3,087 British merchantmen and eighty-nine priva- 
teers were captured during the war. Of those, 879 merchantmen and 
fourteen privateers were recaptured, resulting in an actual loss of 
2,283 vessels. The second set of figures, based on the New Lloyd2 
List shows 3,386 vessels seized, with 495 recaptured and 507 ransomed 
-
for a total actual loss of 2,384. Unfortunately, the figures do not 
represent a true picture of rebel privateer activity. On the one hand, 
it seems likely that both tallies are incomplete. A t  the same time, 
however, although one writer asserts the tally of 3,087 represents 
prizes taken by rebel privateers alone, it actually includes prizes 
taken by the Continental and various state navies as well as the 
French, Spanish, and Dutch. For instance, in 1780, the Spanish Navy 
captured fifty-five British merchantmen out of a single convoy. 27 
Despite the fact that reliable figures are unavailable, several 
things are clear. A large number of rebel privateers and privateersmen 
were at sea during the war. Furthermore, they were fairly effective. 
As will be seen, they were certainly viewed as a serious threat by 
various elements within the empire, and though delayed, Britain's ul- 
timate response was to fight fire with fire with privateers of her 
own. Loyalist privateering was, to a degree, a product of the British 
reply, and the loyalist desire to become involved in the activity was, 
in part, to counter those rebels engaged in the same pursuit. The 
British authorities, however, were not as enthusiastic about the idea 
and far less quick than the rebels to recognize any advantages to em- 
ploying privateers of any kind, loyalist, British, or British colo- 
nial. When loyalist privateers were finally unleashed, the British re- 
versed their views and fostered the very situation they had initially 
tried to avoid, civil war at sea. Members of the same society would 
confront each other in the same sanctioned, organized form of conflict 
governed by the same basic rules, established and controlled by a cen- 
tral authority. 28 
With the commencement of hostilities in North America, the Royal 
Navy found itself facing a serious problem, a severe shortage of ves- 
sels. As late as September 29, 1775, after five months of conflict, 
there were only thirty vessels on the North American coast, inclusive 
of those in Canadian waters. Only ten of these were rated vessels, and 
most of these were of the sixth or smallest rate. The remaining major- 
ity were primarily sloops and schooners with sixteen guns or less. At 
that time, only fourteen additional warships were en route from Eng- 
land. 29 
As if the immediate naval demand for these vessels was not 
enough, Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves had begun receiving requests from 
the loyalists of various regions for naval vessels to protect them, 
their possessions, and their interests from rebel threats even before 
hostilities erupted. 30 To meet demands, Graves started hiring addi- 
31 tional local craft from colonists. The owners were most certainly 
loyal to the Crown, and with their efforts, the first step towards 
loyalist involvement in the war at sea was witnessed. Along the coast, 
a need for ships forced other colonial officials to follow precedent 
and not only employ loyalist vessels, but crews as well, creating ad 
hoc, stop-gap forces to supplement the weak naval presence. With such 
actions, a number of future loyalist privateersmen smelled their first 
powder of the conflict. It is to the participants that we must now 
turn. 
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CHAPTER 2 
'INFLUENCED BY MOTIVES OF LOYALTY, ZEALOUS FOR THE GOOD OF HIS 
MAJESTY'S SERVICE, AND ACTUATED BY THE ELDEST LAW OF NATURE, 
WE APPREHEND OURSELVES FULLY JUSTIFIED BY THE LAWS OF 
GOD AND MAN:" AN OVERVIEW OF LOYALIST 
BACKGROUNDS AND MOTIVATIONS' 
As stated, in accordance with trends in loyalist studies, a goal 
of this work is to establish identities, examine experiences, and then 
create profiles for loyalist privateers. In other words, an attempt 
will be made to determine who these people were and how and why they 
became what they did. Loyalist privateers generally comply with the 
historical image created for loyalists as a whole, but they also ad to 
it and occasionally challenge it. In addition, regional differences in 
their composition existed. Of course, demonstrating this requires re- 
viewing the established loyalist composite image to create a point of 
departure for making comparisons. In association, a general overview, 
outlining loyalist privateers' backgrounds, positions, and experi- 
ences, will be presented. These topics will be developed more fully in 
later chapters. At the same time, however, motivational elements will 
be discussed in depth at this point. Their all-encompassing applica- 
bility to all loyalists, regardless of region, makes it more appropri- 
ate and convenient to deal with this issue separately. In particular, 
the argument will be made that among loyalists in general and loyalist 
privateers, specifically, negative forms of opportunism and self- 
interest, especially with the intent to profit, were not factors 
prompting them to follow the courses they did, but public virtue was. 
Identity in loyalist studies is synonymous with background and 
is created by distinguishing a combination of characteristics. These 
include such things as social class, economic status, occupation, na- 
tionality, race, gender, age, religion, political stance, place of 
birth, and residence. Some loyalist studies, when read in isolation 
from others, convey the distinct impression that loyalism was a middle 
2 
and upper class phenomenon. The society was one of leaders without 
rank and file. In fairness, this impression generally seems to be un- 
intentional and is primarily due to the nature of the source materi- 
als, the vast majority of which were generated by middle and upper 
class people. When loyalist studies are read in association, however, 
the various conclusions in combination support William H. Nelson's as- 
sertion that loyalists were socially, economically, and culturally di- 
verse with participants reflecting a wide cross-section of identity 
defining  trait^.^ The social fabric of loyalism in general was a com- 
plex and varied weave. That of loyalist privateers, specifically, was 
no different. In terms of socio-economic background, privateers cov- 
ered the spectrum from well-to-do public officials, through rich mer- 
chants and sea captains, lawyers, doctors, teachers, middle class 
shopkeepers, artisans, common seamen, and farmers, to slaves. Regard- 
ing ethnicity and race, they were comprised of men of English, Scots, 
Irish, German, Dutch, French, Portuguese, and African extraction. 
Also, in this traditionally male activity, women were occasionally in- 
volved. As to place of birth, there were both native and foreign-born 
participants. As to residence, while some colonies produced more pri- 
4 vateersmen than others, all had men sailing for the king. In a broader 
regional sense, loyalism was more prevalent in urban coastal areas and 
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remote back country locales. Needless to say, back country residents 
did not dominate the ranks of privateers, but there was at least some 
involvement. On the other hand, logically, coastal urban areas were 
heavily represented. It was from such locales that the two social ele- 
ments absolutely essential for privateering, merchants and mariners, 
came. Again, quite logically, the fact that loyalists as a group were 
adverse to radical change marks them as politically, socially, and 
economically conservative. In light of the diversity evident in other 
loyalist traits, it seems safe to say that loyalism in general at- 
tracted people of all ages. Unfortunately, data is insufficient to as- 
certain if the ages of loyalist privateers conformed to the presumed 
norm. This leaves the issue of religion as an element of loyalism. A 
number of writers have attempted to establish a link between loyalist 
political stance and religious affiliation. In the end, they are 
forced to admit that any such ties that might have existed were tenu- 
ous at best. Others state no correlation can be detected at all. In 
any case, the issue is really moot given that information on the re- 
ligious affiliations of privateers is virtually non-existent. 7 
Analysis of these various identity factors has resulted in two 
additional general assertions about the nature of loyalism. First, not 
only was the character of the movement multi-faceted in any given 
area, it could vary from one locale to another.' This tendency is evi- 
dent as well between privateersmen from different areas. For example, 
as will be shown, while New England privateers tended to be native 
born, in southern locales, first generation immigrants were more in 
evidence. 
The second assertion is that loyalism was a movement of minori- 
9 ties. While privateersmen did not constitute a minority themselves, 
minority elements were certainly present in their midst. Most notewor- 
thy was the large number of blacks, both slave and free who served on 
loyalist vessels. In addition, European ethnic backgrounds were repre- 
sented by the occasional Portuguese and Frenchman in association with 
a somewhat greater number of individuals of German and Dutch heritage. 
Of course, women among privateers constituted a minority presence as 
well. 
Despite a wealth of diversity among loyalist privateers, two 
groups of men (not mutually exclusive), merchants and mariners, logi- 
cally dominated the activity, forming an essential core element around 
which all others gravitated. Between these two groups, all the ele- 
ments required for successful privateering were brought to the table. 
The merchants supplied both venture and fixed capital, as well as 
business savvy. Both groups clearly possessed a knowledge of maritime 
affairs, and the mariners had the expertise to translate that knowl- 
edge into physical action at sea. 
As to non-merchants associated with privateering and those lack- 
ing seafaring experience, the wealthier were generally involved as in- 
vestors. Those of more modest means serving aboard vessels signed ar- 
ticles as landsmen or acted in the capacity of marines. Necessary spe- 
cialists such as medical men and certain artisan types could trans- 
plant their practices to aboard ship. 
Because of their function, privateers usually put to sea with 
larger crews than were necessary to sail the vessel under normal cir- 
cumstances. Extra men were needed to help fight the vessel and provide 
crews for prizes. Many of the additional berths were filled with inex- 
perienced personnel rated as landsmen, marines, or boys. Five extant 
crew rosters offer complete breakdowns of the ratings on specific pri- 
vateers, allowing the ratio of skilled to unskilled men to be estab- 
lished. There were, of course, differences between vessels. One in 
particular, a barge, offered the seemingly disproportionate ratio of 
nine landsmen to six seamen. Given her nature, however, this might be 
expected. As a small craft propelled primarily with oars and intended 
for use close inshore, she would not have required a crew with the ex- 
perience to handle a larger, more complex, blue-water sailing vessel. 
As to the other four examples, two had crews in which the landsmen, 
marines, and boys made up about one-third of the compliment. On the 
remaining two, such crewmen represented only about one-quarter of the 
total. Regardless of their actual rating, these men and boys still 
constituted privateersmen, and as such, they warrant classification as 
mariners. Many who started their privateering careers at these lower 
levels undoubtedly advanced themselves with time and experience to the 
rating of seaman. It should be noted that none of the rosters examined 
designated between ordinary and able seamen. 10 
With acknowledgment of the merchants and mariners, the tradi- 
tional composite view of loyalists is altered, not by contradicting 
the picture already established, but by adding to it. The merchant 
class has often been a focus of loyalist studies, but such works fail 
to take note of the very active role these people played in privateer- 
ing. Consequently, with acknowledgment of their involvement, another 
facet is added to the view of loyalist participation in the war. 
Perhaps more important are the loyalist mariners, both officers 
and seamen, who have not been previously acknowledged to any signifi- 
cant degree and have remained unincorporated as an element in existing 
loyalist profiles. In fact, historians generally maintain that the 
vast majority of colonial mariners supported the rebels and compara- 
tively few sided with the British. This premise is based on several 
arguments. Because colonial seamen held a strong antipathy for the 
Royal Navy, and thus the British, due to the employment of press 
gangs, and then were often involved in prewar mob disturbances arising 
from the political issues of the day, some historians believe these 
mariners were politically involved in support of the revolutionaries 
and remained so when war broke out. 11 
While a large number of colonial seamen certainly did support 
the rebel movement, citing their disorderly conduct as evidence of 
their commitment is tenuous. By nature, Jack Tar was an adventurous 
rough and tumble sort of fellow. As such, it can be surmised that for 
many, participation in social disturbances was really only a matter of 
looking for and finding what they deemed fun while in port. Further- 
more, the existing historical view is based on the assumption that all 
mariners in a port were American. In fact, at any given time, a con- 
siderable number of local seamen would be away on a voyage, while a 
large number of seafarers from other areas of the empire were visit- 
ing. Also, participation in prewar incidents does not mean an indi- 
vidual was firmly ensconced with the rebels. As will be seen, a number 
of loyalist privateersmen actively supported the prewar opposition to 
Britain before ultimately deciding to remain loyal. 
Historian Richard B. Morris acknowledged Jack's tough, undisci- 
plined nature as a factor for his involvement in civil disturbances. 
He saw it, however, as only one part of the equation leading to par- 
ticipation rather than a reason in and of itself. This aspect of 
Jack's character surfaced when prompted by deep resentments against 
royal authority, and in turn, this tendency was recognized and ex- 
ploited by revolutionary leaders. 12 
Another argument presented to show that American mariners pre- 
dominantly sided with the rebels is the fact so few claims for losses 
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were filed by loyalist seamen after the war. In fact, there are very 
few claims of this nature, but on the other hand, there is no reason 
to expect an abundance of them. Life as a mariner was transient with 
minimal personal possessions limited to what would fit in a sea chest. 
In other words, there was not much to lose, and if a loss was in- 
curred, it was probably viewed as just part of the inherent risks of 
seafaring. In turn, preparing a claim for so minimal a loss was simply 
not worth the time or effort. Given the transient nature of the occu- 
pation, many were undoubtedly not in a position to file. Finally, it 
must be asked just how many common seamen possessed the educational 
background to prepare the written claim? Of the 145 men listed on 
seven articles of agreement which the individuals signed themselves, 
fifty-three, or over one-third, were unable to write so much as their 
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names. 
In any case, as the figures to be presented later will attest, a 
considerable number of American seamen were loyal to the Crown, and 
with the acknowledgment of their having been a large and significant 
part of the loyalist populace, the group's historical composite social 
image receives a new face, that of loyalist Jack Tar. Compounding this 
lack of acknowledgement of loyalist mariners, but adding to the inter- 
est of their makeup, is the fact that, as noted, a significant number 
were black. 
The loyalist experience is a subject regularly focused upon by 
historians. Collective analysis of experiences has allowed different 
types of loyalists to be discerned with regard to the nature and de- 
gree of involvement. On the one hand, there were those loyalists who 
were neutral or passive. These were people who deep in their hearts 
supported the King, but for whatever reason, made an effort to remain 
detached from events and factious parties and uphold a middle of the 
road, low-profile stance. 15 
On the other hand, there were active loyalists. These were peo- 
ple who openly made their stance known, vigorously supporting the 
British. Open support could take a variety of forms such as holding 
public office, performing civic and humanitarian duties, providing 
physical labor and logistical services, and of course, openly bearing 
arms in one capacity or another. 16 
In between these two extremes were equivocal loyalists; those 
who displayed a marked degree of undecidedness. Equivocal loyalists 
can, in turn, be divided into three basic groups. First, there were 
those who really had no political ideology and simply went in whatever 
direction the wind was blowing at the time. Such individuals could as 
easily be called equivocal rebels and do not concern us here. Next, 
and pertinent, were those people who initially may have been truly 
confused and undecided on a course of action, but ultimately made the 
decision to side with the British. The third type of equivocal loyal- 
ist, also pertinent, was certainly the most interesting. These were 
individuals who began the conflict in active support of the rebels and 
then, openly switched their allegiance to the British. This group can, 
in turn, be subdivided yet again into two groups. There were those who 
sincerely supported the rebel cause at first. Then, there were those 
who feigned rebel allegiance to avoid trouble until such a time when 
it was prudent to make their true beliefs known. 17 
As with most loyalist categorizations, these groupings were not 
always mutually exclusive. While a great many loyalist privateersmen 
were open and active in their support of the King from the beginning, 
others obviously were not. Instead, they made the progression from 
passive and equivocal to active, in which capacity, given the nature 
of their commitment as privateers, they remained. It was not, however, 
just privateering that ultimately defined these men as highly dedi- 
cated loyalists. A significant number performed other services that 
aided the war effort. As such many of these men were at the pinnacle 
of loyalist activity. 
Another aspect of the loyalist experience focused on by histori- 
ans is their treatment at the hands of the rebels. In the past, loyal- 
ists have been portrayed as victims who were roughly handled by their 
opponents. More recently, however, there has been a trend towards ar- 
guing that loyalists were not as oppressed and abused as was once 
maintained.'' Perhaps this was the case with loyalists in general, es- 
pecially when those of a passive or equivocal nature who avoided con- 
frontation are factored into the whole. Contrary to this, however, 
within the ranks of loyalist privateers as a group, there was a rela- 
tively high concentration of individuals who were severely ill-treated 
for their beliefs. Suffering took a variety of forms including loss of 
personal property, land, and business, imprisonment, exile, the dis- 
ruption of families, and blatant physical abuse. This degree of suf- 
fering in relation to the level of dedication and activity of these 
individuals reflects the fact that loyalist privateers experienced an 
elevated and intensified level of involvement. 
Why did people chose to remain or become loyal subjects? Motiva- 
tion is a profile element historians have spent considerable time and 
effort trying to isolate and identify. Just as loyalists reflected a 
variety of backgrounds, the stance they adopted was undoubtedly 
prompted by a variety of factors. Motivation, however, with its many 
facets is an extremely elusive element, because primarily, as histori- 
ans are forced to admit, loyalist statements accounting for their de- 
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cisions are truly rare. Problematic though this is, it should really 
not come as any great surprise. Why should people who sincerely be- 
lieved they did nothing wrong, and so felt no guilt, be expected as a 
matter of course to offer explanations for their innocent behavior? 
There was simply no reason for them to do so. In fact, the dearth of 
such accounts strongly supports that the vast number of loyalists 
maintained very clear consciences about their decisions and actions. 
Still, this is small consolation to anyone interested in establishing 
just what their motives were, and those who are so inclined must seek 
alternative means of doing so. 
Simple logic relative to basic human nature can be employed to 
determine a number of motivational factors. Others can be defined 
through the collective analysis of identities and experiences. With 
the latter approach, certain shared affinities common to large seg- 
ments of the loyalist community can be detected creating a degree of 
pattern upon which to isolate motivational elements. Of course, the 
results of such a method are nowhere near as conclusive and satisfying 
as if the participants themselves had succinctly outlined the reasons 
for their behavior. 
A number of valid reasons for being a loyalist have been sug- 
gested, and these are evident among loyalist privateers, as well. 
These can be divided into tangible or physical, ideological, and emo- 
tional. In turn, some of these can be subdivided further into posi- 
tive, or acceptable, and negative. Of course, as usual, these classi- 
fications are not mutually exclusive. 
As to positive tangible reasons, kinship ties were a deciding 
factor as were business associations, both within the colonies and 
with Britain. Also, many public officials naturally supported the 
Crown which they represented. Such personal bonds were logically per- 
suasive and difficult to break. Nationality and place of origin aided 
in many decisions. For instance, many of Scottish extraction cast 
their lot with the King, and many of them, as well as many of English 
extraction, were fairly recent first generation immigrants. Needless 
to say, such individuals had yet to acculturate, and were, in fact, 
still more British than colonial. Also, region was a factor as indi- 
cated by the concentration of loyalists along the coast and in the 
back country. The coastal areas were those with the most direct links 
to the mother country. The remote interior locales were those with the 
least ties, but perhaps needed and relied on them the most for their 
well being. A final physical reason was the immediate presence of 
British troops. With the army or navy close at hand, many loyalists 
felt more secure about openly declaring themselves with the belief 
they could and would receive support and protection. 20 
Next, there were the positive ideological reasons. Religion 
falls into this category, but as noted, no significant information on 
the religious affiliations of loyalist privateers has been forthcom- 
ing. Historians have shown that basic morality, however, was undoubt- 
edly an element in that resistance to established authority, espe- 
cially violent resistance, was considered unacceptable behavior by 
many. There is also the fact these people, as viewed by historians, 
were socially and politically conservative and as such, simply did not 
favor change. 21 
Most importantly, though some historians seem loath to accept 
it, or convey an inability to understand it if they do, ideologically, 
loyalists undoubtedly maintained a level of their own brand of public 
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virtue. They sincerely believed in the King and the existing politi- 
cal system and would act in support of it. While not constituting a 
direct explanation for their actions, virtually all post-war loyalist 
claims contain a statement of the petitioner's fidelity to King and 
country. While it could be argued that such declarations were simply 
politic and had to be made because of the position the memorialists 
found themselves in, their actions corroborated by the testimony of 
others support their sincerity. 
Then there were the emotional factors, both positive and nega- 
tive. Of course, closely tied to ideological belief in King and coun- 
try was someone's love of the same. Fear of guilt and shame as a re- 
sult of not doing one's part may have played a role as well. 
Other emotional factors emerged due to direct contact with the 
rebels. Rebel abuse of loyalists, suspected and real, resulted in 
feelings that were certainly involved in the decision making process. 
A scenario could play out as follows. A passive or equivocal loyalist 
would be the recipient of a personal affront from the rebels resulting 
in at least anger and sometimes the less than acceptable desire for 
revenge. Logically, smoldering loyalist sentiments were enflamed, the 
injured party disassociated himself from his abusers, and he declared 
for the king. Sometimes persecution was severe enough that an individ- 
ual was left with no choice but to throw in with the British. For 
open, avowed loyalists who had already taken an active stand, such 
ill-treatment certainly served to strengthen their resolve. Some his- 
torians, however, convey a subtle implication that the victims were 
overreacting and not justified in the degree of their response to the 
situation. 23 
That revenge was a motivating factor for some loyalist priva- 
teersmen is evident from the names of their vessels. Lists of New York 
privateers dating between the Fall of 1778 and the Summer of 1779 in- 
clude the Tory',s Revenqe, the Norf 01 k Revgnge, the Refuqee ' s Revenue, 
the Venqeance, and the Retaliation. In addition, there were three ves- 
sels simply called the Revenqe. 24 
Ill-treatment produced another emotion, simple fear. For the 
abused party, there was logically a dread he would eventually be the 
recipient of additional and even greater physical or material harm un- 
less he sought the protection and safety of the British. Fear was un- 
doubtedly a factor even for those who did not directly suffer abuse, 
After witnessing the sufferings of others, they must certainly have 
entertained the notion that the same could happen to them. So, they 
responded accordingly by also seeking British security. Fear was a 
factor in a broader sense as well. Accepting the inherent conservative 
nature of loyalists as a whole, there was undoubtedly a strong fear of 
general political, economic, and social change if not outright up- 
heaval. 25 
In the case of those equivocal loyalists who started the con- 
flict in sincere active support of the rebels another factor clearly 
played a role in their ultimately becoming loyalists. For some reason, 
they became disillusioned with the rebel cause, or that movement sim- 
ply evolved to a point or moved in a direction they could no longer 
accept in good conscience. So, they felt the need to disassociate 
themselves. Of all the loyalist documents read for this study, in only 
a very few do the writers offer succinct reasons for their behavior. 
Interestingly, in two of these instances, the reasons were identical, 
and there is evidence for a third in the same vein. After each party 
had supported the rebels, neither could accept the idea of independ- 
ence from Britain when affairs turned in that direction. Inability to 
accept a break from Britain is cited by some historians as a fairly 
common reason behind loyalist decisions. 26 
Regarding negative motivation, revenge has already been men- 
tioned. Historians have also viewed loyalists as opportunistic people 
prompted by self-interest. A number of studies, even sympathetic ones, 
convey the distinct impression that while many loyalists acted as they 
did for understandable, even acceptable reasons, those reasons were 
less noble than the lofty ideals motivating the rebels and certainly 
not sufficient to fully justify actions. The rebels were motivated by 
republican concepts essential to which was the idea of public virtue. 
A virtuous citizen was selfless, subordinating personal interests to 
meet civic obligations for the common good. In contrast, individuals 
acting in a self-interested manner were deemed corrupt and morally in- 
ferior. Also, while most studies pay lip service to the idea that some 
loyalists may actually have been sincerely devoted to the crown, the 
feeling is still conveyed that in light of their options, such a mis- 
guided stance is difficult to imagine. Consequently, there is often 
the implication, if not outright assertion, with an extremely negative 
spin, that loyalists took advantage of the situation, maintained self- 
serving agendas, and conducted themselves accordingly. Their associa- 
tion with what was considered a self-interested, corrupt government is 
seen to support this. By implication, loyalists were incapable of 
self-sacrifice and so, corrupt themselves. They lacked the "For King 
and Country" British equivalent of public virtue. While there is lit- 
tle doubt revenge was a motivational element for some, it is unlikely 
a negative form of self-interest prompted many loyalists to take the 
road they did. 27 
This historical outlook pertaining to self-interest is certainly 
problematic from a philosophical point of view. The line between self- 
interest and patriotism is often very thin, if it exists at all. An 
individual only supports a government because he or she believes in 
and identifies with it, and doing so serves a purpose, either spiritu- 
ally or materially. In other words, a government must first have some- 
thing worthwhile to offer that will support and enhance the people's 
well being and chosen lifestyle before those people validate it with 
their support. When a government ceases to give the people what they 
want, it is time to reassess, and when it is found that nothing more 
is forthcoming in support of the people's desired way of life, then, 
possibly, it is time for something new. Upon reflection, when push 
came to shove, loyalists decided they were basically content with 
British rule. Those who became rebels clearly were not. By definition, 
a revolution involves change. If an individual supports a revolution, 
it indicates a desire for change. Why? The answer is to create a 
situation in which one will be allowed to better one's self and lead 
an improved life. Thus, support of a revolution is certainly self- 
serving. Furthermore, pursuing such a course of action is usually done 
at the expense of others through violent imposition, which is cer- 
tainly indicative of severe unfeeling selfishness. The bottom line is 
there would not have been a revolution if people did not hope to gain 
something from it, and so, in conjunction, statements to the effect 
that loyalists suffered from self-interest hold little weight if for 
no other reason than the extreme double standard they reflect. 
Three maxims that always need to be kept in mind when dealing 
with loyalists is that they did not want the war, they did not start 
the war, and many were given little choice about their participation 
in the war. Loyalist involvement was merely a defensive response, and 
as such, in accordance with the prevailing eighteenth century views on 
civilized conflict, theirs was a truly just war, as much theirs as 
28 Britain's. Loyalist privateer George Leonard, quoted in the chapter 
title, was certainly of this opinion. His statement, "we apprehend 
ourselves fully justified by the laws of God and man," continued, "in 
making retaliations and reprisals.~~~ As a group, loyalists were a peo- 
ple who saw no need for drastic change. They did not want something 
more, better, or different. On the contrary they were basically con- 
tent with what they had and were attempting to maintain it. In other 
words, loyalist activity stemmed from the basic need of self-preser- 
vation created by circumstances brought about by others. A large part 
of self-preservation on this level involves support of a government 
that allows one to exist in the manner desired. To preserve yourself, 
you help preserve the power that protects and so insures the way of 
life you feel is best. The whole thing is a give and take symbiotic 
relationship. Consequently, self-preservation and survival should not 
be confused with opportunistic self-interest. Where is the problem in 
desiring to maintain the status quo? As matters stand, historically, 
the rebel's desire for change resulting in self-improvement is posi- 
tive and not indicative of self-interest, whereas the loyalist desire 
to maintain the status quo is negative and reflective of self-serving 
interests. This is really rather illogical. 
To examine this issue on another basic level, a maxim for in- 
spiring patriotism is the bottom line need to defend home and family. 
Defense of these entities is a fundamental element in defense of coun- 
try. Loyalists were certainly trying to do this. Everything they had 
worked for and possessed was suddenly threatened. In fact, many found 
themselves in a situation more dire. Having already lost heavily in 
terms of property, possessions, and business to the rebels, and with 
families sometimes split up, they were doing more than defending and 
maintaining. They were attempting to simply survive and regain what 
had been lost. 
Supporting the argument that a strong element of sincere self- 
lessness motivated loyalists is the simple fact that so many voluntar- 
ily put themselves in harmls way, actively bearing arms for the King. 
Historians estimate between 10,000 and 50,000 adult males served in 
the Provincial Corps and militia units at different times during the 
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war. They might have avoided involvement and let the British resolve 
matters for them. This is especially significant where first genera- 
tion immigrants of British origin are concerned, especially the more 
recent arrivals. They would seem the most logical candidates to simply 
pack up, disassociate themselves, and return home. Yet, a great many 
did not. Viewing the war as much theirs as Britain's, numerous loyal- 
ists did not shirk their duty, but rather elected to do their part and 
see matters brought to a favorable conclusion. Of the few men who of- 
fered their reasons for being active loyalists, George Leonard, who 
will be quoted at the end of the chapter, conveyed this sentiment. 31 
In addition, as will be seen, a number of loyalists had made 
their position clear before the commencement of hostilities, so they 
certainly were not acting on the belief that war would be beneficial 
to them. Also, there is the fact that a considerable number of the 
loyalists in question met with substantial abuse from the rebels from 
the beginning, indicating they maintained strong, well established 
views from early on. It is unlikely shifty, self-serving opportunists 
would leave themselves open to such ill-treatment by publicly expound- 
ing in favor of issues that obviously did not matter to them. Fur- 
thermore, the experience of rebel abuse must certainly have conveyed 
to many that open support of the British might not be easy or pleas- 
ant, even if they believed the British would quickly resolve matters 
in their favor. Finally, as will also be shown, a number of these men 
suffered what can only be defined as serious injustices at the hands 
of the British, the very people they supported. Yet, their allegiance 
did not waver despite such incidents. 
Opportunistic, self-interested behavior is often ascribed to 
three key elements of the loyalist community. First, black loyalists, 
in particular, slaves, are often viewed by historians in this light. 32 
Free blacks were, theoretically, in a position to make the same 
choices for the same reasons as whites. Slaves, however, acted in ac- 
cordance with a different set of circumstances. In fact, loyalist 
slaves can be further subdivided into two groups, those still in bond- 
age to loyalist masters and those who had run away from rebel owners. 
Regarding the former, their motivation, if it can be called that, was 
obvious. They acted in accordance with the dictates of their owners. 
Logically, at least some were not at all happy with their situation. 
Two slaves, each named Ned and owned by North Carolina loyalist John 
Hamilton, jumped ship from the privateer brig Britaniq in which Hamil- 
33 ton was part owner. 
As for runaways, escaping their situation as slaves with hopes 
of gaining the freedom held up as a reward by the British is the rea- 
son most often cited by historians for these blacks having become loy- 
alists. This was undoubtedly a very real and widespread motivating 
factor. Slaves prompted by this incentive, however, are generally 
viewed historically as being merely opportunistic. The reasons for 
their actions were distinct from and without regards to the broad, 
mainstream issues and the various traditional ties to Britain prompt- 
ing white loyalists. Runaway slaves simply took advantage of the situ- 
ation. While no historian can be accused of begrudging slaves their 
attempts at freedom, these views on motivation seem to cast a slight, 
negative pall, perhaps unintentionally, over the participation of 
black loyalists. Accordingly, relative to white participants, slave 
motivation becomes less pure. There is the unstated implication that 
their involvement lacked some degree of integrity, because for their 
own benefit, they opportunistically selected the side generally per- 
ceived as the enemy with whom they shared no affinity. This outlook 
has led to the refusal of at least one historian to accept blacks as 
true loyalists, and it has caused others to qualify and temper their 
classification. 34 
In reality, this is rather demeaning with the implication that 
slaves could not be politically aware and make their decisions accord- 
ingly. As Sylvia Frey has argued, the slave community was undoubtedly 
quite knowledgeable of events, issues, and their significance. The 
very fact slaves were aware that the British were offering freedom to 
runaways supports this. By running away and joining the loyalist 
ranks, tens of thousands of slaves made a conscious personal decision, 
exhibiting an awareness of the situation, to select a side and become 
35 active participants. They were electing to undergo sacrifices the 
same as, if not greater than, white loyalists. Under the circum- 
stances, the numerous slaves who served on privateers should be ac- 
corded full status as loyalists. 
Public officials constitute the second element of the loyalist 
community who are often viewed as self-interested. In essence, there 
are assertions that these men remained loyal to the crown because it 
was the crown who supplied them with a li~elihood.~~ On a certain 
level, there is undoubtedly a great deal of truth in this, but again, 
a very negative spin has been put on what was generally an innocent 
situation. The negative view of public officials, however, is quite 
weak in that it fails to acknowledge the fact that many of these men 
were public officials in the first place because they were civic 
minded, believing in what they did and the system they did it for. As 
such they naturally followed the already established line of heart and 
conscience rather then the lure of pay. Negative self-interest, with 
regards to officials, is not applicable as a motivation. Also, if for 
no other reason, this opinion is invalidated by the blanket manner in 
which it is seemingly applied to all public officials, which simply 
defies credibility. 
Nowhere is the sentiment that loyalists were opportunistic and 
self-serving more apparent than in the historical treatment of the 
merchant class. Historians regularly assert that negative self- 
interest was that group's primary motive for remaining loyal. More 
specifically, continued allegiance to the British would prove the most 
financially profitable course to steer. According to the historical 
interpretation, the merchants believed they would make a fortune in 
trade . 37 
Of course, this easily translates into their actions having been 
founded on the less than virtuous reason of simple greed. In turn, by 
republican standards, this means they were corrupt. There may have 
been some merchants who for some reason entertained such notions, just 
as some rebel merchants undoubtedly did the same. But, in general, the 
prevailing historical view is very difficult to accept if for no other 
reason than the vista is so all-encompassing. It is again problematic 
from a philosophical standpoint, as well, when examined in light of 
the known facts. As to general self-interest, to a degree, a certain 
element did exist among loyalist merchants, but it was definitely not 
negative. Instead, it manifested itself in a basic desire for simple 
self-preservation and survival rather than increased riches. The pos- 
sibility of financial gain was certainly not a serious factor, if it 
was a factor at all, prompting loyalist merchants to remain loyal. 
Among loyalists, merchants in particular were conservative indi- 
viduals, and as such, they were not seeking something new or more. 
They had been merchants previously, still were, and would be. Making 
money and being successful were key to their existence and happiness. 
The existing government and the trade situation it had established 
were essential in making the attainment of the merchants' goals possi- 
ble. For merchants, Britain was the fosterer, nurturer, and protector 
of the trade that constituted the basis of their existence. Rather 
than attempting financial gain, they were trying to avoid the finan- 
cial loss that disruption of government, society, and thus, trade 
would result in. Their inclination to support Britain merely reflected 
a desire to preserve that good existence they believed they had and 
maintain a status quo trade situation. Undeniably, this is a rather 
natural instinct for which it is difficult to condemn someone. E'ur- 
thermore, from the merchant's point of view of the empire, trade was 
the major element holding it together. Therefore, support of govern- 
ment for a continuance of the established trade situation was clearly 
for the common good.38 
If a loyalist were profit oriented, he could view the situation 
from two perspectives. First, he could think in terms of more immedi- 
ate, short term profits that might be gleaned as a direct result of 
the war. At the same time, he might view matters in the sense of long 
term profits. This would entail looking to the post-war future with a 
speculative eye to what the trade situation would be after the British 
successfully defeated the rebels. In essence, a merchant might hope 
not only for a secure market situation protected by British might, but 
an improved one as well. Neither of these views for loyalist motiva- 
tion, however, stand the test. Why? As will be seen shortly, no seri- 
ous, immediate market opportunities existed for loyalists. As to long 
term, there is nothing to suggest there was anything to speculate on, 
or that the postwar era would be any different from that preceding. In 
all likelihood it would have been business as usual following the war. 
Consequently, any eye to the long term future was undoubtedly for 
maintaining or returning to the status quo rather then toward the pos- 
sibility of even greater financial rewards. 
Furthermore, the facts of the matter belie that loyalist mer- 
chants, and by association, mariners, acted for opportunistic, profit 
oriented reasons. On the contrary, their responsive behavior relative 
to events which negatively affected them indicates a high level of 
public virtue. Although designed to control and suppress rebel trade, 
the Restraining and Prohibitory Acts severely restricted loyalist 
maritime commerce as well, making it difficult even for them to make 
any money. The first Restraining Act, affecting only the New England 
colonies, was passed on March 30, 1775. Individuals there could not 
export any domestically grown or manufactured enumerated commodities 
to anyplace in the empire. They could not re-export enumerated com- 
modities from other British domains to any place other than Britain 
and the West Indies. As to non-enumerated goods, domestic or imported 
from elsewhere with the intent to re-export, such could not be shipped 
to any point other than Britain, the West Indies, or Ireland. All im- 
ports to New England had to first pass through Britain. The only ex- 
ceptions to these rules concerned the import and export of provisions 
for the army and navy, and the import of raw materials and manufac- 
tures from the West Indies. In addition, all ships' paperwork had to 
be in complete order, and the region's fishing vessels were generally 
banned from operating in the North Atlantic. Failure to comply would 
result in stiff fines, loss of bond, and seizure of vessel and cargo. 39 
Almost two weeks later, on April 13, the second Restraining Act 
passed. Pertaining to the remaining colonies with the exception of New 
York, North Carolina, and Georgia, its mandates were virtually identi- 
cal to those of the first. The three exempted colonies were granted 
consideration on the grounds that they were still believed to be basi- 
cally loyal, and so, were salvageable. The two acts would go into ef- 
fect on July 1, and July 20, respectively. 4 0 
By May 25, Vice Admiral Samuel Graves, Commander-in-Chief of the 
4 1 Royal Navy in North America, had received copies of both acts. In the 
interim, he, too, had issued pertinent orders against colonial trade. 
He directed his captains to take possession of any unauthorized vessel 
carrying arms or provisions into the colonies. 4 2 
Of note is the fact that no exceptions were made for friends of 
government in any of these acts or orders. On the contrary, the nega- 
tive, limited trade situation established by them affected loyalists 
as well as rebels. As such, affairs were not conducive for loyalists 
to believe the atmosphere was ripe for turning major profits from 
trade during the war. 
In early July, additional directives were sent from London. All 
trade between the rebellious middle and southern colonies, including 
New York and North Carolina, would cease. More significantly, all New 
England vessels became subject to seizure with the notable exception 
of those belonging to friends of government. Considerate though this 
might initially sound, it could only have been a small consolation to 
New England and other loyalist merchants for whom the trade situation 
had actually just worsened. In essence, though New England loyalist 
merchants could keep their vessels, there was even less they and other 
loyalist merchants could do with them. Furthermore, all indications 
are the burden of proof as to one's loyalty would be exacting and fall 
upon the individual. Consequently, for any loyalist merchant choosing 
to pursue any remaining commerce options, operations would still be 
potentially risky when conducted under the watchful eye of a zealous 
Royal Navy which had authority to stop and search all vessels. 4 3 
On September 2, conditions worsened when yet another order was 
sent from London updating Graves' instructions. At this point, all 
vessels belonging to the twelve colonies already referred to (Georgia 
was still exempt) were to be seized unless it was apparent they were 
en route directly to or from Britain, Ireland, or the West Indies. In 
addition, the crews of colonial vessels could be impressed.44 
While the September 2 directives failed to take note of loyal- 
ists, they had, in fact been acknowledged two days earlier in a sepa- 
rate dispatch to Graves. By it, loyalist merchants were granted the 
opportunity to remove their wares and merchandise to the security of 
their vessels, and then, seek naval protection. At that point, they 
would be allowed "every Indulgence which the Law will allow." While 
this sounds favorable, the law no longer allowed for much. Between 
late March and early September, 1775, trade opportunities for loyalist 
merchants had gone from bad to worse, diminishing significantly. Of 
course, profits undoubtedly diminished accordingly. All this, however, 
was really only a prelude of what was to come. 45 
On December 20, 1775, a bill even more restrictive in nature, 
the Prohibitory Act, passed. Replacing the two Restraining Acts and 
going into effect in stages between January 1 and August 1, 1776, the 
Prohibitory Act declared that all vessels belonging to and all others 
trading with the thirteen colonies (Georgia was now considered in a 
state of rebellion as well) were to be seized. In effect, all colonial 
commerce was to come to a halt. No exceptions were made for loyalists. 
The only vessels exempt were those in government service or those pos- 
sessing government licenses to carry stores and provisions to the 
army, navy, and the civilian populaces of garrisoned areas. 4 6 
With the advent of this bill, any loyalist who, up to this 
point, might have entertained unrealistic hopes of taking advantage of 
the situation and turning a profit, must certainly have had those 
hopes squashed. For loyalist merchants, whether or not they suffered 
the usual wartime problems of blockade and enemy predators was of lit- 
tle consequence, because they still could not get their vessels to sea 
and trade freely in the manner they once had. 
In conjunction, it was difficult in any case, if not impossible, 
for loyalist merchants to export goods for other reasons. Many were or 
would be cut off from their sources of trade goods and materials be- 
cause production regions were in rebel hands. This was compounded by 
the fact many were dispossessed with the result that their business 
connections were severed. In essence, the situation was very disrup- 
tive to trade. 
Unable to export and with import opportunities severely limited, 
business was curtailed. For loyalist merchants, the situation allowed 
only two possible but unattractive options to circumvent restrictions. 
An individual could remove himself, his family, and his entire opera- 
tion to a point outside the thirteen colonies, reregister his ves- 
sel(~), and resume business in a new locale. Of course, this is assum- 
ing the individual in question still had something to relocate with 
and was willing to abandon his home. Furthermore, one historian has 
indicated efforts to relocate were problematic, not only because of a 
lack of capital, but also because of a lack of business connections in 
47 
new locales. While, as will be seen, some chose this route, the ma- 
jority of future privateers chose the alternative to remain in Amer- 
ica. For many, however, this still entailed a disrupting relocation to 
a British-held port and adapting to new, but very restricted market 
situations and business associations. For those remaining in British- 
held colonial ports within the thirteen colonies, all that could be 
done was to petition for a license and contract to carry necessary 
stores and provisions for the services and civilian population they 
protected. While this alternative would at least keep some vessels in 
service, keep some seamen employed, and provide some income (perhaps 
even a good one), such heavily controlled, limited, and rather menial 
employment, if it could be had at all, was hardly the sort of business 
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venture many of these men were used to. Yet many opted for this de- 
spite the unfavorable situation. The fact that so many did not give up 
and remained under the circumstances says a great deal about their 
sincerity of devotion and level of commitment. Of course for loyalist 
merchants remaining in rebel held areas, there were no options at all. 
Given that these trade restrictions began at an early date and 
rapidly increased, few, if any, loyalist merchants could have made 
their decision without a knowledge of them. Furthermore, the Prohibi- 
tory Act would remain in place, with only a couple of specific conces- 
sions being granted, throughout the period covered in this study. Con- 
sequently, it is impossible to imagine that any loyalist merchant, 
aware of the restrictions as anyone must certainly have been, would 
even consider that the war might prove a profitable opportunity. On 
the contrary, the situation was such that loyalists could not hope to 
make money. They could not hope to gain anything from the war. Those 
attempting to maintain the status quo could not even do that for the 
time being. In light of this, any loyalist who still might think he 
could turn a profit on the war and who acted for strictly self-serving 
opportunistic reasons, had to have been on the one hand, either very 
naive or stupid, or on the other, an extremely adventurous speculator. 
Any individual, however, who was solely profit minded and willing to 
gamble to such a degree, would have found the rebels just as attrac- 
tive if not more so. With them, there was the opportunity of new mar- 
kets and avoidance of the British trade restrictions. In fact, on a 
certain level it could be argued that the effects of the Acts were 
harder on loyalists than they were on the rebels. The latter were at 
least in a position to be free to ignore and defy the acts, whereas 
the loyalists were not. Yet, in spite of the negative effects of the 
Restraining and Prohibitory Acts, the men in question remained loyal. 
Ironically, these trade restrictions did have one positive effect. 01- 
timately, unable to conduct their normal business regimen, loyalist 
merchants and mariners were forced to seek alternative business oppor- 
tunities as a matter of survival, and for many, privateering fit the 
bill perfectly. As will be seen, however, the Prohibitory Act did lit- 
tle, initially, to promote that course of action either. 
The ill-effects of the trade acts did not stop with the mer- 
chants. They undoubtedly extended further to disrupt the associated 
occupations of others, especially mariners. Logically, a reduction in 
trade would result in a lack of employment opportunities for many mas- 
ters and seamen. Nevertheless, large numbers of these men remained 
loyal, supporting the idea that making money was not a serious factor 
in their decisions either. 
The Prohibitory Act impacted some loyalists' trading activities 
to an even greater degree. A number of loyal merchants and mariners 
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actually lost vessels to the Royal Navy because of it. Despite such 
injustices, these men remained loyal. This particular incurrence of 
losses instead of profits says a great amount about the sincerity of 
their stance. 
The reader need keep in mind that loyalist trade was negatively 
affected by factors other than British legislation. Loyalist merchants 
were also under the constraints of the Continental Association, the 
stipulations of which forbade the import and later, export, of goods 
in an effort to force Britain to redress grievances. Being caught in 
violation of the Articles could easily result in the loss of cargo and 
possibly vessel. As such, loyalist merchants, and mariners as well, 
were truly caught in the middle of a less than happy situation. 
As stated, most of what can be defined as loyalist motivation is 
founded on basic logic and an understanding of human nature, and as a 
result, conclusions are primarily speculative. Furthermore, as histo- 
rians will agree, for any given individual, when the decision was 
made, it was likely made for a variety of deeply personal and inter- 
50 twined reasons. Still, in light of loyalist response to influential 
events such as the trade acts, there is no reason to doubt the major- 
ity of merchants and mariners who turned privateer were sincere in 
their convictions and very active support of the Crown. In actuality, 
loyalists were really no different from the rebels. In their own way, 
they were just as virtuous. Of course, among the good, there was un- 
doubtedly, as always, an element of the bad and the ugly. 
Having outlined the basic attractions of privateering and, in 
general, discussed the factors prompting men to be loyalists in the 
first place, this study will now address the reasons these individuals 
became privateers. Before continuing, it need be noted that again, a 
general lack of relative source materials results in some speculative 
suggestion. For hundreds of owners and officers and thousands of sea- 
men, information pertaining to their background, war-time experience, 
or both is sadly lacking. Information that does exist is often sketchy 
and episodic at best. As for personal explanations about why men be- 
came privateers, they are almost as rare as those outlining why they 
were loyalists in the first place. There are, however, some infoma- 
tive accounts of their actions and pertinent commentary by peers and 
associates that reflect their mindset. 
What motivated a large portion of the loyalist community center- 
ing on the merchant and mariner classes to enter into privateering? 
There were undoubtedly a number of factors in combination prompting 
any individual's involvement. If it were accepted that the merchants, 
in general, were driven by greed, then there would be a simple answer. 
In the same manner that some historians believe opportunistic, profit 
oriented self-interest motivated loyalist merchants, other historians 
maintain the same incentives were the factors behind anyone becoming a 
51 privateer at any time. If this were the case, quite logically, loyal- 
ist merchants could be expected to pursue this course of action. Pri- 
vateering would offer yet another financial opportunity to cash in on 
the war and further enrich their coffers. This was not, however, the 
situation. A number of legitimate reasons motivated men to take up 
privateering, not the least of which was a high level of public vir- 
tue. 
While the possibility of making some money was undoubtedly a 
strong motivating factor for loyalists to privateer, it was generally 
so only in a qualified sense, free of negative implications. Further- 
more, money was certainly not the only reason to become involved. In 
the annals of privateering, loyalists were rather unique. Privateers- 
men at other times or places usually had the luxury of operating out 
of safe, secure, home ports, and were allowed a greater latitude in 
their decisions about whether or not to become privateersmen. Many 
loyalist privateers, however, were dispossessed, needy, and desperate. 
While men at other times and places resorted to privateering out of 
necessity, because their trade was adversely affected by war, those 
men still had the option of trying to pursue the normal regimen and 
attempt to trade. For loyalist merchants and mariners, because of the 
trade acts, even this narrow window of opportunity was shut. Hands 
were seriously tied. Privateering offered the only really viable op- 
tion for many to be able to maintain themselves and their families. 
So, financially speaking, the loyalists' desire to become involved 
with privateering was not a matter of making more money for money's 
sake. It was a matter of making some money to survive. This seems to 
have been the case with Roger and Robert Stewart, Virginia mechant/ 
mariners, who had lost heavily in terms of property and trade. With 
their last remaining vessel they took up privateering, and of her they 
said, "she cruised with various sucessn and "afforded to them a toler- 
able but precarious subsistance. n52 
For many others of lesser status, the need to acquire a means of 
support was particularly crucial. Thousands of refugees flocked to New 
York, creating a serious indigent problem. For many in need of income, 
serving on a letter of marque or a privateer, if not the only employ- 
ment opportunity, was certainly an attainable one. So, simply put, and 
not to detract from other, more noble motivating factors that acted in 
association, for many, privateering offered the prospect of an occupa- 
tion so they could subsist. To others, it handed up the opportunity to 
offer employment to those in need. George Leonard declared this was a 
major reason for his fitting out seven armed vessels. 53 
One thing can be said with absolute certainty about loyalist 
privateersmen. Given the initial opposition to the activity and the 
late date of its acceptance, few, if any, merchants or ships1 masters 
(those men essential to instigating operations) became loyalists just 
in order to go privateering. It was simply not a realistic option at 
the time the vast majority of these individuals made their decision. 
If nothing else, the trade restrictions imposed by the Prohibitory Act 
served to deter such ideas. According to the act's mandates, prize 
goods were considered no different than any other trade commodity. As 
such, loyalists of New York or Newport could not bring them into port 
without a license, and once there, they certainly could not export 
them. Of course, initially, this would have negatively affected the 
attraction of privateering for any profit-minded individual by reduc- 
ing potential yield. What was the point of going to all the time and 
trouble to privateer when it would be very difficult, if not impossi- 
ble, to realize a worthwhile return from your investment. Before any- 
one could privateer freely and effectively in the traditional manner, 
trade restrictions governing prize goods needed to be lifted, or a 
means of circumventing them needed to be found. Yet, despite these 
limiting factors, many still wanted to enter into privateering. 54 
Because some historians, and even some contemporaries, have 
viewed privateering as an opportunistic, self-serving, profit-minded 
activity that amounted to little more than legalized piracy and hurt 
war efforts by siphoning off men and materials needed for more crucial 
roles, it is considered tainted and distasteful in some circles. 55 
These views thus convey the implication that men associated with pri- 
vateering did not have the same level of public virtue as soldiers in 
the ranks facing selfless death without the prospect of compensatory 
reward. Such writers seem to forget that many a Continental soldier 
was induced into the army with promises of high bounties and rather 
substantial land grants while naval personnel on both sides were af- 
forded the opportunity of prize money in addition, at least theoreti- 
cally, to regular pay. While men signing articles on letters of marque 
received seamen's pay, those joining privateers did not. Their only 
prospect of financial recompense was if prizes were actually taken, 
and even then monetary reward was not a certainty. 
Most contemporaries did not maintain negative views of priva- 
teers. The vast number of accounts appearing in the newspapers indi- 
cates the public clamored for news of their activities and viewed the 
56 participants as heroic in stature. Furthermore, if there was a real 
problem at the time with the virtue of privateersmen, and the idea of 
their making money was distasteful, it must be asked why governments 
generally went so far to encourage and support the activity. In the 
mercantile world, deriving an income at the expense of one's enemies 
was exactly what governments wanted and privateers could do. Consider- 
ing that during the conflicts for empire during the eighteenth century 
increased control of trade and the enhancement of economic status were 
primary considerations for a country going to war, what greater serv- 
ice could there be than to wage it in a fashion that maintained an eye 
to this end? There was no stigma. Making money by appropriating an op- 
ponent's wealth was respectable and deemed every bit as important as 
seizing his territories and defeating his army and navy. In short, in 
accordance with the views of the period, privateering served what was 
perceived as the common good. Consequently, even if loyalist priva- 
teers acted for reasons of financial gain it was legitimate for them 
to do so in the eyes of the western world. George Leonard, when stat- 
ing in reference to privateering, "profit and honor are inseparably 
blended" clearly conveyed this belief .57 
While some historians view privateering distastefully, there is 
a popular perception that maintains an overly attractive, romantic im- 
age of the activity. The life of a privateersmen was glamorous, swash- 
buckling, and full of adventure with the added prospect of acquiring 
wealth. There was freedom from all the harsh and distasteful aspects 
of military and naval service.58 Even with this outlook, an air of 
self-interest is still implicit in that it conveys there was an un- 
willingness on the part of privateers to face the harsher rigors of 
war. 
In reality, privateering was a very serious undertaking, not to 
be taken lightly. The investment costs were considerable, the risks 
were high, and the chances of turning an exceedingly large profit, if 
any, were relatively slim. Concerning the profitability of privateer- 
ing in general, some historians maintain that in actuality only a very 
few individuals amassed any serious wealth from their involvement, and 
59 what returns others realized were not really worthwhile. Other histo- 
rians, however, assert that while most participants did not become 
rich, the chance to turn a tidy profit, justifying one's efforts, did 
exist, and a fair number realized what were at least worthwhile re- 
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wards for their time and trouble. Regardless, everything came down to 
chance. Involvement entailed a major gamble, and so a major decision. 
For investors, the possibility of losing a vessel at sea or backing an 
unsuccessful cruise were very real, both resulting in serious finan- 
cial loss which, for many loyalists, could be ill-afforded. Further- 
more, there were the physical risks for crewmen. Daily, at sea, a pri- 
vateersmen faced a variety of life threatening situations ranging from 
the constant hazards of seafaring to intermittent, vicious combat. He 
could end up just as dead or permanently maimed as a soldier shoulder- 
ing a musket in the ranks. Perhaps even worse, he might languish in a 
rebel prison such as the infamous Simsbury Mines. 
Privateering was well established by the time of the revolution, 
and the experienced merchants and mariners who chose to become in- 
volved knew what the score was. These men were not starry-eyed fortune 
hunters. Privateering required serious commitment and a willingness to 
risk the incurrence of serious loss, financial and physical. It was 
not for the faint hearted. In light of this, with anyone who pursued 
privateering, a motivation other than making money had to have been 
present. There had to be a desire to assist in the war effort which, 
in association with the risk factors, indicates a willingness to sac- 
rifice and thus, a serious level of public virtue. To look at this 
from a different angle, the fact that so many people on both sides be- 
came privateers supports the idea that if the activity was self- 
serving, then, a very large part of society did not hold with the con- 
cept of public virtue. If that was, in fact, the case, then there are 
certainly no grounds for attaching a stigma to privateering or the 
people associated with it. The entire argument becomes moot. 
As will be shown, that virtue played a large part in what these 
men did is confirmed by their other wartime activities. The lives of 
many were far from being solely devoted to privateering. A number 
served in a military capacity as well. Others acted as indispensable 
pilots and guides for the Royal navy. A fair number were quite in- 
volved in civic affairs both as office holders and humanitarians. 
More specifically related to the war at sea and privateering, 
the conduct of a number of these men and women supports the opinion 
that virtue was a key element in their behavior. Just as the negative 
factor of revenge is apparent in the names of vessels, so is patriot- 
ism evident. Again, drawing on the lists of privateers commissioned at 
New York between September, 1778 and July, 1779, one encounters refer- 
ences to the Prince of Wales, the Prince William, the Royal Charlotte, 
the Queen Charlotte, the =n&, the St. Andrew, the St. Patrick, 
the St. George, the British T s ,  the Loyal Sub_iect_, and of course, 
represented by two each, the Britannia and the King George. In addi- 
tion, no less than twenty-four other vessels were named after lesser 
political, military, naval, and royal personages such as the Germain, 
the Dunmore, the Sir Henry C l i m ,  the Lord Howe, and even the Prince 
of Hesse. 61 
--- 
George Leonard spent his fortune fitting out seven armed ves- 
sels, three transports, and some armed boats, and then, for the good 
of the cause, offered their services to the British for less than lu- 
crative convoy, transport, and guide duty. Later, when referring to 
the Associated Loyalists, while undoubtedly exaggerating somewhat, he 
62 declared none were motivated by profit. John Macklin, in addition to 
serving with the Royal Navy, spending time as a prisoner-of-war, and 
being wounded three times, commanded a commissioned vessel for Gover- 
nor Patrick Tonyn of East Florida, never receiving pay for his serv- 
i c e ~ . ~ ~  Another example is found with William Chambers prior to his be- 
coming a privateer captain. A trading venture of his to the Bahamas 
coincided with the Continental Navy's attack on the islands in 1776. 
Described as the only man willing to risk his life and ship to keep 
valuable and much needed gunpowder out of rebel hands, Chambers, at 
Governor Montfort Browne's request, immediately threw his cargo over- 
board to make room for the powder, chartered his vessel to Browne, and 
carried the munitions to St. Augustine. 64 
Virtue was particularly in evidence with female privateers. The 
New York loyalist press heralded the patriotic efforts of Ann Burgess, 
Isabella Burton, and Anne McAdam. Following the examples set by the 
Marchioness of Granby, Queen Charlotte, herself, and other English 
women, and acting as principal owners, these three ladies initiated a 
subscription for loyalist women to raise money to fit out the appro- 
priately named privateer sloop Royal Charlotte. Governor Tryon, also 
impressed with their commitment, commented on their actions in a dis- 
patch to Germain. 65 
Their activity certainly stirred the soul of at least one indi- 
vidual, Exul Virginiensis, prompting him to pen the following wonder- 
ful doggerel verse as a New Year's gift for their efforts. 
When female hearts beat high for virtuous Fame, 
And patriot passions glow with hallowed flame; 
Their good designs, who can refrain to paint? 
Tho' weak his colours, and his lines tho' faint. 
Hail! Lovely Fair! who grace that safe retreat, 
Where Britain's friends in cordial union meet: 
Whose well-taught minds, in just connection view, 
What's to your God, your King, and Country due: 
Since your sweet bosoms loyal ardours feel, 
And true concern disclose for publick-weal; 
Since you adopt our Royal Charlotte's plans, 
Who, to her sex, a bright example stands; 
Assured be, that ev'ry honest Man 
Will idolize THE FAIR AMERICAN; 
Brave loyal Tars, with Hearts of Oak, will vie, 
For you to fight, to conquer, live or die; 
By you inspir'd, they'll plead our common cause, 
With vengeful Thunder, 'gainst the Congress laws; 
Firm to sustain, and resolute to dare, 
The Friends of George, no Gauls or Yankies fear: 
With equal haste, the French and Rebels beat, 
As if they rush'd your lovely lips to meet. 
Soon as full arm'd, you bid your Privateer, 
Go, share the trophies of the rising year; 
Her martial crew, their vent'rous course, they urge; 
Thro' Neptune's plains, piratic Gangs to scourge; 
Our ancient foes, in naval combats, foil; 
Still, in your laps, to pour the golden spoil: 
Some Poet too, will tell each British Dame, 
That New-York Ladies emulate their Fame; 
On their loved Queen, still fix their faithful eyes, 
To catch her manners living as they rise; 
Your loyal compact, with due praise rehearse, 
And place your names, in some immortal verse. 
Thus, when Rebellion, to her native Hell, 
With Diaboliads, is confin'd to dwell; 
Your gallant Youths, will claim no higher Prize, 
Than New-York Nymphs, in chaste endearing ties: 
Then, should they deign, to bliss each am'rous boy -66 
Muse - Haste - A curtain o'er those scenes of Joy. 
Another loyalist whose conduct, though in part activated by re- 
venge, was also motivated by a high degree of selflessness was John 
Goodrich, Sr. At one point in the war, having already lost heavily to 
the rebels, he declared, "I am in the old Stile working for nothing 
and finding myself - but am determined to Persevere for my King b 
Country should I wreck a Second fortune."67 As commander of a priva- 
teer, rather than pursue rebel shipping, he spent the war offering his 
services, without pay, as a guide and consultant to the British on 
their various forays into the Chesapeake Bay. In fact, despite numer- 
ous historical assertions to the contrary, there is no evidence that 
as the captain of a contmissioned vessel, he ever actually seized a re- 
bel vessel. As to his conduct, in post-war testimonials, a British ad- 
miral, a commodore, a general, and a governor used such descriptive 
phrases as, "self disinterested conduct," "disinterested Patriotism," 
"zealous disinterested conductIW and "the most zealous & disinterested 
Conduct. 
Perhaps the most exemplary instances of the patriotic spirit of 
loyalist mariners occurred during similar incidents in July, 1778, and 
July, 1780. Each time, the presence of a threatening French fleet co- 
incided with crew shortages in the British fleet at New York. In the 
first instance, both officers and crews of transports and merchantmen 
in the harbor volunteered en masse to fill naval vacancies until the 
crisis had passed. Between 200 and 300 men answered the initial call, 
and ultimately 1,000 came forward. Others offered the services of 
their vessels. In the second situation, Vice Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot 
requested the New York Chamber of Commerce to help raise 400 to 500 
sailors for the Royal Navy. By the afternoon, the Chamber had already 
gathered 350 volunteers. Within twenty-four hours a total of 2,000 had 
made themselves available. Another example of loyalist aid to the navy 
was that of Samuel Pearce, owner of twenty privateers, who claimed he 
always loaned his crews whenever the navy needed them. 69 
Finally, as will be seen, the actions of some, specifically as 
privateersmen, support a virtuous motivation rather than a purely fi- 
nancial one. Often, loyalist privateers freely engaged rebel warships 
or privateers in serious actions. The significance of this is that if 
profit minded, they could have avoided such actions and chosen to 
search for safer, more vulnerable and lucrative merchantmen. That they 
opted instead to incur serious physical risk in a fight offering less 
reward says a great deal. Joseph Galloway certainly held up such con- 
duct as evidence of loyalist virtue. 70 
Another major reason for British and British colonial mechant/ 
mariners (other than those in the thirteen colonies) to back priva- 
teers was the belief that their employment would assist in the defense 
of trade. They deemed privateering a counter response to their rebel 
opponents involved in the same activity. For the true mainland loyal- 
ist, however, during the period covered by this study, this could only 
have been an indirect and general motivating force. Apart from their 
vessels in government carrying service, they really had no immediate 
commerce to protect. Still, the employment of loyalist privateers 
would be a factor in the defense of the empire's trade in general, and 
undoubtedly at least some loyalists were public spirited enough to 
view matters in this broader light. Joseph Galloway certainly per- 
ceived prospective loyalist privateers acting for this reason. 7 1 
It need be pointed out that some men occasionally entered into 
privateers for rather unique personal reasons. A sickly Collin 
Mackenzie signed articles on a St. Augustine privateer "for the Bene- 
fit of Sea-Air." His efforts were rather counter-productive, resulting 
in his being captured and imprisoned in Charlestown. 72 
Privateering was undoubtedly appealing, because it gave loyal- 
ists a unique venue in which to act. By engaging in it, they gained a 
sense of freedom of action with a high degree of control over their 
own destiny. Generally, divorced from direct association with and con- 
trol by the army and navy, they could attain a greater sense of iden- 
tity, personal involvement and self-worth through awareness of the 
significant role they knew they were playing in the war effort. Priva- 
teering allowed them an opportunity to fight, in their own way, what 
had become their war as well as Britain's. 
Many loyalists simply wanted to do their part to help, and pri- 
vateering was the chosen means by which to do it. Fed up with the re- 
bels, John Dunlop left North Carolina for England just so he could fit 
out a privateer, return to America, and harass his enemies. Both 
George Leonard and Joseph Galloway maintained there were numerous in- 
dividuals desirous of doing their part to aid the cause as privateers- 
7 3 
men. 
Privateering offered the best venue in which merchants and mari- 
ners could express their support of the crown for another logical rea- 
son. The various owners and captains were established, respectable men 
with unique, specialized backgrounds and experience. That they should 
join the army and stand in the line of battle with musket in hand is 
expecting too much. For them to have found a berth on a naval vessel 
equal to their abilities and status was impossible. As a result, pri- 
vateering afforded the only realistic avenue of involvement, and as 
men readily familiar with ships and the sea, what better way was 
there? For common seamen, as well, in light of their background, the 
activity was the logical choice. In fact, for merchants and seafaring 
men privateering was really just an extension of their peacetime occu- 
pation. 
George Leonard, privateer captain and owner, undoubtedly summed 
up many a loyalist privateersman's views when he wrote: 
The people under my direction are loyalists of this country who 
fled for protection to the British standard, unwilling to be idle 
spectators of a contest where their happiness depends on the suc- 
cess of British arms; we were also unwilling to enter as common 
seamen on board his Majesty's ships or as soldiers in the army, as 
most of us were by birth and education, gentlemen. 7 4 
As shown, there were a number of motivational elements that came 
into play when people made the decision to remain loyal and support 
the king. To summarize on the issue of negative opportunism and self- 
interest versus public virtue, loyalists simply were not prompted in 
their actions by the former. For the merchanthariner class in par- 
ticular, the state of trade and privateering during the first years of 
the war certainly negated profit oriented opportunistic self-interest 
being an element in their decision making process. Furthermore, their 
later actions attest to their sincere desire to play a part in the war 
effort and illustrate their high level of virtue. 
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CHAPTER 3 
"GENTLEMEN WELL DISPOSED TO HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT:" 
THE LOYALIST PRIVATEERS OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY REGION' 
The Chesapeake Bay region witnessed the most extensive and seri- 
ous active involvement of loyalist mariners during the first two years 
of the rebellion. There, a large number of individuals who would later 
be part of the privateering community as owners, captains, and common 
seamen rallied around Virginia Governor, John Murry, Lord Dunmore's 
standard, offering assistance to the royal cause. Primarily, the men 
whose identities are known were from Virginia, but a number from Mary- 
land became active as well. Largely urban and coastal and dominated by 
members of the merchant and mariner classes, there was also healthy 
leavening of individuals from other backgrounds in this group. Men of 
foreign birth were very much in evidence, as were ethnic and racial 
elements. Motivated by various factors, most displayed their pro- 
British stance at a fairly early date. Some, however, were decidedly 
neutral at first, and there is some evidence of equivocal behavior. 
Regardless, most suffered significantly in one way or another for 
maintaining pro-British sentiments and ultimately siding with them. 
As elsewhere along the North American coast, a weak Royal Navy 
presence existed in the Bay, and like other governors, Dunmore be- 
lieved a stronger naval showing would help maintain control of his 
colony and protect the persons and property of those who remained 
loyal. As early as May 1, 1775, Dunmore wrote both Vice Admiral Samuel 
2 Graves and General Thomas Gage requesting additional naval support. On 
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June 8, with control rapidly slipping from his grip, Dunmore, fearing 
for the safety of his family and himself, fled Williamsburg and sought 
sanctuary on H.M.S. Fowey at Yorktown. There, H.M. Sloop Otter and 
H.M.S. Mercury joined him and shortly after, British naval operations 
against the rebels began. A July 7th report indicates the Otter would 
cruise the coast in search of rebel provision vessels, and although 
Dunmore could have had no knowledge of it at the time, such activities 
3 
were about to be authorized in London. As of July 1, the navy was to 
establish a loose blockade with squadrons focusing on key points along 
4 the North American coast. On July 5, William Legge, Earl of Dartmouth 
and Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote Dunmore notifying the 
governor that Admiral Graves's instructions were 
to exert the most vigorous Efforts for suppressing the Rebellion 
now openly avowed & supported in that Country, & to seize and de- 
tain all Ships & Vessels belonging to the Inhabitants thereof, 
such only excepted as are the Property of persons who are friepds 
of Government, & have shewn an Attachment to the Constitution. 
These directives took the mandates of the Restraining Acts a step fur- 
ther in that all rebel vessels, whether trading or not, became subject 
to seizure. While loyalist vessels were not to be molested, these in- 
structions in no way should be interpreted to mean that they would be 
allowed to carry on trade. In addition, naval forces were to protect 
all loyal subjects and their property. 6 
In September, additional instructions were sent from London con- 
cerning naval operations and the roles the governors were to play in 
them, One directive empowered Royal Navy officers to demand provisions 
from colonists, offering a fair market price in return. If the offer 
7 
was refused, then, necessary items could be taken by force. Also, be- 
cause of fears that large rebel merchant bottoms would be converted 
into men-of-war, the navy was authorized to confiscate their masts and 
rudders or otherwise disable them.' Of more importance, however, was 
the circular directive sent to the governors reminding them that His 
Majesty's vessels were only to be used for purposes assigned by the 
9 Admiral, thus undercutting local authority and control. These orders, 
in combination with the Restraining Acts and those issued in July, 
were intended not only to create a blockade and bring to a stop all 
rebel maritime trade, but prevent the insurgents from acting offen- 
sively with warships of their own. 
Throughout the remainder of his campaign, Dunmore remained un- 
10 
easy about not having sufficient naval vessels for his goals. Only 
six spent any amount of time with the governor, and there were never 
more than four at any one point. Furthermore, these vessels were not 
only responsible for the Chesapeake region. They were required to 
cover the Delaware Bay and the North Carolina Outer Banks as well. The 
navy was stretched thin, and Dunmore had grounds for concern. To coun- 
teract this deficiency, he would increasingly rely on loyalist craft 
11 
and personnel to augment his force. Fortunately, there was consider- 
able local talent to draw upon. 
While naval plans were being formulated, on August 23, George I11 
issued His "Proclamation for Suppressing Rebellion and Sedition." This 
document would be of considerable importance for future privateersmen. 
Of significance were the following passages. 
To the end therefore that none of our subjects may neglect or vio- 
late their duty through ignorance thereof, or through any doubt of 
the protection which the law will afford to their loyalty and 
zeal, we have thought fit ... to issue this our Royal Proclamation, 
hereby declaring, that not only all our officers, civil and mili- 
tary, are obliged to exert their utmost endeavours to suppress 
such Rebellion, and bring the traitors to justice; but that all 
our subjects of this realm, and the dominions thereunto belonging, 
are bound by law to be aiding and assisting in the suppression of 
such Rebellion, ... and we do accordingly strictly charge and com- 
mand all our officers, as well civil as military, and all other 
our obedient and loyal subjects, to use their utmost endeavours to 
withstand and suppress such Rebellion [ . ] l2 
On July 15, Dunmore had shifted his base of operations to the 
Elizabeth River between Norfolk and Portsmouth, both towns being cen- 
13 ters of loyalist activity. There, he hired the first of a number of 
loyalist vessels, the William and then the Eilbeck (later the Dunmore) 
14 to augment his flotilla. By September, loyalists were beginning to 
join the governor seeking protection and offering support. Over the 
following months, numerous loyalists gathered under the royal banner 
that flew over what was fast becoming a floating town due to the accu- 
mulation of shipping which at times would total over one hundred ves- 
15 sels. A number of these individuals, representative of all social 
classes, would later be involved in privateering in one way or an- 
other. 
A large element of the Norfolk/Portsmouth merchant class sup- 
ported Dunmore. Included in this respectable and established group 
were Jonathan Eilbeck, Roger and Robert Stewart, William Calderhead, 
Hector MacAlister, Robert Gilmour, Hugh Miller, Thomas Farrar, John 
16 Begg, Neil Jamieson, and Robert Sheddon. Merchant George Blair from 
17 
nearby Smithfield offered his assistance as well. This was a tight 
18 group unified by common bonds. At least half were Scots. Ten were 
first generation colonists of whom none had arrived earlier than the 
last French war.lg Some still maintained strong family and business 
ties with Britain. Neil Jamieson, undoubtedly the wealthiest of the 
group, was factor for the Glasgow firm of Glassford, Gordon, & Monti- 
eth & Co., as well as being a junior partner. 20 Robert Sheddon was a 
partner in his brother's operation, John Sheddon & Co., also in Glas- 
2 1 gow. 
Within the immediate Norfolk/Portsmouth band there were also 
strong commercial, social, and family ties. Sheddon did business with 
22 Calderhead and MacAlister. Calderhead was part owner with Gilmour and 
23 Jamieson in a distillery. Jamieson and MacAlister had business ties. 24 
Sheddon, Jamieson, and the Stewarts, at least, lived in close proxim- 
25 ity to each other. Of course, Roger and Robert Stewart were broth- 
er~.'~ As will be seen, other significant business and family ties ex- 
isted as well with Robert Sheddon. 
Being relatively recent immigrants to the colonies, the majority 
of these men had not had time to acculturate. Their sentiments towards 
Britain undoubtedly remained strong. In fact, they were in many ways 
still more British than American. This, in association with the strong 
personal and business bonds between themselves and the mother country 
certainly helps explain, at least in part, their decisions to remain 
loyal. 27 
Jamieson was also well connected with important loyalist mer- 
chants elsewhere, who would be involved in privateering. Such included 
James Anderson and Nathaniel Coffin of Massachusetts, and Hugh and Al- 
exander Wallace of New yorkm2' 
Another link was that as merchants these men were closely asso- 
ciated with seafaring. Almost all were ship owners.29 A few still com- 
manded vessels. Roger and Robert Stewart described themselves as sail- 
30 ors and shipmasters who had advanced themselves. Hugh Miller was a 
31 sea captain as well as a merchant. Other Virginia skippers joining 
Dunmore were Willoughby Morgan and, from the Eastern Shore, William 
32 Picket who sailed for Sheddon. From Maryland came Captains Thomas 
Slater of Baltimore and Joseph ~ a ~ l a n d . ~ ~  In addition, though their 
colony of residence is unknown, there were Captains Charles McDonald, 
John Buchanan, and James Ridley. 34 
Joining Dunmore too were elements of Virginia's middle class 
such as shopowners John Lownds and John Carmont, and Royal Navy vet- 
eran turned shoemaker, John Muirhead. Carmont and Muirhead were also 
first generation colonists from scotland. 35 
Of those future privateersmen who joined Dunmore from the lowest 
of social classes, the slaves, the names of two, those belonging to 
Mary Rotherway and Roger and Robert Stewart, are not known. Rother- 
way's, however, gained his freedom from Dunmore. The Stewarts', along 
with six of their other slaves, had been raised from a boy specifi- 
36 cally to be a mariner. George Mills, only five years a slave in Vir- 
ginia from the Guinea coast, ran away and gained his freedom as well 
by joining the governor. Unfortunately, it is not known if he ever 
served on a privateer. In his brief postwar memorial, however, he 
stated that he spent the entire war at sea, without reference to naval 
service, making it quite possible he served aboard such a vessel. 37 
Of interest is the fact that some of these men were initially 
sympathetic to the rebel cause. Jamieson signed the non-importation 
agreement in 1770, and during the Tea Crisis, he even cooperated so 
far as to send back a shipment of that commodity consigned to him- 
self.38 In 1774, he, Sheddon, and Gilmour were members of the Norfolk 
39 Committee of Correspondence. Jamieson was later on the Norfolk Bor- 
ough Committee to enforce the Articles of the Continental Associa- 
40 tion. Sheddon signed the non-importation agreement as well in 1774 or 
1775. 
By late 1775, though unhappy with the situation in general, 
Jamieson displayed loyalist preferences and an attachment to Dunmore. 
He thought little of the rebels, and was so uneasy, he was prepared to 
pull up stakes and leave if need be. With his trade goods aboard ship, 
Jamieson slept with loaded arms and claimed he could depart within 
thirty minutes notice. Still, he had enough faith in the British put- 
ting down the rebellion that he went so far as to order a shipment of 
goods contrary to the association in mid-November. 42 
Jamieson's situation was interesting. As a man of great wealth 
capable of extending considerable credit, he was actively courted by 
the rebels as well as the British. Ultimately, however, Dunmore re- 
ceived the benefit of Jamieson's wealth. With loans totaling 530,000, 
Jamieson made it possible for the Governor to supply his fleet. He 
also worked surveying and appraising vessels taken into government 
service and contracting for shipments of supplies. 4 3 
Some, such as MacAlister, Blair, and Carmont joined Dunmore 
4 4 early, seemingly without hesitation, as active supporters. Both Blair 
and MacAlister were granted captain's commissions - Blair in the 
Queen's Loyal American Regiment and MacAlister in the Ethiopian Bat- 
4 5 4 6 talion. The latter also served as paymaster for Dunmore. Carmont and 
Begg fought with the British at Great Bridge in December. 4 7 
For joining the British, all for whom the information is avail- 
able, lost considerably in the way of real estate, debts owed, per- 
sonal property, business, and merchandise, and this, in turn, undoubt- 
48 edly solidified their loyal stance all the more. Although compara- 
tively minimal in amount, even runaway slave George Mills claimed a 
4 9  loss of £10, which for him was considerable. Having joined Dunmore, 
they continued to suffer at the hands of the rebels, which could only 
have strengthened their resolve. MacAlister and Sheddon lost vessels 
50 and cargoes for violating the association. Jamieson's and Sheddon's 
houses and other Portsmouth properties were burned. Begg, Carmont, 
Blair, and Muirhead were all captured by the rebels, and the last 
three were badly treated.52 Blair spent over twelve months in close 
confinement, often in irons, until making his escape. 53 Carmont , after 
being convicted of bearing arms against the colony and then refusing 
to help the rebels dig entrenchments, was tied with his arms around a 
tree in freezing weather. With the circulation cut off and severely 
frost bitten, he never regained the proper use of his hands. 54 
At the same time, the strength of their convictions did not 
waiver when they suffered reverses at the hands of the British. The 
Royal Navy seized a vessel in which Jamieson had invested." On 
Dunmore's orders, Calderhead scuttled three of the five vessels con- 
taining his wares and personal effects due to a lack of men to sail 
56 57 them. Sheddon lost two vessels and cargo in the same manner. As if 
Carmont had not suffered enough, while imprisoned, the vessel contain- 
ing all his merchandise was also lost or destroyed with Dunmore. 58 
Interestingly enough, there were those who joined the British 
despite what could be defined as ill-treatment at their hands. One of 
these was Thomas Slater, On a return voyage from Granados to Virginia, 
his brigantine, the Betsey, was. stopped by the Royal Navy and his crew 
pressed. His voyage effectively over, Slater, although ill-used by the 
navy, still offered his services to Dunmore. Then, after sitting idle 
a while, the Betsey herself was pressed into service as a tender under 
direct naval command. After fitting her out at his own expense for 
this new role, Slater stayed with his vessel in a subordinate capac- 
ity. 59 
As is to be expected with such established and respectable men, 
a number are known to have had families. Falling in this group were 
Muirhead, Eilbeck, Morgan, Wayland, Jamieson, Sheddon, and Calder- 
head.60 When Jamieson departed the colony, it was necessary to leave 
his wife, Fernelia, behind. As late as 1780, she was still in Vir- 
ginia. Although the sources are vague, Eilbeckls wife may have re- 
mained as well. 61 
Upon leaving Virginia, the vast majority of these men made their 
way to New ~ o r k . ~ ~  A few, such as Sheddon, Eilbeck, and Morgan, went to 
63 Bermuda. Roger Stewart returned to scotland. 64 
Most of these men, Calderhead, Gilmour, Sheddon, MacAlister, 
Farrar, Begg, Jamieson, Eilbeck, Miller, Blair, and Lownds would go on 
to invest in privateers.65 Picket, Muirhead (who would also serve again 
in the Royal Navy), Slater, Wayland, McDonald, Buchanan, and Ridley 
66 
would become captains. The Stewart brothers would also own a priva- 
67 teer with one of them acting as skipper. In addition to being a part 
owner, Morgan served in the capacity of a lesser officer aboard such 
vessels, and for a while, commanded his own vessel, either a privateer 
68 itself or a tender to one. Carmont appears to have acted as a common 
69 
seaman. As far as is known, those who came from the slave community 
acted as common seamen as well. 70 
Not all Virginia loyalists left with Dunmore. Some departed at 
an early date without any affiliation with the Governor. John Sheddon, 
brother of Robert, returned to Glasgow, Scotland, earlier when hos- 
tilities commenced.71 Another Scottish partner in the Sheddon firm was 
John Sym of Smithfield, Virginia, who, because of the political un- 
rest, returned to North Britain at an early date as well.72 Sym also 
acted as factor for his kinsman, Andrew Sym, another merchant who had 
spent time in Virginia, but had returned to Scotland at an earlier 
7 3 date. Andrew, with whom Sheddon also conducted business, would soon 
be heard from on the North American coast. 7 4 
There was also Emanuel Walker, another business associate of 
Jamieson's. Walker resided in Petersburg where, though principal fac- 
tor for the British firm of Spiers, Bowman, & Co., he had earned a 
reputation as a rigid supporter of the Continental Association. By 
early 1776, however, he had seemingly had enough and asked permission 
from the Committee of Safety to leave the colony. That body granted 
Walker's request on March 2, and he left for Philadelphia. Like so 
many others, after first going to Glasgow, too, he would make his way 
to New York and be involved in privateering as an owner. 75 
Typical of many Virginia loyalists, these men were Scottish im- 
migrant merchants linked by both family and business ties to each 
other and Britain. While John Sheddon and John Sym are not known to 
have been involved in privateering, they were part of the web, and 
their return home must have reinforced the ties to Britain of their 
relatives, Robert and Andrew, who did enter into the activity. 
Others who behaved themselves managed to maintain a neutral po- 
sition and remain until early 1777. A t  that time, however, being ac- 
cused of "seducing and corrupting the minds of the people ... and giving 
intelligence to the enemy," first generation British merchants who 
would not confirm their allegiance to the rebels were required by an 
Act of Assembly to depart within forty days after January 1, 1777.76 
Merchants William Sheddon of Tappahanock (kinsman of Robert), Daniel 
Fraser, a French and Indian War veteran, of Petersburg, and Henry 
Mitchell of Fredericksburg, all left and made their way to New York. 
Sheddon then went to Bermuda. Like so many in the exodus with Dunmore 
or earlier, not only were these men recent immigrants, they were all 
Scots as well. Also leaving for New York was immigrant merchant John 
Begg who had earlier served with Dunmore until captured. After three 
months imprisonment, the rebels released Begg on parole, but he later 
refused to take the oath. Like the earlier group, this party lost 
heavily in terms of money and property. 77 
Sheddon had run afoul of the rebels once already. Suspected of 
having supplied Dunmore with provisions, the Essex County Committee 
investigated his activities in November, 1775. Though acquitted, Shed- 
don's situation remained unpleasant, and one gets the impression the 
Act requiring him to leave came at a time when life in Virginia for 
men of his ilk was becoming unbearable. Prior to departure he was ex- 
posed "to the Resentment of the violent" and he often "experienced 
ill-usage and injurious Treatment. "78 
Of interest is the story of John Martin of Botetourt County. A 
prosperous landowner and veteran of Lord Dunmore's War against the In- 
dians in 1774, Martin managed to maintain a peaceful existence for the 
first year of the war despite his support of the King. In 1776, how- 
ever, the rebels "drafted" him for military service. Given his situa- 
tion in a "Rebellious part of the Country,'' he felt obliged to accept 
conscription and play along until an opportunity presented itself to 
join the British. Unfortunately, the British did not arrive as ex- 
pected and Martin spent many months serving in Georgia and South Caro- 
lina. Unable to return to Virginia and loath to actually fight with 
the rebels against the British, when the chance to desert arose, he 
took it. Getting aboard a ship for the West Indies, Martin made St. 
Lucia. There, after first sailing on a smuggler, he signed articles to 
serve on a privateer. 79 
One final Virginia loyalist must be mentioned, merchant and 
landowner Samuel Martin. Martin is of interest because though born in 
Virginia, he relocated to Whitehaven, Scotland, years before the war. 
There, he conducted business operations which included a large trade 
with his native colony, considerable shipping interests, and the man- 
agement of at least a large portion of the family's Virginia proper- 
ties totaling over 9,700 acres. Of course, he suffered heavy losses in 
these areas. Martin, a relative of Governor Josiah Martin of North 
Carolina, was important enough to have the ear of men such as John 
Montagu, Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty and William 
Knox, Under Secretary to Lord George Germain. Though absent from Vir- 
ginia during Dunmore's campaign, Martin was, nevertheless, somewhat 
involved. While on a trading voyage to that colony, one of his ves- 
sels, the Unicorn, was taken into ministerial service by the Gover- 
nor. 8 0 
Throughout the war, Virginia slaves continued to make their es- 
cape to the British lines. Many, such as James Dalkeith, Isaac Bailey, 
Benjamin Smith, Tom King, Maxwell Roy, Titus, James Jackson, Jack 
8 1 Robinson, and Southey served aboard loyalist privateers. Slaves in 
Maryland did the same. Four known to have served as crewmen were 
Isaac, owned by Alice Rous, and Daniel, Charles, and Abram, owned by 
William Bell. 82 
Maryland produced other privateers as well, some of whom have 
already been mentioned. Another whose trials were similar to John Mar- 
tin's was Robert Begnal of Georgetown. Although it is unclear if Beg- 
nal was an immigrant or second generation, he was of Irish extraction. 
Because he refused to take the rebel oath of allegiance he was as- 
sessed triple taxes for a period of three years; the rebels believing 
this would coerce him into line. When this plan failed, they con- 
scripted Begnal for a nine month term of service with the militia. At 
this juncture, the loyalist had two choices. He could submit to the 
rebels or escape. Even though he realized he would lose a great deal 
of his property by doing so, he opted to leave. He proceeded to load 
his family and what valuables he could on his "Schooner Flattn and 
sail for Portsmouth, Virginia. There, he made contact with the British 
under Benedict Arnold who promptly commandeered his vessel for govern- 
ment service. Begnal lost all. Following a stint in the Commissary De- 
partment at Charlestown, South Carolina, Begnal and his family arrived 
destitute in New York. There, in an effort to provide for them, he 
signed on a privateer. Shortly after, he was taken prisoner, forcing 
his wife and child to petition the British for relief to keep from 
starving. 83 
Daniel Chamier, originally from a well-to-do London family, was 
also a Maryland resident, having arrived in 1753. Described as honor- 
able, friendly, hospitable, and philanthropic, Chamier removed to New 
York where he became Auditor and Comptroller of Accounts for the army. 
He also invested in a privateer before dying in December, 1778.'~ 
James Anderson, a mariner from Fell's Point (Baltimore), was a 
very equivocal loyalist. Not only did he willingly take the rebel 
oath, he willingly joined their forces and was made a lieutenant on a 
111 
galley. Because his zealous conduct was viewed so favorably, he was 
ultimately given his own command. What happened next that precipitated 
a change in allegiance is unknown, but Anderson proceeded to sail his 
vessel to New York and deliver her to the British. When next heard 
from, he commanded a loyalist privateer. 85 
There were yet other men from the Bay area who, although they 
did not join Dunmore, would make their way to New York and pursue pri- 
vateering. Benedict Byrne was a mariner from either Virginia or Mary- 
land, who, before becoming a privateer captain, served in a provincial 
unit, was captured, escaped to New York, and there acted as a pilot. 8 6 
David Carcand of Calvert County, Maryland, was a planter, but he was 
also "Bred to Sea." His nautical experience allowed him to pursue his 
later role as sailing master on an armed vessel. 87 
Two other Maryland loyalists were merchants, Anthony Stewart and 
his father-in-law/partner James Dick. At the time the war started, 
Dick had already faced problems with the rebels for at least several 
years. In 1770, one of his vessels, the Good Intener, prevented from 
unloading in the colony, was forced to return with her cargo. Stewart 
is particularly noteworthy for having been the owner of the Pegqy 
Stewart carrying tea consigned to Annapolis in October 1774. For this, 
the mob confronted Stewart and forced him to sign a paper saying he 
was sorry for the offense and would, along with the Williams brothers 
who owned the tea, set fire to the vessel and its cargo. This he did, 
destroying a brigantine valued at £1,500. Apparently this was not pen- 
ance enough, for he was continually threatened and finally forced to 
flee in 1775. Both he and Dick would go to New York. Dick would become 
a privateer owner and Stewart would serve with the Associated Loyal- 
ists. 88 
Finally, there was no less a figure than Robert Alexander, law- 
yer, who was a delegate to the Continental Congress in 1775. Though 
against British taxation, he was also against "republican Government" 
and the use of violence. Opting for "Constitutional Correctionw as the 
solution to the problem with Britain, he withdrew from Congress when 
independence was declared. Forced to give up his law practice because 
he would not take the oath, he left Maryland in August, 1777, to join 
the British at Philadelphia and ultimately go to New York. There, he 
would serve on the Board of the Associated Loyalists. 89 
Like other Virginians and Marylanders, a number of these men are 
known to have lost considerably in terms of personal property, real 
estate, etc. Furthermore, families suffered. Begnal's situation has 
already been recounted. For Carcand, who left his family behind, 
losses resulted in their being in "Great Di~tress."~~ Stewart and Al- 
exander were also forced to leave their wives and numerous children. 92 
Although the merchant/mariner class was the dominant element, 
the Virginia and Maryland privateers exhibited a cross-section of re- 
gional society by including others of varied occupational, economic, 
and class background, ethnic elements, and racial minorities. A small 
degree of equivocalness and neutral behavior (acceptable and under- 
standable under the circumstances) was detectable, and a number of mo- 
tivational factors came into play when making the decision to become 
active loyalists. These included the tenuous security offered by a 
British presence at Norfolk. Also, these men were the recipients of a 
considerable amount of rebel abuse, which either provoked them to take 
the course they took or reinforced positions already taken. 
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CHAPTER 4 
"A SPIRITED, ACTIVE, INDUSTRIOUS FAMILY:" 
THE GOODRICHES OF VIRGINIA' 
During the summer and early fall of 1775, while Dunmore was at- 
tempting to buttress the royal presence, another important sequence of 
events was transpiring, the consequences of which rebel merchants and 
mariners would come to have cause to regret. Though perhaps an extreme 
example, as this complex yarn shakes out, the reader will get an idea 
of the trials suffered by at least one family during the revolution. 
The Goodriches began the war in support of the rebels, acting on their 
behalf. An error in judgement, however, and the consequent overreac- 
tion by the rebels to it (quite probably fueled by negative personal 
factors) resulted in serious persecution of the family. This had the 
affect of forcing them from the rebel camp and into the arms of the 
British where they would become extremely influential in shaping the 
course of the war at sea. The familyf transformation, however, was 
gradual due to compounding events and circumstances in which they 
found themselves caught in the middle. 
On June 14, 1775, Thomas Newton, Jr., burgess delegate for Nor- 
folk, Virginia, informed William Goodrich that Treasurer Robert Carter 
2 Nicholas wanted to discuss a business deal with him. William, (Billie) 
Goodrich, "a well made lusty Man, about 34 Years of Age [sic], about 5 
Feet 8 or 9 Inches high, stoop shouldered, smooth faced, full eyed, 
[who] sometimes looks redish about the Eyes, and generally wears short 
light or yellow coloured curly Hair," was the second son of John Good- 
3 
rich, Sr. and brother of John, Jr. (Johnie), Bartlet, and Bridger. By 
the eve of the revolution, this family, descended from ancestors who 
arrived in Virginia in the 1630s, was well established and successful 
4 
as both landowners and merchant mariners. The elder Goodrich's hold- 
ings were extensive. In Portsmouth alone, he owned three lots of land 
and eighteen structures (plus outbuildings) which included (some serv- 
ing dual functions) seven dwellings, six warehouses, one store, six 
artisan shops, and a wharf. In the countryside, he possessed six es- 
tates with considerable livestock and land totaling 1,915 acres. In 
Alexandria, he owned two lots with two more houses and another store. 
In addition, he had well over thirty adult slaves, at least eleven of 
whom were seamen. 5 
The family also owned twelve merchant vessels said to trade the 
world over, but especially in the West Indies. Probably inclusive of 
the twelve, they were concerned in a total of twenty-three merchant- 
men. As mariners they were acknowledged as perhaps the best the region 
had to offer. Four of the adult males were described as being fully 
acquainted with every inch of the Chesapeake Bay and its numerous 
tributaries. These four were also said to display a "genius" for ship 
design and construction. 6 
Furthermore, the Goodriches favored the rebel cause. As of May, 
1774, John, Sr. was a member of the joint Norfolk-Portsmouth Committee 
of Correspondence, and on at least one occasion, a Goodrich vessel 
7 
conveyed messages between committees. Goodrich also supported the Con- 
tinental Association and actively urged individuals such as Jonathan 
Ewing to sign the agreement as well. 8 
For the deal about to be proposed to William, the Goodriches 
seemed the perfect choice. They possessed every quality needed, in- 
cluding one final and very necessary ability. As mariners, they were 
involved in an activity so many of their calling participated in, 
smuggling. John, Sr. was actually known as a "famous Contraband Man," 
and because of this, as early as May 21, 1775, Richard Henry Lee sug- 
gested that he was the one for the job in question. 9 
Representing the family's company, William traveled to Williams- 
burg a day or two after receiving word from Newton, and there met with 
Nicholas. Virginia desperately needed gunpowder, and William, undoubt- 
edly due to his skills as a mariner and smuggler with considerable 
trade connections, was asked to take bills of exchange valued at 
£5,000 sterling, proceed to the West Indies, and purchase all he 
could. A letter outlining Billie's instructions indicated that a great 
deal of faith was placed in his abilities with "no doubt." Further- 
more, the directive said, -we must rely altogether for your endeavours 
for the best as it is impossible for me to say what is the [beslt 
method to take in the islands[; I] therefore leave it to you to trans- 
act this matter as you think [best] for the good of the voyage." In 
essence, William was given carte blanche to do whatever was necessary 
to obtain the gunpowder and make the transaction. Also included in the 
letter was a list of contacts, including a Mr. Isaac Van Dam, and the 
directive that William should make one of his brothers privy to the 
situation in case of accident and the need for someone else to take 
10 
over. 
William did not jump at the opportunity. He had doubts and was 
apprehensive. When told the powder was to be obtained at any price, he 
requested confirmation from the Assembly. He also questioned his per- 
sonal safety, asking whether or not his life would be in jeopardy by 
undertaking the voyage. Newton and Nicholas assured him it would not, 
but did admit the possibility of William losing his vessel. In light 
of the situation and William's experience, both the question and reply 
seem rather odd.'' 
So, a smuggler was hired to smuggle, and on July 14, 1775, Wil- 
liam Goodrich, in a sloop commanded by James Eastwood, set sail on a 
voyage that would permanently effect his life, his family's lives, and 
perhaps the lives of everyone else involved in maritime trade in North 
America and the islands. 12 
William's voyage was a relatively lengthy one, lasting until Oc- 
tober, because of the difficulty he had obtaining powder. His first 
stop was Antigua where he sold £500 or £550 worth of bills of exchange 
for cash. Next, he went to St. Eustatia where he sold another £2,000 
and deposited £500 in cash with Isaac Van Dam, one of the contacts 
designated in the instructions. Van Dam was to use it to pay for pow- 
der procured and shipped by a Mr. Bartrand at St. Pierre, Martinico. 
Van Dam would then hold it in readiness for a vessel to pick it up and 
carry it to Virginia. William then sailed to Martinico in an effort to 
locate more powder, but once there, finding none and believing he was 
watched by suspicious British officers, he left and, via other French 
islands, returned to St. Eustatia. There, he found that Bartrand had 
managed to get 1,800 pounds of powder and William also managed to buy 
750 pounds more from a French schooner. Finally, in the proverbial 
eleventh hour, "a small English Guinea Ship" arrived from which an- 
other 1,600 pounds was obtained. This brought the total to 4,150 
pounds of explosives. The transaction with the Guineaman is of further 
interest. 13 
Before continuing, however, it is necessary to backtrack a bit 
and discuss another related event. At some point, and indicative of 
the faith the Virginia rebels placed in the Goodriches' abilities, the 
Virginians contracted with John, Jr. for a second shipment of goods. 
This time, the family was to procure and run in a cargo of coarse lin- 
ens. For this venture, they were not advanced any funds. 1 4  
While William was searching for powder, Bartlet was also in the 
West Indies making transactions of his own. At Antigua, he had encoun- 
tered the Guineaman first, and aware of the powder she carried and his 
brother's search for the same, he offered to purchase it. This same 
vessel, however, also carried a small amount of British textiles, 
white lead, and linseed oil, and her Captain agreed to sell the powder 
only on the condition that Bartlet take the entire cargo, the textiles 
included. Of course, as British goods, these articles were proscribed 
from importation by the Articles of Association. Despite this, because 
of the need for powder and the difficulty in getting it, Bartlet 
agreed to the transaction. The Guineaman then sailed to St. Eustatia 
where the bargain was completed and for some reason, the cargo was 
briefly transferred to an intermediary vessel, the schooner Fanny, 
Robert Connoway, Master. Connoway, in turn, passed the powder to Wil- 
liam. It need be noted that Bartlet did not make the transaction with- 
out making a profit himself. Having paid between three shillings and 
three shillings, nine pence per pound for the powder, he charged Wil- 
liam four shillings, six pence per pound. Although it must have seemed 
of little consequence at the time, this deal would cause the family 
considerable problems. 15 
Meanwhile, in Virginia, in October, affairs began to warm with 
the British becoming increasingly aggressive in response to rebel 
military buildup. Early in the month, for their exploits, the Governor 
and his naval associates were being called "pirates and banditti" by 
16 the rebels. On October 12, Dunmore's troops began a series of suc- 
cessful forays up rivers into the surrounding countryside to relieve 
17 the rebels of stores of arms, ordnance, and munitions. Also, at some 
point in late September or early October, without any authority for 
taking such action, the Governor created an ad hoc Vice-Admiralty 
Court to deal with the prizes being brought in. Lacking a judge, five 
commissioners were appointed to oversee matters. As of October 5, at 
least two prizes had been condemned.'' 
While contemporary rebel and later historical accounts give the 
impression Dunmore's raiders, also styled "harpiesn and "sheep- 
stealersn by the revolutionaries, committed heinous depredations, all 
indications are that at this time and for months to come, forays 
ashore were conducted merely to seize war materials and a printing 
press, procure food and fuel for the growing number of people in 
Dunmore's floating town, bring off slaves, and rescue stranded loyal- 
ists. As late as February 26, 1776, naval officers were still directed 
to first offer payment for provisions from the populace. Property dam- 
age seems to have been minimal and confined to such things as the oc- 
casional outbuilding storing grain. There are no references to the 
theft or destruction of other forms of personal property, nor are 
there any accounts of physical abuse. 19 
The Governor was also aware of rebel smuggling activities and 
knew an attempt to run in gunpowder was afoot. Furthermore, he knew 
Billie was somehow involved in the later undertaking- In an effort to 
intercept the shipment, Dunmore had two prizes (condemned by the Admi- 
ralty Court but not sold) fitted out as tenders (small auxiliary craft 
taken into government service to act in consort with the naval ves- 
sels) to cruise for the powder vessel and other smugglers. 20 
On October 1, William sailed for the mainland with his cargo of 
powder, a small assortment of weapons, and a parcel of shot, for which 
he had spent £1,501.4.0, West Indian Currency (slightly over £850 
sterling). The remaining amount of money he entrusted to Van Dam to 
purchase additional powder, which he would store until William re- 
turned to pick it up. On October 9, Billie made Ocracoke on the North 
Carolina Outer Banks. He then proceeded up the sounds to the Pasquo- 
tank River where he safely off-loaded the powder and a large quantity 
of legal osnaburgs brought in on his own account. From there, William 
headed for Norfolk to see Newton, but before arriving, he was warned 
that Dunmore was looking for him and, in any case, Newton was not 
there. So, he went to the family home in Portsmouth only to be told 
the family had moved inland to one of their plantations. At the same 
time, William received a second tip that Dunmore was searching for 
him, because of his efforts to obtain powder for the rebels. So, off 
William went again to the next refuge where he spent a day or two with 
family before moving on to Williamsburg. According to William's own 
account, while en route to the capital, he happened to meet Newton to 
whom he gave a full account of the venture, and who, upon hearing 
about it, seemed satisfied with matters as he should have been at this 
point in the affair. William was then directed by Newton to continue 
on to Williamsburg to meet with Nicholas and present the same account 
to him. This was done with Nicholas also being satisfied with what he 
had been told. William then returned home to move his pregnant wife, 
"looking to layin in the corse of a month or solw to the care of a 
midwife. 21 
Despite his knowledge that an effort to smuggle powder was in 
progress and that William was involved, Dunmore seemingly had little, 
if any, solid, specific information upon which to act. He later 
claimed he knew of John, Sr.'s involvement, but James Parker later 
stated that Dunmore had refused to believe anything ill of the elder 
Goodrich, and so, he felt very deceived upon learning of his partici- 
pation in the scheme. This tends to indicate the Governor had been 
suspicious of Goodrich at some point and had confronted him, but Good- 
rich must have convinced him of his lack of personal involvement. Had 
Dunmore believed family members, other than William, were party to the 
undertaking, it seems likely he would have acted against them. Yet, 
John, Sr. and John, Jr. appear to have gone about their business with- 
out any personal interference. On October 15, however, the situation 
changed. On that date, while John, Sr. was on the coast keeping watch 
for his returning vessels to help facilitate their entry through the 
blockade, Dunmore intercepted the following letter written to Goodrich 
by his son-in-law and sometimes business associate, Robert Sheddon. 22 
Sir Johnie came up yesterday, and Set off about 2 
O'clock this Morning for Nansemond - T.Hs. Boat could not 
find the way in, and got safe up here - Johnie hired a 
Vessel, which would Sail this day - Morris would be in 
time to prevent any other Vessel, Returning except long 
Splice with Salt from Turks Island, which is much wanted - 
Johnie has placed several boats for to look out - I have 
not heard from Nansemond Since Billie went up, but no 
doubt the business is done - J. Webb set of to Secure the 
papers &c and to push the Sloop out - The F. must now be 
at Sea 10 or 11 Days - Bartlates Letters is not yet come 
to hand - The Sloop Sailed this day fortnight and has a 
considerable Value in Course Linens a Board which Billie 
seemed resolute to have Secured, I beg't him to get W. Cr 
to undertake it and not be seen himself in S- as it 
might be a Means of discovering what Course to Stear - 
Receive your shirt &c by Jupiter who goes to Conduct 
Greenock and Luckie - I wish you may be so luckie as to 
get a Sight of the F- to Secure her and the letters a 
Shore to dessapoint the many Malicious Enemys you have, 
who have made themselves bussie for your destruction - 
Every thing remains quite here at present, take care of 
yourself which is the only uneasiness we have now.- I am 
Sir 
Your Most Obedt. Servt 
Robert sheddonZ3 
Clearly indicating clandestine shipping operations and the Goodrichest 
involvement, this letter enraged Dunmore, who immediately had Sheddon 
and John, Jr. apprehended and brought before him where they met the 
full force of the governor ' s violent wrath. 24 Under interrogation, 
Sheddon somehow convinced Dunmore he had no involvement with or knowl- 
edge of the gunpowder. He declared his sole purpose in writing the 
letter was to warn family and friends of potential trouble in an ill- 
advised undertaking with the other cargoes, and so prevent their 
ruin.25 Releasing Sheddon, Dunmore turned his attention to John, Jr., 
clearly implicated by the letter, who must have confessed to even 
26 more, because he was clapped in irons in close confinement. In the 
course of the confrontation, either Sheddon or Johnie explained the 
abbreviated parts of the note. "T.Hs." was Thomas Hardwick, "F" re- 
ferred to the schooner Fanny, "W.Cr." was Willis Cooper (Wills Cow- 
per), and the "Sw pertained to ~ u f  
Before continuing, several comments need be made about Sheddon's 
very interesting missive. In the past, there has been, with good rea- 
son, some confusion about the number of vessels referred to and their 
28 
cargoes. While a number of craft are discussed, there are three ei- 
ther mentioned directly or alluded to that are of significance. First, 
there was William's sloop with a cargo of gunpowder and osnaburgs 
which had already made port on the Pasquotank ~iver." Then, there was 
a second sloop with a valuable lading of coarse linens which had also 
30 
made port near, if not at, Suffolk, Virginia. Her cargo undoubtedly 
consisted of the textiles the rebels had contracted for. These, valued 
at £840 and for which the family was owed £1,098, are known to have 
31 been landed and sold in October. Finally, there was the schooner 
Fanny carrying the enigmatic letters as well as an additional cargo of 
32 
osnaburgs. Like William's, these textiles seem to have been legal and 
brought in on Bartlet's personal account. Combined, the brothers' per- 
sonal cargoes consisted of 50,000 yards of osnaburgs valued at a very 
tidy sum between £3,125 and £3,750. 33 
Furthermore, some historians believe that the textiles referred 
to were the same as those purchased illegally by Bartlet from the 
34 Guineaman. Of course, this would constitute smuggling against the Ar- 
ticles of Association. In fact, not only is there no reference to the 
textiles bought by Bartlet, those actually discussed do not match up 
with the illicit textiles in either value or type. Their worth of only 
£297.17.10 is certainly not comparable with the considerable value of 
the osnaburgs and coarse linens known to have arrived.35 Furthermore, 
the illicit textiles consisted of "Checks Cotton Ginghams Striped hol- 
130 
land Jeans Scotch thread Printed Linens [and] Irish Linens" certainly 
not osnaburgs or the coarse linens consisting of dowlas, Russia sheet- 
ing, and linen, as well as more osnaburgs of German man~facture.~~ The
bottom line is that there is no indication the illegal cargo was smug- 
gled in at this time. As far as the rebels were concerned, all three 
textile cargoes that did arrive were legitimate. It was Dunmore who 
would have viewed the shipments as illegal and did. 
Another interesting feature of the note is that given the fact 
both sloops had already returned, and their cargoes were secure, the 
only concern was for the Fanny and the "letters" she carried from 
Bartlet. The exact nature of the "letters" will probably never be 
known, but it is evident the family did not want them falling into the 
wrong hands. There are, however, three possible interpretations as to 
the identity of these mysterious items. First, it is possible they 
were actual letters containing incriminating information the family 
wished to keep secret, but this does not seem likely. If necessary, 
such documents could easily be destroyed and the contents conveyed 
verbally at a later date without loss and with no one the wiser. Sec- 
ondly, the term "letters" could be a code word for smuggled goods, but 
this makes little sense in light of the fact that other smuggled goods 
are referred to directly as what they are in the same note. This 
leaves the third and most logical explanation. The letters were let- 
ters of credit. Such would certainly have been of value and something 
the family would not wish to destroy or have fall into the hands of 
their enemies. 
This leads to the question of the identity of the "many Mali- 
cious Enemys." Quite logically, the reference was to Dunmore, and ob- 
viously, he was a concern. He was certainly attempting to intercept 
the gunpowder and other goods shipped by the Goodriches, and his ef- 
forts clearly gave the family cause for worry. Sheddon was undoubtedly 
referring to Dunmore's possible interference when he stated he did not 
want William to go to Suffolk to personally handle the transaction 
with the coarse linens, because his presence "might be a Means of dis- 
covering what Course to Stear-." In essence, William's presence would 
tip off Dunmore as to the location of that cargo. Also, John, Sr. was 
on the coast in an effort to assist his incoming vessels from falling 
into Dunmore's grasp. 
Yet, there are agpects of the letter that strongly suggest 
Dunmore was not the only enemy. Primarily the letter was an update of 
information for John, Sr. on the state of affairs, but it also served 
as a warning. Keeping in mind that Goodrich, Sr. was already acting to 
keep his vessels from Dunmore, it is evident he was quite aware the 
Governor was intent on causing trouble and certainly did not have to 
be reminded of the fact. Furthermore, there is the wording of the let- 
ter. Despite the fact Sheddon's prose leaves a great deal to be de- 
sired, the phrase, "many Malicious Enemys you have, who have made 
themselves bussie for your destruction" clearly indicates a fair num- 
ber of people conspiring against Goodrich. Dunmore would constitute 
only a single enemy. Also, the use of the word "Malicious" is of note 
in that it conveys a personal element which would seem unlikely to ex- 
ist between John, Sr. and the Governor. Finally, the phrase, "your de- 
struction" conveys a sense of someone wanting to totally ruin the el- 
der Goodrich in some manner. 
At the time the letter was written, only two vessels remained 
unaccounted for at sea, and only one of those, the Fanny, was seem- 
ingly of serious consequence to the family. Still, while the loss to 
Dunmore of a single schooner and cargo, if not insured, and even the 
letters, would have constituted a financial setback, perhaps even a 
serious one, it would not have resulted in Goodrich's destruction, 
monetarily or otherwise. The very real possibility of occasionally 
losing a vessel under any circumstance was a risk every merchant mari- 
ner took and accepted. 
Furthermore, all the family members were accounted for, safe, 
and beyond the Governor's grasp at the time Sheddon wrote. So, Dunmore 
did not present a personal threat at that time. In fact, it is highly 
doubtful he had previously presented a personal threat at all to any- 
one but William, and even if he had apprehended Billie, it would not 
have resulted in John, Sr.'s destruction. The governor was far more 
concerned with intercepting the powder than with catching whoever 
brought it in. Of course, this does not negate the fact that anyone 
caught doing so was going to be in serious trouble. Still, Dunmore did 
not consider John, Sr. to be involved, and if it was John, Sr., him- 
self, who convinced him of this, the elder Goodrich knew the Governor 
was a threat only if he was found out by being caught. That the family 
members were able to go about their business unmolested shows Dunmore 
was certainly not acting like someone bent on John, Sr.'s destruction, 
and John, Sr. was not concerned as much with Dunmore as he was with 
simply getting his cargo in safely. That Dunmore did not act until af- 
ter intercepting Sheddon's letter adds considerable credence to this. 
Also, the fact John, Jr. was, seemingly, so easily apprehended sup- 
ports the idea that family members were little concerned about the 
governor targeting them personally. In essence, while John, Sr. was 
concerned about Dunmore in a general sense as a potential problem, 
Dunmore was not concerned about John, St. in a specific sense. The 
governor was a problem to the family only if they were caught. 
All this tends to suggest that John, Sr. had personal enemies in 
the rebel camp as well as political ones in the British. Someone in 
Goodrich's position as a wealthy merchant had undoubtedly had a few 
conflicts over the years with individuals in the course of simply con- 
ducting routine business. One we know of was no less a figure than 
Robert Carter 111 who on two occasions was so displeased with the 
Goodriches that he ceased conducting business with them altogether. 37 
One thing is certain. Someone informed on the family to Dunmore 
about the powder. William was certainly of this belief. The rebel 
leaders acknowledged the fact as well. An angry Edmund Pendleton im- 
plied the act was more than a slip of the tongue stating, "A villain 
has given Lord Dunmore information of it." Considering the obvious 
clandestine nature of the operation, whoever the culprit was, he must 
have been fairly highly placed in the revolutionary government. 38 
Accepting the Goodriches had personal enemies in the rebel camp, 
the question remains whether the informer conveyed his intelligence 
because the Goodriches, specifically, were involved, or simply because 
the news of the powder itself was significant. Of course, the answer 
will probably never be known. If the former, however, there is a clue 
to what the malefactors intended. They wanted John, Sr., personally, 
to be caught by Dunmore, hoping he would at least be imprisoned, if 
not executed, for treason. This would certainly entail his destruc- 
tion. Even if the informer and "Malicious Enemysn were unassociated, 
Dunmore's being aware of the family's involvement could be used to ad- 
vantage by the latter. It would be hoped John, Sr. would be caught, 
and that possibility may have been actively promoted. Unfortunately 
for any "Malicious Enemys," if this was part of their agenda, Dunmore 
must have initially let them down by refusing to believe John, Sr. was 
a party to the gunpowder scheme. 
Of primary concern to the family at this point were the letters. 
Of course, it is doubtful any rebel "Malicious Enemys" were aware of 
their existence, but someone was clearly looking for some means of de- 
stroying John, Sr. Sheddon, aware of the enemies' intentions, knew the 
letters offered the means of their doing so, and was duly anxious 
about their safe arrival. Of course, this line of thought would indi- 
cate there was something incriminating about the letters which the 
family wished to keep the rebels from finding out about. What? The 
most plausible explanation is, if they were letters of credit, which 
seems likely, they probably indicated Bartlet had conducted other 
business with the British in the islands. They might also indicate the 
family would be doing business with political undesirables in Vir- 
ginia. As such, their interception, in addition to resulting in a fi- 
nancial setback, could also result in John Sr.*s destruction. In es- 
sence, whatever incriminating evidence they contained could be used to 
ruin his reputation and make it impossible for him to conduct business 
within the existing political climate. At the same time, however, it 
need be noted that such letters could only point to family members 
having done business with British merchants or their intent to do so. 
Because they were not a commodity, bringing them in, in and of them- 
selves, could not be construed as going against the Association or be- 
ing illegal in any other manner. 
If the "Malicious Enemys" existed, which seems probable, they 
were in a good position to see their goal of John, Sr.'s destruction 
carried into effect. If matters worked out as they probably hoped, the 
Governor would handle affairs for them, and they could avoid getting 
their hands dirty. If this failed, they could continue their own ef- 
forts. The family may well have been caught between two groups of ene- 
mies. 
Because of the family's reputation as smugglers, historians have 
39 assumed that all their cargoes were illicit. There is no basis for 
such assumptions, and to this point, one thing is apparent. There is 
no evidence the Goodriches had done anything overtly wrong with re- 
gards to Virginia and the rebels. On the contrary, they had gone to a 
great deal of trouble and personal risk to honor their two contracts, 
and two of their vessels had imported an additional large quantity of 
legal osnaburgs which could only have been of use to the Virginians. 
Certainly, all seemed happy with the powder deal, and no one found 
fault with the contract for coarse linens. The worst they could have 
been accused of was conducting business with the enemy based on infor- 
mation gleaned from the letters. Even then, however, there is no in- 
dication of their actually smuggling anything and going against the 
Articles of Association. Furthermore, during William's and Bartlet's 
absence, John, Jr. went so far as to show his loyalty to the rebels by 
passing on intelligence and warning them of a possible attack by 
Dunmore on Williamsburg. 4 0 
The Goodriches were, however, in serious trouble, having given 
"mortal Offensen to Dunmore, who was "very violent", and who, having 
4 1 John, Jr. in his power, possessed considerable leverage. Hearing of 
his son's unhappy situation and undoubtedly concerned about his well 
being, John, Sr. contacted Dunmore professing "his Sincere repentance 
of what was past, and his earnest desire of returning to his duty."'* 
He also sought an audience which was arranged. At this meeting Dunmore 
made it clear that procuring the powder was a capital offense. Also, 
although there is no indication the topic arose at this time, it could 
hardly have escaped John, Sr.'s notice that a large part of his Ports- 
mouth holdings, including his house, warehouses, stores, shops, 
wharves, trade goods, and several vessels, were literally under Dun- 
more's guns. Threatened with an extreme loss of property in addition 
to the seemingly very real possibility of losing a son, Goodrich, un- 
der duress, fell under Dunmore's control. His only choices were to put 
on as good a face as possible, bow to the inevitable, attempt to 
soothe Dunmore, try to talk his way out, comply with the Governor's 
wishes, and hope for the best. In the manner of a true businessman, 
John, Sr. offered the simple explanation that the powder deal was just 
an opportunity for "a good freight." The whole affair was a business 
matter and nothing more. This obviously was not enough, because Good- 
rich then made a serious proposition to Dunmore. He would offer up 
William as a hostage while he, himself, sailed to the West Indies to 
procure the powder and any remaining money for the Governor. Dunmore 
agreed to this, and John, Sr. committed himself and his family to a 
very dangerous game of walking a narrow path between the proverbial 
rock and hard place. 43 
William was brought on board Dunmore's ship to join Johnie by 
October 31. At that time, the Governor applied pressure for more in- 
formation. Intimidated, Billie offered additional details about his 
voyage and dealings with Van Dam in a formal deposition. 44 
Armed with a pass from Dunmore, John, Sr. set off on in early 
November to South Quay on the Black Water River to get William's 
sloop, which had been moved there from the Pasquotank, and set sail 
for St. Eustatia. He made it no further than Ocracoke Inlet where he 
45  
was stopped by a tender in Dunmore's service. The tender's captain, a 
Mr. Jones, refused to acknowledge the pass on the grounds that Good- 
rich was known to the British to be an "old Rascal," and therefore, 
4 6 Dunmore would never have issued such a document. It had to be a for- 
gery. As a result, the British "Used him very Ill."" Soaking wet, and 
without food, drink, bedding, or a change of clothes, Goodrich was 
clapped in the hold of a vessel and kept there for a several days. 
Following this, he was sent in his own sloop, possibly in irons, to 
Norfolk. There, Dunmore, in exasperation, informed Jones of his error 
in performing his job too well, and a new scheme was f~rmulated.~~ 
According to the new plan devised by Dunmore and the Goodriches, 
William would be sent (seemingly under guard) on one of the naval ten- 
4 9 ders to obtain the powder and any remaining money. Once he had ob- 
tained the funds, he was to use them to purchase arms and additional 
powder for the British and then return any left over to Dunmore. 50 
John, Sr. and John, Jr. were paroled on the condition they report on 
51 board Dunmore's ship every ten days. William sailed, probably in the 
fourth week of November, and John, Sr. retired to his plantation on 
the Nansemond River. 52 
William's account of his seizure by Dunmore, his father's ef- 
forts to go to St. Eustatia, and his own subsequent selection for the 
task are of interest. While the basics of his story conform to other 
known facts, the specifics he offered initially appear questionable. 
In general, William recounted his being captured, John, Sr.'s attempts 
to get to the islands and his being detained by Jones, and as a re- 
sult, his (William's) being selected to make another effort. Beyond 
this, however, Billie recounts these events in a very different and 
somewhat strange light. He stated he was seized at 2:00 a.m. by a 
party of eight men and an officer at one of his father's plantations 
while en route back to St. Eustatia. He further stated that at that 
time he had yet to see his father since his return from the West In- 
dies and believed him to still be at the Capes. Then, William pro- 
fessed that when John, Sr. heard of his being taken, he picked up the 
directions concerning the transaction with Van Dam and, taking over 
the operation, sailed to St. Eustatia to complete the unfinished busi- 
ness. In the process, the elder Goodrich was captured by Jones. The 
paperwork seized at the same time showed William had left a consider- 
able amount of funds with Van Dam, and as a result, the younger Good- 
rich was ordered by Dunmore to retrieve the money and powder. 53 
As noted, these specifics do not fit the story as known, with 
the result it initially appears William's account, written later when 
a prisoner, was a fabrication perpetrated to get him off the hook. 
Yet, there are indications, in some cases in the specifics themselves, 
that William was telling the truth as he knew it. In essence, it seems 
William did not know about his father's dealings with Dunmore, the 
plan he would be held hostage, or his father's reasons for going to 
St. Eustatia. If this is accepted, then William's account makes per- 
fect sense. 
Even William's assertion that Dunmore did not find out about the 
remaining funds deposited with Van Dam until after John, Sr. was cap- 
tured at Ocracoke is believable. Of course, Dunmore knew, having heard 
it from John, Sr. who had probably received the information via Shed- 
don. William, however did not convey this fact in his deposition for 
the governor, and consequently, if William was in the dark about the 
whole affair, to his knowledge, this would have been the first time 
Dunmore had become aware of the fact. 54 
That William was seized at 2:00 a.m. at one of his father's 
plantations, a fair distance from Norfolk, supports the fact that he 
had not been made privy to the scheme. First of all, the unnecessary 
detail indicates the account, in itself, is true. Furthermore, accord- 
ing to Dunmore, John, Sr. was to insure William would be at a certain 
place at a certain time to be apprehended. This being the case, if 
William was aware of what was transpiring, it must be asked why a more 
convenient time and location were not selected? It must also be asked 
why William would make up such a yarn when undoubtedly, if he were 
aware of the true nature of the situation, the explanation of acting 
under duress with the threat of capital punishment, would have suf- 
f iced. 
This leads to the final argument in support of the fact William 
had no knowledge of what was going on. Having just spent a consider- 
able amount of effort avoiding capture by Dunmore, why would he sud- 
denly and willingly submit to imprisonment and the seemingly very real 
possibility of facing execution, even if directed to do so by his fa- 
ther? To reiterate, it really does appear William had no idea of the 
true nature of what was transpiring between his father and Dunmore. 
Furthermore, the situation exemplifies the fact that the family mem- 
bers did not always conspire and act in concert. 55 
While John, Sr. attempted to clear the Outer Banks for St. Eus- 
tatia, son-in-law Robert caught up on his business correspondence, 
which reflected exactly what he had come to think of the Articles of 
Association and where he stood politically. On November, 9, he penned 
a missive to his brother, John, in Glasgow, Scotland, patting himself 
on the back for what he felt was the important assistance he had ren- 
dered Goodrich in the matter with Dunmore and stating he was in good 
standing with the rebels. Next, Sheddon clearly indicated his prefer- 
ence for the Crown. Then, citing the profits made on the 50,000 yards 
of osnaburgs brought in on William's sloop and the schooner Fanny, he 
openly defied the non-importation agreement by advising his brother to 
invest as much as possible in a large cargo of "every Necessary Arti- 
cle - None of your Luxuryw and send it out to Virginia where there 
were great demands and profits to be made. The intention was that an- 
other business associate in Glasgow, former Virginian Andrew Sym, also 
be a partner in the venture. In a second letter to John dated the next 
day, Robert again indicated there was a fortune to be made and sug- 
gested John Goodrich, Sr. might be brought in on the deal as an inves- 
tor. It should be noted that there is no indication the matter had 
been discussed with Goodrich. On the contrary, all evidence suggests 
that Sheddon's father-in-law had no knowledge of the scheme. He was 
only suggested as a possible alternative partner as an afterthought. 
Goodrich was not referred to in this regard in the first letter, and 
given the fact that at the time both were penned he was attempting to 
sail to St. Eustatia, there was no opportunity for Sheddon to have 
discussed the matter with him between November 9 and 10. The letter 
does, however, indicate Sheddon's awareness of his father-in-law's 
past and propensity for smuggling. 56 
For a man so involved in smuggling, Sheddon seems to have had 
considerable problems when it came to successfully sending incriminat- 
ing mail. These letters were intercepted as well. This time it was by 
the rebels. 57 
By late October, the situation in Virginia was intensifying. On 
the 27th, the British made a brisk but unsuccessful attack on Hampton 
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resulting in the loss of the Hawk, tender. In November, Virginia 
troops began to move against Dunmore, and in an effort to hinder them, 
several tenders cruised up the James River with H.M. Sloop King Fisher 
to destroy the ferries at Jamestown Island and Burwell's Landing. 59 
Others sailed to take up station at strategic points to enforce the 
blockade, "seising all that pass.n60 As of November 5 ,  a tender at Oc- 
racoke had taken two prizes loaded with salt. 61 
On November 15, Dunmore used the occasion of his victory at 
Kemp's Landing as reason to issue a proclamation written on the 7th 
and held in readiness for the appropriate moment. This declared mar- 
tial law and required all loyal subjects capable of bearing arms to 
rally to him. Furthermore, "all indented Servants, Negroes or others, 
(appertaining to Rebels,)" that could and would shoulder a musket 
would be freed if they offered their service to the King. With this 
proclamation, Dunmore drew his line in the sand forcing the populace 
to decide their loyalties. 62 
By late November, "Tenders were plying up the Rivers, plundering 
Plantations and using every Art to seduce the Negr~es."~~ All indica- 
tions are that until the proclamation, and probably for some weeks 
thereafter, the tenders in Dunmore's service were commanded and proba- 
bly manned with Royal Navy personnel. The reliance on and increased 
use of Loyalists to command and man tenders seems to stem from the is- 
suing of the proclamation. 
Early December witnessed Dunmore arming additional sloops and 
64 schooners taken into government service for use as tenders. By late 
in the month, at least three with loyalist commanders and crews were 
at sea. Robert Stewart was captain of one, an eight or ten gun sloop. 65 
Affairs did not always go well for these vessels. The rebels captured 
the other two while they were foraging and attempting to collect 
66 stranded loyalists. Although some of the loyalist vessels serving 
Dunmore were occasionally referred to as privateers, there is no indi- 
cation the Governor ever exceeded his authority and issued letters of 
marque. Furthermore, the loyalist tenders generally did not cruise on 
their own as would a privateer. In most instances, they acted in con- 
sort with Royal Navy craft, thus placing them under the control of 
professional British officers. 
During this same time, Dunmore began raising two regiments of 
troops, the Queen's Loyal Virginia Regiment from white Tories, and 
Lord Dunmore's Ethiopian Regiment from blacks. On December 9, a nasty 
and tragic action at Great Bridge resulted in a British defeat, forc- 
ing them to fall back on Norfolk. As the rebels advanced on that port, 
local loyalists flocked to the Governor for refuge. There, with Brit- 
ish and rebels confronting each other, matters were tense, and on 
January 1, they came to a head. Caught between the opposing forces, 
Norfolk was burned during an engagement in which both sides did their 
best to intentionally level certain sections of the town for their own 
reasons. 
Meanwhile, with regards to the Goodriches, by early December, 
individuals in the rebel camp were increasingly aware of the family's 
ill-treatment at the hands of Dunmore and commented on it sympatheti- 
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cally. Others grew suspicious. Questions were asked about the Good- 
riches' contact with the Governor and their conduct concerning the 
powder seemingly on his behalf. 6B In essence, the f amily' s association 
and activities with the governor, regardless of the reason, were caus- 
ing doubts. The reference to John, Sr. in the letter from Sheddon to 
his brother must have raised a few eyebrows as well. Consequently, on 
December 11, the Virginia Convention appointed a Committee headed by 
James Mercer and including Newton, William Aylett, Richard Henry Lee, 
Richard Bland, and others, "to enquire into the Conduct of John Good- 
rich William Goodrich and John Goodrich junr. relating to the importa- 
tion of Gunpowder and other Articles for the use of this Colony.a69 It 
should be noted there was no reference to Bartlet. 
At some point in December, an event transpired that was undoubt- 
edly the most disreputable act in a long series. The incident also il- 
lustrates the public's awareness of the family's activities. While 
William was away, an enraged mob, believing he had sold out the rebel 
cause and intended to deliver the powder money to Dunmore, showed up 
at the house where his wife was recuperating from giving birth three 
days earlier. It was their intent to burn the structure with her in 
it, and only the exertions of family friends prevented their doing so. 
Still, fearing for her life, these friends, within two weeks, sent her 
off by sea to a place of safety. 70 
On January 4, 1776, a separate, local committee met in Isle of 
Wight County to deliberate on John, Sr.'s activities. Primarily this 
group was concerned about the fact John, Sr. was able to freely sail a 
small schooner on the Nansemond and James Rivers without interference 
from Dunmore. Goodrich offered a logical and legitimate explanation. 
He used the schooner to report to Dunmore every ten days as per the 
agreement of his parole and in fact, he had only made the trip four 
times. Seemingly on his own Goodrich also offered that he intended to 
ship some corn from his plantation in Isle of Wight to that in Nanse- 
mond. Regardless of the legitimacy of this explanation, the committee 
felt that if others could not travel as freely, then John Goodrich 
should certainly not be allowed to do so. Furthermore, they declared 
he could not ship provisions of any kind without authorization from 
the Convention or Committee of Safety. The Isle of Wight Committee 
then turned the proceedings over to the Convention's Committee and or- 
dered Goodrich to deliver himself and his vessel into the custody of 
the commanding officer at Burwell's Ferry near Williamsburg. Given the 
degree of public outcry exhibited by the mob in attacking William's 
wife and the fact he was being investigated by two committees, John, 
Sr. was certainly aware of the fact he and his family were in serious 
trouble. Yet, there is no evidence that John, Sr. was anything but 
complacent and cooperative about going along with the directives, in- 
dicating a belief on his part that he was guiltless of any crime. 71 
Problems were beginning for Robert Sheddon as well. On January 
5, the Virginia Convention declared his conduct inimical, and as a re- 
sult, his sloop, the Agatha, and a part of her cargo of rum which had 
been seized were decreed to be forfeit to the colony. 72 
John Goodrich, Sr., on January 10, performed a rather brazen act 
which, under the circumstances, tends to further reflect just how sure 
he was of himself and his innocence. He petitioned the Convention to 
direct the Committee of Safety to pay him the balance of his account. 
This was undoubtedly the amount due for the coarse linens which had 
yet to be paid.73 
On January 13, the Convention's Committee met and presented its 
findings on the Goodriches. Accepting that John, Sr.'s actions were 
the result of his drawing "the resentment of Lord Dunmore," his unhin- 
dered excursions by water were merely to honor his parole, and the 
corn he intended to transport was only a small amount intended for the 
use of his family, they 
Resolved that the said John Goodrich hath been active in favour of 
this Colony and hath suffered considerably on that Account that 
nothing in his Conduct appears to be inimical to the common cause, 
but that no Grain or other Article of Prp4vision should be Water- 
borne in the neighbourhood of the Enemy. 
As to William's conduct in going back for the powder and remain- 
ing funds, the committee accepted that he too had acted under duress. 
They also seemingly accepted the word of John, Sr. and John, Jr., de- 
spite the fact they had had no contact with William since his recent 
return, that he had brought back neither powder or money. 75 
Out of the frying pan and into the fire, family members were 
suddenly confronted with an altogether new charge, the smuggling of 
British goods proscribed by the first Article of the Association. 
Bartlet, in absentia, and John, Jr. were accused of conspiring to 
break the rules and run in the additional goods purchased from the 
Guineaman. In St. Eustatia, the textiles had been repacked and con- 
cealed in rum puncheons for shipment, and the invoices badly altered 
to indicate they had been shipped from that place rather than Liver- 
pool and Antigua and were of Dutch rather than Irish manufacture. 
Bartlet then shipped the cargo in the schooner Fanny to some point on 
the Potomac River where it was received by John, Jr. Like his father, 
Goodrich, Jr. seems to have fully cooperated with the committee by 
freely answering their questions and so honestly admitting that this 
had been done as to supply his inquisitors with specifics. He even 
produced the invoices which were being used as evidence against him. 
In his defense, John, Jr. recounted how Bartlet, in order to get the 
gunpowder from the Guineaman which was badly needed by the colony, had 
been required to purchase the rest of the cargo as well. This fact was 
confirmed by the testimony of Robert Connoway, Master of the Fanny. 76 
In addition to finding fault with the textiles, the Committee 
made a point of noting that Bartlet had sold the powder to William at 
a profit. In doing so, they conveyed a strong hint of disapproval of 
this action as well. Although it is not stated directly, there is the 
impression Bartlet's actions were considered less than patriotic. 77 
Despite John, Jr.'s explanations and the fact William had been 
directed to do whatever was necessary to get the powder, he and 
Bartlet were found guilty. The goods in question were to be forfeited 
for the use of the colony. Furthermore, in accordance with the punish- 
ment prescribed by the Articles of Association, a resolution would be 
published in the Gazette requesting that no one have any further busi- 
ness dealings with either of the two brothers. 78 
At this point, some comments are in order about the historio- 
graphical treatment of the Goodrich family in general. Because of the 
family's reputation for involvement in smuggling and the fact members 
did actually smuggle in the small amount of British textiles, histori- 
ans have conveyed the impression they were all basically bad people 
who were dishonest about everything else they did.19 It has been diffi- 
cult for historians to conceive that family members, because of their 
participation in an activity generally winked at could still be honor- 
able men in other respects. They were businessmen, and in the world of 
18th century business, involving a relatively small and closely asso- 
ciated community of men, a merchant's word and honesty were of great 
importance and a key to the level of success the Goodriches had obvi- 
ously attained." As in any community, there were rules of conduct, and 
if you did not play by them, you did not play at all. This is not to 
say John, Sr. was all pure and lily white. As shown in his dealings 
with Dunmore, he was more than capable of dissembling. Dunmore, how- 
ever, was the enemy at the time, and so, such conduct can be deemed 
acceptable under the circumstances. Furthermore, although clearly 
tightly knit, the family is treated as a single entity in which mem- 
bers constantly acted together conspiratorially and in complete har- 
mony as a group. In essence, historians maintain they conspired and 
lied about everything, and this view has seriously biased interpreta- 
81 tions of their conduct and testimony. In reality, the individual ac- 
counts of each are quite candid. There is no reason to doubt them. In 
further defense, given the various voyages undertaken and the number 
of times and places different family members were in the custody of 
one faction or the other, contact between them was relatively brief 
and sporadic. What contact there was took place during a series of 
events ever increasing in complexity and often rapidly developing. 
There was little opportunity for family members to meet to fabricate 
and coordinate their stories. Yet, the detailed testimony of any given 
family member, recounting their personal involvement in a specific in- 
cident and forming only a part of the puzzle, meshes with and corrobo- 
rates that of another. 
Regarding the testimony offered at the inquiry, John, Jr.'s ex- 
planation for why the textiles were purchased in the first place is 
considered merely a fabrication to excuse a blatant smuggling effort 
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and get out of trouble. In fact, the story makes perfect sense and 
there is no reason to doubt it. Such a transaction does not seem at 
all atypical for the 18th century. The Guineaman was from Liverpool 
and as such, was undoubtedly preparing for the last leg of a long tri- 
angular voyage. For the sake of cost efficiency, her captain would 
have wanted to get rid of all of his cargo as fast as possible. He 
certainly would not have wanted to incur additional expenses while 
waiting around hoping to find a buyer for the relatively piddling re- 
mainder of his cargo valued at only £297.17.10. 
Furthermore, when there were obviously very large, valuable car- 
goes of legitimate textiles to be had, it must be asked why anyone 
would purposely risk getting into trouble for such a comparatively mi- 
nor additional quantity? As mentioned earlier, the osnaburgs brought 
in legally and already sold by William and Bartlet were valued at be- 
tween £3,125 and £3,750. 
Historians have asked if the story about purchasing the textiles 
were true, then why were family members simply not open and honest 
about it from the beginning? If they had been candid about the trans- 
action, given the circumstances, it seems doubtful the Virginia gov- 
ernment would have found fault with them. The family's failure to do 
this is held against them as illustrative of their devious motives and 
83 lack of honesty. While this idea entails some valid reasoning in the 
proverbial perfect world, in the real one it reflects a certain level 
of naivete. Still, the question needs to be addressed. Why did the 
family not tell the convention and instead conceal and smuggle the 
textiles? Clearly aware the textiles were a problem, they could not 
count on the Virginia rebels being so understanding. The family might 
still get into trouble and lose the cargo as well through confisca- 
tion. The cargo, however small, still represented an investment 
Bartlet would not wish to risk losing. All indications are that under 
the circumstances, right or wrong, Bartlet simply either did not think 
the textiles were of any consequence or did not care. Furthermore, 
William had been told to do whatever was necessary to get the gunpow- 
der. Though, in retrospect, clearly an error in judgment, it seems 
plausible that for Bartlett, as a smuggler, the easiest, most trouble 
free, and safest way to handle the textiles was to bring them in clan- 
destinely with no one the wiser. 
More importantly, if both John, Sr. and John, Jr. were lying 
about these facts, why did they not lie about everything else? On the 
contrary, both were extremely cooperative, honest and forthright about 
everything else to the point of offering testimony and evidence that 
was incriminating. In light of this there is no reason to believe they 
fabricated a self-serving yarn about the nature of the transaction 
with the Liverpool vessel. In turn, if father and son actually had 
cause for concern about their guilt and were intent on worming their 
way out of a tight spot, it would have been easy to deny everything, 
keep their own council, and conveniently lose or misplace the incrimi- 
nating invoices. This did not happen. 
As to the smuggling act itself, as mentioned earlier, some his- 
torians believe the illicit textiles came in on the Fanny in mid- 
October. There is no evidence to support this, and in fact, it could 
not have been the case. John, Jr. received the cargo himself somewhere 
on the Potomac River. At the time in question, however, he was in 
Dunmore's custody. In conjunction, it seems highly unlikely that as an 
experienced smuggler, Bartlet would have shipped such a cargo without 
first communicating with his brother about its impending arrival, giv- 
ing him time to make preparations to receive it. Yes, William had al- 
ready returned prior to the arrival of the Fannv and might have given 
word she was coming in. The Fanny, however, had actually sailed days 
before William got back, and taking into account the uncertainties of 
wind and weather, Bartlet, an experienced mariner, certainly could not 
have counted on his brother getting back in time to make necessary ar- 
rangements. Such a scenario would have been entirely too haphazard, 
leaving too much to chance. All indications are the textiles in ques- 
tion came in at a later date. 
Of note is the fact that, although both brothers were held 
equally responsible, given the nature of the deal with the Guineaman, 
the decisions regarding the transaction and intended smuggling were 
Bartlet's alone. The act was certainly not premeditated, and he could 
not have conspired about the purchase either before or during the 
event with John, Jr., because he was in Virginia. Although undoubtedly 
later informed about the textiles' purchase and plans to smuggle them, 
Johnie's involvement was really only as an accessory after the fact. 
What was he to do but help his brother who had already committed him- 
self to this course of action? 
Also of significance is the fact that it is apparent the matter 
of the textiles had only just come to light. There was no reference to 
their being a topic of inquiry for the two committees at an earlier 
date. Yet, suddenly they were an issue with which, to use a modern 
term, the family was "blind-sided." Adding weight to this argument is 
the fact Bartlet was suddenly named as a co-conspirator. Roughly only 
two weeks before, probably on December 27, Bartlet and his sloop, the 
Dorothy, in ballast, were seized by a rebel vessel actively employed 
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in stopping vessels suspected of breaking the Articles of Association. 
Although the Dorothy was detained, it seems Bartlet was released. 
There is no record of his being held, and the fact he was not present 
for the inquiry supports he was not. If a charge of smuggling had al- 
ready been leveled at Bartlet at the time he was stopped, something 
one would think officials, especially the captain of a vessel appre- 
hending potential smugglers, would be aware of, it is difficult to 
imagine Bartlet not being placed in custody and sent to Williamsburg. 
He was not. Consequently, the matter of the textiles could only have 
come to light during the early part of January after the Dorothy was 
seized. '' 
Not only was the charge recent, certain aspects of it were sus- 
picious. It must be asked how individuals with a reputation for being 
experienced smugglers could get caught with and examined for such an 
inconsequential cargo? Bartlet had certainly taken pains to run it in 
clandestinely, and it was run in successfully. They were not caught in 
the act. Perhaps the reference to John, Sr. in the Sheddon letter had 
caused suspicions. Even so, clearly someone (a "Malicious Enemyn?) had 
to have been looking very hard for evidence against the family to have 
found out about this past clandestine incident. Then, in conjunction, 
someone (another nMalicious Enemy"?) had to have informed on them, Fi- 
nally, it needs to be asked why, considering the family's efforts on 
the part of the rebels, involving considerable trouble and risk, and 
their ultimate honest explanation about what had transpired, such a 
major issue was made out of what was really a relatively inconsequen- 
tial affair and such a harsh penalty imposed? With the posting of the 
resolves in the press, John, Jr.'s and Bartlet's business careers were 
effectively over. They became persona non g r a t a  in the rebel merchant 
community. They were ruined. The situation is even more curious in 
light of William having been directed to do whatever was required for 
the successful completion of the voyage. In a worst case scenario, 
someone really was intent on John Goodrich's "destruction." William 
certainly believed someone had let the cat out of the bag to Dunmore. 
At best, the Virginia rebels come off looking very naive. They had 
hired smugglers to smuggle, then became upset when they smuggled. 
The very nature of the proceedings is rather suspicious as well. 
In December, the Virginians had established an Admiralty Court, one of 
the purposes of which was to deal with smugglers. Yet, the Goodrich 
brothers were not accorded the benefit of a trial under this institu- 
tion's authority. They were merely pronounced guilty by the investi- 
gating committee. 85 
A final note on this part of the story concerns the Virginians 
taking a dim view of Bartlet's having made a profit off the powder he 
sold to William. Perhaps, to again use modern parlance, it was time 
for a "reality check" with the rebels. Bartlet was not the person des- 
ignated to fulfill the contract, but he went to considerable time, ef- 
fort, and personal expense to acquire additional amounts of the needed 
commodity. Consequently, it is somewhat hard to find fault with him, a 
merchant, making at least some money out of the deal. 
While these events were transpiring for family members in Vir- 
ginia, William was having an interesting time in St. Eustatia where he 
had been sent to claim the powder and unspent money and had arrived by 
December 6. He later asserted he had no intention of returning with 
either for Dunmore. In fact, a large part of the funds were not even 
available to collect. Van Dam had sent bills valued at £2,000 sterling 
to France to buy additional powder. As for the remainder, £3,762.11.0 
in West Indian currency (roughly £2,150 sterling), William, with Van 
Dam's assistance, came up with a scheme to appease the Governor. He 
would return just enough of the bills, two with a total value of £400, 
to keep the Governor happy. Approximately £1,750 sterling would remain 
with Van Dam. In support, Van Dam offered a ledger and note explaining 
the balance of William's account and assuring the rest of the money 
would be handed over when it was known the bills had cleared without 
protest. Then displaying his business savvy, William made arrangements 
that only he or his brother, Bridger, could receive the remaining 
money from Van Dam in the future. This stipulation put William in the 
position of controlling the situation relative to both the rebels and 
the British. Of note, William later stated there was, in fact, powder 
ready to be picked up when he arrived in St. Eustatia. This, he simply 
left, and Van Dam later sold it to a vessel from New ~ork.'~ 
Somewhere between January 4 and 9, 1776, William returned to 
Virginia where, failing to mention the existence of the powder, he 
handed the two bills and Van Dam's account over to Dunmore, explaining 
that the remaining bills had been sold. Upon receipt, the governor 
seemed satisfied with the state of affairs and released William. There 
is no evidence William purchased any arms or additional powder as per 
his instructions. 87 
By offering bills of exchange, William bought time and lulled 
Dunmore by hoodwinking him, at least to a certain degree. Bills of ex- 
change were the 18th century version of checks, not ready cash. Al- 
though Dunmore seemed to think those William brought back could be re- 
deemed for the British, their negotiability remains questionable. If 
not negotiable, the bills were worthless. Even if they were, the bills 
were of no immediate value to Germain. Issued by an illegal and as yet 
unrecognized government and drawn on the London firm of John Norton & 
Sons, it seems unlikely Dunmore could find a buyer among his followers 
(or anyone else in the colonies) willing to take the risk of purchas- 
ing such dubious paper with such a suspicious history. As an alterna- 
tive, all he could do was send them to England, which is what he did. 
This course of action would take time and undoubtedly still be prob- 
lematic. Norton and Sons had strong Virginia ties, supported the re- 
bels, and were aware of the circumstances for which the bills had 
originally been ~irculated.~~ As such, they certainly would have ques- 
tioned their appearance in the hands of British officials and, at 
least, argued against payment. In any case, the rebels had not as yet 
actually lost any money due to William's actions. At worst, the imme- 
diate funds designated for munitions was reduced with the 2400 in a 
state of limbo. In light of William's plan to pull the wool over 
Dunmore's eyes, it seems probable he originally intended to inform the 
Convention of his actions. In turn, even if Norton and Sons were 
obliged to make payment, regardless of the bearer, the Virginians 
could still contact them with orders to refuse payment to anyone at- 
tempting to cash the bills. By one account, upon being set free, Wil- 
liam promptly set out for Williamsburg, perhaps partially for this 
reason, perhaps because he had heard of his family's situation there. 
Whatever the reason, upon finding out about William's destination, 
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self, stated Dunmore released him on parole to visit his family with 
whom he spent three days before returning to the Governor as a pris- 
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oner . 
It seems highly unlikely that William was lying about his inten- 
tions and the nature of what transpired when he met with Van Dam, pri- 
marily because of Van Dam's actions in response to the situation. Keep 
in mind that Van Dam was not a Goodrich associate. He was recommended 
to William by the Virginia Government. In other words, he was on the 
side of the Virginians not the Goodriches. Given that Billie arrived 
under guard on a British warship, if he really intended to reclaim the 
powder and funds for the British, one would think Van Dam would have 
detected something was amiss and withheld everything. Furthermore, it 
would be expected he would be suspicious enough to contact the Vir- 
ginians to assess what was going on and inform them of the situation. 
He did none of this. On the contrary, he went along with William, 
handing over the two bills and penning an explanation for the others. 
Clearly Van Dam did not feel anything was wrong. His actions indicate 
he was aware of William's predicament, convinced of his true inten- 
tions, and willing to play along. This goes far to support that Wil- 
liam was telling the truth about what transpired in St. Eustatia and 
why. He was only going through the motions of acting on Dunmore's be- 
half. 
At this point, John, Sr.'s statement to the committee that Wil- 
liam returned neither powder or money can be addressed. The testimony 
is also held up as evidence of the family's dishonesty given that Wil- 
91 liam actually came back with two bills of exchange. In fact, John, 
Sr.'s comment, when juxtaposed with William's account of events, was 
truthful as far as he knew it to be. Recall that William said he in- 
itially did not intend to return with either item, indicating a pre- 
meditated plan of action. John, Sr. was very much a part of formulat- 
ing the plan for William to go to St. Eustatia. As such, it seems 
likely the two conspired beforehand merely to go through the motions 
of getting the goods and money without actually doing so. Believing 
this was what William intended and what would occur, John, Sr. felt 
confident saying his recently returned son had brought neither item 
back. Furthermore, John, Sr.'s testimony was undoubtedly taken down 
under examination prior to January 13, possibly before William's re- 
turn, and even as of that date, he seems to have had no contact with 
his son to learn otherwise. Even if he had heard from William, John, 
Sr. was not lying. William brought back bills of exchange rather than 
cash. 
As stated earlier, the Goodrich family has been viewed as a sin- 
gle group that constantly acted together in complete agreement. What 
one did, all supported and did as well. In fact, of the five male fam- 
ily members under consideration, all were adults who led their own 
lives and were responsible for their own actions. They must be viewed 
as separate individuals, each making his own decisions for his own 
personal reasons in his own time. Accepting this, the question must be 
asked when the various family members jumped off the fence rail into 
the loyalist camp. 
Historians maintain that all family members, if not already com- 
mitted to the loyalist cause, were well on the road to becoming so by 
December, 1775. 92 Certainly, John, Sr . ' s post-war memorial to the Loy- 
alist Claim's Commission states he was in Dunmore's service at that 
93 time. Technically, in a qualified sense, he was, but for the same 
reason he failed to mention his involvement with the rebels and the 
gunpowder, he obviously would not mention the fact he was not a will- 
ing associate. In any case, as will be shown, the December date is far 
too early for most of the family members. Each departed from the revo- 
lutionaries at different times in succession, seemingly when each had 
had enough of accumulating rebel provocation. The Goodriches were 
caught in the middle of a spiraling sequence of events beyond their 
control. Because of their activities for the rebels, they were in a 
position to be intimidated into association with the loyalists. This 
contact, in turn, led to increasing doubts and persecution on the part 
of the revolutionaries progressively forcing them away. In reality, it 
can be said rather than leave the rebel camp, the Goodriches were al- 
ienated and driven from it into the waiting embrace of Dunmore. The 
governor, becoming aware of their potential usefulness to the royal 
cause, would court their favor and welcome them when they had no place 
else to go. As of December, however, the only rebel affronts to the 
Goodriches were the assault on William's wife and the establishment of 
the committee of inquiry. While serious, most family members seem to 
have accepted these incidents and taken them in stride. In January, 
the accusation and conviction for smuggling in conjunction with the 
apparent doubts about the family's patriotism, because of their con- 
tact with Dunmore, constituted additional provocations. Yet, most of 
the family still professed loyalty to the rebels and acted accord- 
ingly. Bartlet was the exception. 
Bartlet's activities between mid-October and late December are 
somewhat of a mystery and a bit problematic. All indications, however, 
are that he stayed in St. Eustatia in October, and remained in the 
West Indies (if not specifically at the Dutch island) throughout the 
fall and early winter. There is no report of his having returned to 
Virginia during this time. Sheddon's cryptic note of October 15, while 
indicating that Bartlet's enigmatic letters were expected, offer no 
hint that Bartlet, himself, would be arriving. Another source states 
that on October 16, Dunmore intercepted correspondence from Bartlet in 
94 St. Eustatia which he had sent on yet another vessel. If it is ac- 
cepted the illicit textiles were shipped at a later date, given they 
were sent by Bartlet and allowing the Fanny time to make a return voy- 
age, this activity would indicate he was at St. Eustatia at least un- 
til early November, if not later in the month. He was also at that 
same island during the first week of December at the end of which he 
returned to Virginia. 95 
As of December 22, it is evident he had not only returned home, 
but was acting for Dunmore as well. The Governor contracted with 
Bartlet to hire the Fanny for government service into which she en- 
tered on that date. Furthermore, Bartlet went so far as to fit her out 
at his own expense. His commitment to the royal cause at that time is 
interesting because it predates not only the inquiries, but also his 
seizure and release by the rebels. Clearly, the Virginians were not 
yet aware of his actions, and it is possible family members were not 
as well. 96 
The facts recorded by the rebels about Bartlet's detainment, 
probably on December 27, pose a problem, however, about his location 
in that at first glance, they would appear to contradict his being in 
Virginia on the 22nd. One document states he was twenty days out from 
St. Eustatia when stopped. Another reiterates Bartlet had cleared from 
the Dutch island and adds his destination as Nansemond. Yet a third, 
of a later date, is interesting, because it says the voyage was from 
Antigua to Norfolk. Ignoring the third document for the moment, the 
first two, when read in association, tend to imply Bartlet was taken 
immediately upon his return following a twenty day voyage. Of course, 
this raises the question of how he could be at sea and dealing with 
Dunmore at the same time. The answer is really quite simple. Bartlet 
had actually been in Virginia at least a week prior to detainment. 97 
In support, the weight of evidence is with the documents per- 
taining to the hiring of the m. These include not only the testi- 
mony of Bartlet and Dunmore, but the surveyors' report as well, all 
agreeing the schooner was taken into service on December 22. As 
Bartlet's presence was required to make the agreement as well as fit 
her out, there can be no doubt about his actually being there. 98 
How then can the rebel documents be accounted for? The facts 
they offer, while rife for misinterpretation, are essentially true and 
even offer a few hints. While there is no doubt Bartlet left St. Eus- 
tatia twenty days earlier, that the actual voyage took twenty days, 
although possible considering the uncertainties of wind and weather, 
is suspect. Other vessels seem to have regularly made the passage in 
99 less than two weeks; some, such as William's sloop, in much less. In 
essence, Bartlet could have easily returned earlier, before the 22nd. 
In light of other known facts, the twenty days must be interpreted to 
indicate only when he left the islands, not where he was or what he 
did in the interim. In conjunction, as will be seen, the discrepancies 
between destinations can actually be used to explain what occurred. 
There is also the intriguing fact that the Dorothy was in bal- 
last. For a merchantman to make a passage without a cargo was cer- 
tainly not at all uncommon, but given the situation and the individual 
in question, it is curious. Why would an experienced merchant in a po- 
sition to procure a cargo for a destination known to be an excellent 
market make the run in ballast? In fact, after all the time spent in 
the islands, why did Bartlet choose that point to go home? The answer 
is that Billie had just arrived with information from home. 100 
NOW, Bartlet's activities in December can be tentatively pieced 
together. It seems unlikely he had not heard something about what was 
going on with the family. The Fanny's master may have been able to 
convey a partial account outlining the basics. Yet, it is doubtful 
Connoway was privy to any of the finer points of the behind the scenes 
negotiations, and during the time frame in question, there would have 
been much that transpired after his departure for the island that he 
could not have known. Consequently, while aware the family was having 
problems, there was much Bartlet must have been in the dark about. 
William would have offered his brother the first detailed, first-hand 
account bringing him up to date on just how serious matters at home 
had become. Hearing this, Bartlet made a hasty departure for Virginia 
which accounts for his sailing in ballast. His destination, quite 
logically, was Nansemond, not a place of business, but one of the fam- 
ily seats. In light of the fact Norfolk was under the control of 
Dunmore, then considered an enemy, there is no reason to believe that 
port was his destination at that time. In any case, it is likely 
Bartlet made Nansemond by the 19th or 20th, only to find that since 
William had left, affairs had taken on a whole new and even more seri- 
ous complexion. The rebels, having called for an inquiry and attempted 
to assault William's wife, were showing themselves to be as great an 
enemy as the Governor. Obviously, in Bartletls mind, they were even 
more so, because these two rebel actions seem to have been enough 
provocation to make him decide to throw in with Dunmore, which he did 
within a day or two. Having made the pact, Bartlett was in the logical 
process of bringing the Dorothy around to Norfolk to join the Governor 
when she was detained, thus accounting for the discrepancies in desti- 
nations. 
The reference to Bartlet's departure from Antigua is really of 
no consequence. It can easily be explained by the fact it was undoubt- 
edly Bartlet's last port of call prior to St. Eustatia. It was proba- 
bly noted, because it was a British port and therefore suspicious. 
Three days after the inquiry in which John, Sr. and sons were 
exonerated of any inimical conduct against Virginia with regards to 
their trading efforts to obtain necessary items for the colony, the 
committee reported its resolution to the Convention concerning the fa- 
ther's petition for payment. After acknowledging that family members 
had satisfactorily carried out the contract for the coarse linens and 
admitting they were due payment of £1,098, the committee offered yet 
another affront when it announced its intention to retain the money 
until all the powder funds were accounted for. In essence, after hav- 
ing just declared the family innocent, the committee conveyed it still 
had serious doubts and was distrustful of them. Interestingly enough, 
at the same time, indicating they were still in the dark about 
Bartlet's status, they did agree to return the Dorothy. 101 
Not to be put off easily, John, Sr. immediately entered two more 
petitions on the same day. The first concerned the status of son-in- 
law Robert Sheddon, daughter Agatha, and their two children who were 
aboard a vessel in the harbor at Norfolk. After acknowledging he knew 
the Convention viewed Sheddon as inimical because of his attempted 
smuggling, Goodrich pointed out that Robert had been of some service 
in procuring the powder. He hoped the Convention would thus view him 
in a more favorable light and allow him and his family to return 
ashore "and reside under the protection of this Colony." This was 
hardly the request of a man who had turned traitor. 102 
Goodrich then repetitioned for payment. This request is notewor- 
thy for its sense of restraint, humility, and complacency, given that 
he could not have been at all happy about the rejection of the first. 
After quite justly pointing out the family "had exposed themselves to 
great dangers and had suffered many hardships and inconveniences and 
had incurred considerable expense in their endeavours to serve this 
Colony", he prayed the "Convention would take the same into Considera- 
tion and make such reasonable Compensation as shall be thought 
"103 just. 
In light of the nature of this second request, a refusal to com- 
ply in any way on the part of the committee could only be viewed nega- 
tively. John, Sr. had just cunningly put them in a position in which 
they were required to play their hand one way or the other, letting 
him know exactly where he stood. While the Convention responded fa- 
vorably to the petition concerning Sheddon's wife and children, the 
second request fell on deaf ears. 104 
By February, compounding events, including the attempted assault 
on William's wife, conveyed to John, Sr. that the family was in such 
serious trouble with the rebels, that the safety of his own wife and 
youngest children was cause for concern. At some point prior to the 
15th of that month Margaret Goodrich received a pass from the Commit- 
tee of Safety for herself and the three youngest offspring to leave 
the colony. Also allowed to accompany her was Bridger. 105 Described as 
"about 5 Feet 10 Inches high, stoop shouldered, a genteel well looking 
young Man, about 24 Years of Age, [sic] of a daring bold Countenance, 
light coloured Hair, his Face a little freckled,"106 this is the second 
glance at this youngest of the adult brothers. Although he had been 
authorized by William to collect the powder money, there is no evi- 
dence Bridger was actively involved in any of the family's dealings to 
this time. That he was allowed to leave supports this. He would, how- 
ever, become a major player in the family's fortunes. As of the 15th, 
however, it is evident these individuals had yet to depart, because on 
that day the Committee added that such slaves as were usually employed 
as domestics could also leave with Margaret. 107 
Also by February, the Governor's tenders were exceedingly ac- 
tive. By one account, they brought in prizes daily. One was a brig and 
a number of others were New England vessels sent for grain and 
100 flour. On February 3, six tenders went raiding with three pushing up 
the Nansemond; their boats making it as far upstream as Goodrich's 
plantation. During this foray a storehouse with corn was burned. A re- 
bel perspective contended the raid was partly undertaken with the con- 
currence" of Goodrich and sons, to bring off two vessels loaded with 
provisions by locals. To what degree if any the Goodriches were in- 
volved is impossible to say. If, in fact, a family member was party to 
this at this time, it was undoubtedly Bartlet. The others had yet to 
cast their lot with Dunmore. This, however, was about to change. 109 
On February 26, Andrew Snape Hamond ordered Captain Matthew 
Squire, H.M. Sloop Otter to proceed to Baltimore to seize or destroy 
two rebel armed vessels laden with flour. Failing this, the Otter was 
to cut out any vessel in the harbor loading provisions or being armed, 
and if she met with resistance, she was to fire on and destroy the 
town. General orders were to seize and detain all rebel ships and 
ships trading with the rebels. Accompanying the Otter were two sloop- 
tenders, the Edward and the Samuel. The Samuel, was commanded by one 
of the Goodrich brothers. There is nothing to firmly indicate which, 
but the weight of circumstantial evidence indicates it was Bridger. 
Also along as "superintending Pilot" on the Otter was John, Sr. In ad- 
dition to his navigational responsibilities, his role in the endeavor 
was to assist Squire in obtaining livestock for the ~ritish.''~ 
That Bridger was the brother in question is supported by a num- 
ber of factors. To begin with, he is known to have been active with 
111 Dunmore at this time. Also, historians traditionally link him with 
112 this event. Finally by process of elimination, after accounting for 
the whereabouts and activities of the other brothers, only Bridger is 
left. There is no evidence John, Jr. ever commanded a vessel for the 
113 Governor. Bartlet was in the West Indies at this time. This leaves 
only William, and as will be seen, all evidence supports he had yet to 
join Dunmore. 
The only evidence suggesting Bridger did not accompany the raid 
is highly suspect. A document listing prizes condemned and sold under 
Dunmore's authorization includes a vessel reported to have been taken 
by Bridger on March 17, which does not match any of those taken by the 
Otter and her tenders. Of course, this would indicate Bridger was 
P 
elsewhere at the time. The date, however is extremely unreliable. Cer- 
tain aspects of this document, which shows signs of having been drawn 
up long after the events it records, are rather haphazard, especially 
the dates of capture. For twenty-two prizes listed, dates of capture 
are given for only three, including Bridger's. The two remaining are 
wrong. Consequently, this document can not be relied upon for proof of 
Bridger's whereabouts, and unless new sources come to light to the 
contrary, it must be accepted he commanded the Samuel in late February 
and March. '14 
At this point in time, there can be no argument that Bridger, 
despite his complete lack of previous involvement, certainly had even 
more reason to join Dunmore than Bartlet. Someone in the rebel camp 
had sold out his father and brothers to the Governor about the gunpow- 
der. His family's patriotism and conduct had been questioned to such a 
degree that two formal inquiries had been held to investigate them, 
and two brothers had been publicly censored. Then, adding insult to 
injury, the Convention withheld payment of a considerable amount of 
money owed the family. Worst of all, an attempt had been made on the 
lives of a brother's wife and infant child. All things considered, for 
Bridger, it seems enough was enough. 
What of John, Sr.'s reasons for acting with Dunmore at this 
time? Historians maintain that as a merchant and smuggler, he was un- 
scrupulous and profit minded to the point that he was motivated in his 
decision by simple unmitigated greed, and the governor supposedly made 
115 him an offer too profitable to refuse. There is absolutely nothing 
to support such an opinion. On the contrary, Dunmore, himself, later 
asserted that the Goodrich "Services were performed free of Fee or re- 
ward, and upon every occasion, the Family demonstrated self disinter- 
ested Conduct. "'I6 The worst that can be said is that in his early 
dealings with the governor, John, Sr.'s actions were governed to a de- 
gree by the threat of considerable property loss to the British if he 
117 did not comply with their demands. In light of the prevailing his- 
torical viewpoint, it must be asked just what financial rewards John, 
Sr. hoped to glean by changing sides? By joining Dunmore he gave up 
control of a considerable part of his wealth to the rebels and risked 
losing that which remained. At a time when the family was realizing 
significant profits dealing with the revolutionaries, as the value of 
the osnaburgs attest, all the Governor could offer was the possibility 
of taking a few prizes and the rather tenuous backing of a government 
that might look favorably on them for their conduct and see fit to 
118 protect their vessels. Given a choice based on potential profits, 
Dunmore could offer John, Sr. nothing he could take to the bank. There 
was nothing to gain and even more to lose. In fact, after John, Sr. 
began acting with the Royal forces, the family still lost at least one 
vessel and cargo, valued at L697, to the British under the Prohibitory 
119 Act. Also, the Fanny was lost to the rebels while in government 
120 service. Only with extreme hindsight can it be said the family 
gained anything by joining the British. In the case of John Sr., as 
will be seen, he personally gained very little if anything. 
In reality, there can be little doubt John, Sr. was motivated by 
the same provocations as Bridger. He was certainly more directly af- 
fected by them. Yet, despite his services to the governor, his actions 
then and later indicate his participation was less than whole-hearted 
and he maintained serious reservations. Despite all that had befallen 
him, he was not, as yet, a devout loyalist. 
In addition to John, Sr., two other pilots accompanied the Otter 
121 
and her consorts up the Bay. When this small squadron arrived off 
the mouth of the Patapsco River leading to Baltimore, a very interest- 
ing situation developed involving two of these men, one of whom was 
undoubtedly Goodrich. Unfortunately, although John, Sr. served on the 
Otter, it is impossible to identify which of the two pilots concerned 
--- 
was which. Then again, it does not really matter. As the Otter ap- 
proached the entrance to the river on March 8, she ran aground. After 
considerable effort, she was gotten off five and a half hours later. 122 
During this same time, the two tenders, the Samuel and the Edward, 
went into the mouth of the river to take a rebel merchantman, the ship 
Molly, Captain Laurence, also aground.lZ3 The following day, the Samuel 
and the Edward were still trying to secure the Mol.1~ when the Maryland 
State Navy ship Defence and a small ad hoc flotilla of local vessels 
approached, driving away the tenders and forcing them to abandon their 
124 prize. While this was transpiring, the Otter was making every effort 
to get under way and come up in support, but was unable to do so when 
it was "found from the Pilot's ignorance it was impossible. "Iz5 If this 
pilot was Goodrich his conduct can only be viewed as very suspicious 
for a man reputed to know every creek and inlet of the Bay. It can 
only be interpreted that he was being uncooperative and feigning igno- 
rance in an effort to hinder the mission. 
With the return of the two tenders, the first pilot was replaced 
with a second.lZ6 Given John, Sr.'s reputation and position as chief 
pilot, if he was not the first pilot then he was certainly the second. 
There can be no doubt that a frustrated Captain Squire would have se- 
lected his best man to take over. Yet, interestingly enough, the sec- 
ond pilot did no better than the first. Conveying an apparent reluc- 
tance to proceed, he argued Baltimore could not be approached for a 
number of reasons. The river was chained, shore batteries with heavy 
guns existed, and the trees marked for navigational aids had been cut 
127 down. Interestingly, although the rebels were frantically in the 
process of gathering vessels to sink if need be and block the harbor, 
none had been sunk as yet, and there does not seem to have been any 
128 actual chains. As to the shore defenses, Squire's orders stated that 
if a battery that could not be overpowered was in place at the mouth 
129 of the river, he was to abort the mission. All that existed, how- 
ever, was a hastily erected breastwork mounting "several" guns at 
Fells Point, upriver near the town itself.l3' Allowing the second pilot 
the benefit of the doubt regarding these two potential deterrents, he 
may have believed and been acting on false information supplied to him 
by someone on the Molly. The third argument, however, is more diffi- 
cult to accept. Again, calling into account John, Sr.'s reputation, is 
it to be believed that as a highly experienced pilot, undoubtedly se- 
lected because of his qualifications for the mission, he would have 
absolutely needed the navigational markers to negotiate his way up the 
river? The rebel vessels do not seem to have had too much trouble corn- 
ing down without them. Regardless of the validity of the arguments, 
the very fact they were cited as insurmountable obstacles reflects an 
individual not overly intent on seeing the objective carried out. If 
the second pilot rather then the first was in fact John, Sr., we are 
still confronted with a man whose actions could only serve to hinder 
the operation. Squire certainly did not have a pilot he could rely on 
when he needed one, and the intelligence given him seems to have been 
131 a major factor in his decision to abort the mission. His superior, 
Captain Hamond was definitely of the belief the mission failed due to 
a lack of competent pilots. 132 
Although the situation at Baltimore proved too much for the & 
ter and her consorts, forcing them to withdraw back down the bay, they 
-
nevertheless managed to take seven prizes and burn another during the 
133 cruise. Four or five more, including the Molly, had been seized at 
the mouth of the Patapsco, but were recaptured by the Defence.13' Of 
those retained, a schooner and two sloops, were specifically taken by 
Bridger in the Samuel. 135 
The Baltimore voyage is noteworthy because two accounts offer 
insight into Bridger's character, showing him a committed, determined, 
angry, volatile, and even vengeful young man. He was someone to take 
notice of and be concerned about. Rebel Captain Thomas Wirt, while a 
prisoner of the British, heard him say, "that if they did not get 
fresh provisions the next time they came up here they would knock down 
all the Houses along Shore."136 In actuality in this particular in- 
stance, although this sounds like a rather nasty threat, Goodrich was 
really only reiterating Squire's orders from ~am0nd.l~' Nevertheless, 
the statement does reflect a resolute individual. 
The second account, from the rebel press, is significant not 
only for the image offered of Bridger, but for conveying just what the 
rebels thought of him. In fact, the image presented is absolutely 
priceless. While the basic facts concerning Goodrich's conduct are 
probably true, the rebel diatribe is so over-blown and filled with 
anti-Goodrich sentiment that upon reading it, it is difficult to sup- 
press a good chuckle. Recounting captures by Squire's vessels, the 
Maryland Gazette stated: 
among many others they took two poor industrious French Neutrals, 
so called, as they were crossing the bay in a small boat, and 
robbed them of their all, being the hard earnings of ten years 
honest industry - The infamous Goodrich, the younger, commanded 
one of the tenders, and his father was in the Otter as Pilot - 
The violence and barbarity of the former towards the prisoners 
will hand down his detested name to posterity loaded with the 
curses of his ravaged and oppressed country - The other officers 
in general treated these and other prisoners not only with human- 
ity but politeness; but this native barbarian, the reproach of his 
country, and basest of all Paracides, added brutal insult to his 
robberies - he tore from these poor people every thing that they 
had on board, even down to an old razor and a peck of meal, and 
picked thf&r pockets of 97 1. the fruits of many years sweat and 
labour [ . I  
Bridger was a very busy young man during late February and 
March. He used the brief periods when not acting with the Royal Navy 
to cruise independently. As of March 26, he had four additional prizes 
to his credit. 139 
Upon returning from Baltimore, John, Sr. attended prize auc- 
tions. Whatever his political stance at this point, he was still a 
merchant mariner with an eye for a good ship to be had at a bargain. 
On March 27, he purchased the schooner Betty, one of Bridger's 
prizes. 140 
In February and March, while Bridger was busy taking prizes and 
upsetting the rebel denizens of the Bay, Bartlet was involved in other 
activities for the Crown. On February 13, he contracted to hire the 
141 
sloop Lord Howe to Dunmore for Government service. At some point, he 
also received a commission in the Queen's Loyal American Regiment. 142 
By early March, he was back in St. Eustatia on the Governor's 
behalf attempting to retrieve the rest of the powder funds. Bartlet, 
however, was not alone. Rebel agent Abram Van Bibber was also there, 
in part for the same purpose. Van Bibber met with frustration, because 
he was not authorized to receive the funds as per William's instruc- 
tions to Van Dam. Bartletls intentions were thwarted as well for this 
same reason and by a new complication. Van Dam was dead. The money was 
tied up with only Van Dam's widow having any control of it whatsoever, 
and she was not about to hand it Over. According to Van Bibber, 
Bartlet "came out a great Tory" attempting to claim the money on the 
grounds he had a right to it, because the Virginians had withheld pay- 
ment for the coarse linens. 143 
With the failure of this approach, as per Dunmore's instructions 
should a problem arise, Bartlet went to Antigua to procure a letter 
from Vice-Admiral James Young directing the Governor of St. Eustatia 
144 to have the money handed over. "[Blut having no Credentials whatever 
and giving rather a lame Account of himselfw Bartlet did not impress 
Young, who believed him an "Imposter" and did not supply the letter. 145 
Because Bartlet failed at this, it was assumed his claim was invalid, 
and Van Bibber resumed his efforts. Using all of his "Interest and 
art", "Bowing c scrapingn and placing himself "under many obligations 
to manyw he managed to repossess a large part of the money. For the 
rest, he received pledges of its payment in time. 146 
That Bartlet went for the money rather then William or Bridger 
is clear indication neither had joined Dunmore by the time Bartlet 
sailed which was probably just after hiring out the Lord Howe. If they 
had, there can be little doubt one of them would have gone instead 
given they were the only ones authorized to pick it up. This tells us 
something else. In light of Bartlet's troubles, either William refused 
to authorize Bartlet as a recipient, or had not even bothered to tell 
his brother about this stipulation with Van Dam. It would seem he cer- 
tainly had not told Dunmore. According to Young, Bartlet had no ac- 
ceptable credentials which one would think William would have given 
his brother if he were privy to and supportive of the undertaking. 
Again, it would appear the family did not always act together. 
As of March 30, William finally threw his hat into the loyalist 
147 
ring. Until this point, the worst that could be said about William's 
involvement with Dunmore is that he was the actual owner of the sloop 
Samuel commanded by Bridger on the Baltimore expedition. Whether the 
--
sloop was used for government purposes with William's blessing, or 
Bridger acted on his own in using his brother's vessel without asking, 
is unknown. Even if William willingly allowed the use of his sloop, it 
was a relatively passive act. The latter alternative is, however, a 
distinct possibility in that Bridger had, in fact, been master of the 
Samuel since at least 1774. Bridger was Dunmore's man, and he and the 
-- 
Governor had the Samuel. within their power. In essence, use of the 
sloop may well have been beyond William's contr01.l'~ 
It is difficult to imagine that anyone in the family had more 
cause to doubt his ties to the rebels than William. Being sold out to 
Dunmore, the inquiries, the treatment of his brothers, the withholding 
of payment due, and of course, the attempted assault on his loved 
ones, must have given him cause for serious reflection on matters. In 
light of the state of affairs, can it be wondered that he not only 
questioned but disavowed his association with the revolutionaries? 
Yet, even all these reasons combined were not enough to drive him to 
such action. There was something else. 
William left an interesting and candid account which, though 
rambling, garbled, generalized, and vague in terms of its chronology 
of events and time frames, explained his decision to change his alle- 
giance. The gist of the passages of immediate concern is as follows. 
Upon returning from St. Eustatia in January, William was again con- 
fined on ship by the governor who attempted to convert him to the 
royal cause. William warded off Dunmore's approaches, saying he "could 
not think of taking up a m  against a cuntry that was Acting in devence 
of there Liberties." The rebels, however, then began to suspect Wil- 
liam's association with the Governor concerning the powder with the 
result that payment was withheld for the textiles and an angry mob at- 
tempted to assault his wife. William then spent the next three months 
on parole on a vessel after which Dunmore again attempted to sway him 
and again William refused.14' 
In William's own words, 
This Occasion'd his Lordship to grow a little mad. "What," says 
he, "don't the ill treatment of those fellows on shore to Mrs. 
Goodrich lead you to resent it?* I replyed that I did not think it 
was right to resent the ill treatment of a few Invious men on the 
whole Cuntry, and that I could not take up armes agains them with 
a clair Contience as long as they were acting in defence of there 
Liberties. "But," says he, "you may depend upon it that they mean 
to Shake of their dependence on grate brittain?" Then I told his 
Lordship that if he would alow me to remain nuteral until1 they 
did declare themselves free and independent of grate brittain, 
that I should then look upon myself to be in duty bound to take a 
part in favour of grate brittain, and would do avery thing in My 
power to appress the Americans in such a declaration. Upon which 
we parted, and I do declair upon my honour, Gentlemen, that I did 
not do nothing in favour of government but what I was obleged to 
do before they Declared for Independence. Upon the declaration of 
Independence in Virginia, 1 told Lord Dunmore that I was then 
ready and willing tySotake a part in favor of grate brittain Agree 
able to my promiss. 
At face value, this account does not jibe with other known 
facts. It conveys the impression that after Dunmore's second effort to 
sway William at the end of three months, even more time passed before 
William made his decision based on independence being declared by his 
fellow Virginians. Logically, this would imply he remained neutral un- 
til after at least May 15, when Virginia formally decided to support a 
vote of independence in the Continental Congress, if not July 2. Yet, 
as will be seen, William was clearly active on Dunmore's behalf as of 
March 30. Of course, this would indicate William's statements about 
his rebel sympathies, motives, and activities were false. There is, 
however, another way to interpret this testimony which shows William 
was, in fact, sincere and truthful. 
As indicated, the sequence of events and time frames are poorly 
related and thus, misleading. This is apparent from other corroborat- 
ing evidence and even from information offered earlier in this same 
document. For instance, the rebels were clearly suspicious of the fam- 
ily's activities over a month before refusing to pay the money owed. 
In conjunction, William's testimony makes it seem the assault on his 
wife three days after giving birth coincided with the decision to 
withhold payment and occurred after his return from his second voyage 
to St. Eustatia in early January. Yet by his own earlier statement 
clearly referring to the latter half of October, she was then, "big 
with Child and looking to layin in the corse of a month or so."lS1 A 
supporting document, also written by William and referring to the same 
time, says she was then upwards of eight months pregnant.152 This cer- 
tainly indicates a birth date in late November or early December, well 
before the time implied in the deposition. Furthermore, in what is a 
relatively lengthy document, the writer only offered two specific time 
references, and even these are vague. He mentions the deal with Nicho- 
las was made "Sometime in July" and the shipment of coarse linens ar- 
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rived in October. William is also known to have been simply wrong 
about his dates. He stated he was captured in August when it was 
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really July. In essence, William merely conveyed his meanings and 
facts poorly. Although clearly an intelligent young man, the grammar 
and organization of this and other documents show he was less than a 
gifted writer. 
Part of the key to interpreting William's deposition lies in in- 
terpreting the reference to the three months spent aboard ship. Rather 
than meaning exactly ninety days beginning with the second week of 
January, Billie was really only saying he was on parole during the 
three months of January, February, and March. Given this, Dunmore's 
second visit could have occurred as early as mid-March thus allowing 
William a couple of weeks of neutrality before making his decision. If 
this interpretation is accepted, then some sense can be made of this 
testimony in that at least the time period referred to 
fits with when William is known to have joined Dunmore. 
This, however, still does not explain the clear statement that 
William did nothing until after independence was declared. If William 
was not lying, then it is apparent he was not really referring to a 
time after May 15 or July 2. Something occurred prior to March 30 that 
unequivocally convinced William independence was at least a foregone 
conclusion. What? 
In fact, there were a number of incidents and factors, singu- 
larly or cumulatively, that William could have viewed as evidence the 
rebels had adopted such a stance. Certainly, the topic was already one 
of serious discussion amongst the rebel leaders and in fact had actu- 
ally been debated in the Continental Congress in late February with 
the radical majority in favor.'55 By March at the latest, six of the 
seven Virginia delegates supported such an a~ti0n.l~~ Also, the end of 
January witnessed the publication of Tom Paine's inflammatory Common 
Sense, calling for a break from England and convincing many of the 
need to do so. Perhaps by late March talk of independence had become 
so commonplace that to some it simply seemed inevitable. 
In late January, Dunmore offered a reconciliation proposal to 
157 the Virginians. During the third week of February, they rejected it 
on the grounds they did not have the authority to treat with the gov- 
ernor. The proposal had been forwarded to the Continental Congress as 
the only governing body that could respond to it. This action clearly 
indicates Virginia recognized the higher authority of a governing 
group other than the king and Parliament - a group acting independ- 
ently. 158 
Even more important, however, and more likely to have affected 
William's decision, was the fact that toward the end of the third week 
in March, shortly before William changed sides, Dunmore received word 
of the Prohibitory AC~.'~' With the implementation of this Act, the 
Crown, for all practical purposes, began treating the colonies in re- 
bellion as enemies outside the empire. Open season was declared on re- 
bel shipping for the Royal Navy. So serious were the Act's mandates, 
some rebels questioned the need for a formal declaration of inde- 
pendence. They felt, in effect, the British Government had just done 
it for them. 160 
Then, most significantly, came the rebel response which was per- 
haps the most influential factor in swaying William. The Continental 
Congress had actually received notice of the Act as early as February 
27.1b1 On March 23, Congress, evoking the Laws of Nations and repre- 
senting the "United Colonies", authorized those colonies to issue Let- 
ters of Marque and Reprisal against British shipping.16* This was the 
action not only of an independent government, it was the action of an 
independent government formally at war with England. Whatever Wil- 
liam's level of political consciousness, as a merchant mariner of con- 
siderable experience and status, in the world as he knew it, the sig- 
nificance of this act could not have escaped his particular attention 
and understanding. To a man of his specific background this would eas- 
ily be construed as a declaration of independence. Did William actu- 
ally hear of this prior to switching sides? There is no evidence at 
all to support that he did. Yet, news of the magnitude of this act 
must have spread quickly through the rebel communications networks, 
and the seven days between March 23 and 30 were more than enough for 
word to reach Virginia, Dunmore, and thus, William. Certainly some- 
thing during the last week of March convinced William Goodrich inde- 
pendence had been declared at least as he understood it. In any case, 
William's decision was a thoughtful one based on many valid considera- 
tions. Any or all of the factors discussed may well have convinced a 
disillusioned young man that his associates had gone too far and he 
could not go with them. Like many others, while desirous of redressing 
grievances with the Crown, William could not bring himself to break 
from it, and he joined the Royal forces. He had played the game to the 
end. 
In further support of William's sincerity and truthfulness, the 
contents of his deposition can be viewed from another angle. At the 
time he penned his account, he was a prisoner in serious trouble for 
what the rebels perceived as his treasonous conduct in changing 
163 sides. Granted in putting pen to paper, he conveniently failed to 
comment on topics that might serve to incriminate him, while emphasiz- 
ing those actions which would show him in a better light. Conse- 
quently, it would be easy to view his statements simply as an effort 
to talk his way out of a bad situation. Still, it simply did not mat- 
ter when or why he changed sides. He had done it and no amount of 
sugar-coating his explanation could alter this. In fact, the fabrica- 
tion of such an elaborate yarn could serve no useful purpose. On the 
contrary, if William really intended to mean he had done nothing in 
Dunmore's service until at least after May 15, then his statement to 
that effect could only serve to expose him as a blatant liar. The re- 
bels were clearly aware of his activities prior to that date, and con- 
sequently, any statement on his part to the contrary could only do 
more harm than good.'64 In conjunction, the other numerous facts he re- 
counted which can be corroborated are true, so there is no reason to 
doubt his sentiments or motives. 
Still, before William entered Dunmore's service, the rebels of- 
fered him and the family one more slap in the face. On March 29, the 
Committee of Safety seized control of the family's plantations with 
the intention of managing them and keeping the profits until compen- 
165 sated for the unaccounted powder funds. In his post-war memorial to 
the loyalist claims commission (a document that dovetails with the ac- 
count just discussed though suffering the same problems) William 
clearly stated he joined Dunmore after the confiscation of property, 
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and in part, because of it. If William had yet to make a firm deci- 
sion, it appears this act of the Virginians was the proverbial straw 
that broke the one-time rebel's back. On March 30, taking command of 
the Samuel, Billie departed on his first cruise for the British. 167 
Of particular interest is the fact that on the same date, 
Dunmore wrote the following to Lord George Germain, the new Secretary 
of State for the Colonies. 
My Lord in my dispatch No 34, 1 had frequent Occasion to men 
tion a Family of the Name of Goodrich, Natives of this Colony, 
this is a Spirited, Active, industrious Family, and it has cost me 
much trouble and pain (knowing the Service they would be of to 
which ever Party they joined) to secure them in His Majesty's 
Service. The Male part consist of a Father and Seven Sons, five of 
which are Arrived to the Age of Manhood, who are now most Zeal- 
ously engaged in His Majesty's service, four of them are perfectly 
well acquainted with every River, Creek or Branch within this Bay. 
I have now five of their vessels employed constantly running up 
the Rivers, where they have orders to Seize, burn or destroy every 
thing that is Water Born, that they can get at; they often Land 
and take off what Provisions they can get, which keeps the Rebels 
in constant motion, and I generally send a few of the 14th Regi- 
ment with them. I mention this Family to your Lordship, for two 
reasons, the first is, least any of their Vessels of which they 
have many, in various parts of the World should fall into the 
hands of any of our Ships of War, that they may have that Atten- 
tion Shewn to them that I think them so well entitled to. - My 
second reason is, that should we ever see better times in this 
Quarter (which I pray God may be soon) that His Majesty may Shew 
them such marks of His favour as he as he thinks their Services 
are deserving of. - They have all left their Houses, Negroes, 
Plantations, Stock, and everything else at the Mercy of the Re- 
bels, and are now with their whole Familys Water Born in this 
Fleet. 168 
This document is noteworthy for several reasons. First of all, 
it indicates all of the adult male family members had joined Dunmore 
by March 30. It is probable, however, the Governor was overstating his 
case in claiming John, Jr. was with him. He certainly erred in saying 
169 Johnie's family was with the fleet at the time. John Jr.'s status as 
a rebel or loyalist during the spring and early summer remains a mys- 
tery. All things considered it would seem likely he at least sympa- 
thized with the other family members in their decision to join Dun- 
more, and perhaps he even supported their doing so. Furthermore, it 
would come as no surprise to find he had formally changed his alle- 
giance as well, but if he did, there is no reference to it other than 
this statement, and it must have been in a very minor, low-key capac- 
ity. There is no known reference to his cruising for Dunmore, and 
while the Governor's dispatch might be interpreted to imply otherwise, 
even it offers no direct statement to that effect. On the contrary, 
Dunmore states only four of the family members were accomplished mari- 
ners, clearly referring to John, Sr., William, Bartlet, and Bridger. 
Supporting this is a later statement by Captain Hamond to the effect 
that only John, Sr. and three sons were active in the governor's serv- 
170 ice. In fact, no reference has been found to indicate Johnie ever 
commanded a vessel under any circumstance or even went to sea in any 
capacity other than perhaps as supercargo on short voyages in the Bay. 
In light of this apparent lack of activity, and in conjunction with 
circumstantial evidence to be discussed later, it is quite probable 
John, Jr., in fact, adopted a stance of neutrality and attempted to 
maintain it. Perhaps this was enough for Dunmore to feel he had him in 
his control. 
As to the fifth "adultw son, this was undoubtedly Edward, the 
oldest of the "three youngest childrenw allowed to leave with Marga- 
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ret. Very little is known about Edward's activities during the war 
other than that later he was involved in privateering to some de- 
172 gree. There is, however, no other reference to his serving Dunmore, 
and given his age and situation, it seems extremely unlikely he acted 
in any capacity on the Governor's behalf. As an obviously very young 
"adultw he was not old enough at this time to act independently, and 
his presence with the fleet was undoubtedly due to the simple fact his 
mother was there. 
This document is interesting too, because it can hardly be coin- 
cidence that Dunmore wrote this at a time corresponding exactly with 
William's decision to join him. It is tempting to read between the 
lines and interpret Dunmore as saying that after all his efforts, with 
William's decision, he had finally won over all four family members 
who counted most for his purposes; John Sr., William, Bartlet, and 
Bridger, the four mariners familiar with all parts of the Bay. 
Finally, the dispatch is significant for one other reason at 
least partly accounting for the family's decisions. While the Virgini- 
ans were busy persecuting the Goodriches for relatively petty reasons 
which blinded them to the family's potential usefulness to their 
cause, Dunmore, though he had initially treated them roughly, realized 
and esteemed their worth to such a degree he was willing to overlook 
what were, in reality, far worse offenses and actually court their 
support. This made the Goodriches' decisions all the easier. Few are 
prone to stay where they are not wanted. 
William, commanding the Samuel and in company with the sloop 
Lilly, departed from the Elizabeth River and sailed up the James. 173 
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The all.~, a prize, had been recently purchased by Dunmore on March 
174 25. On this cruise, her first in government service, it is remotely 
possibly John, Sr. commanded her. One rebel newspaper account written 
several weeks later associated him with one of the events of the 
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cruise. On the other hand, both William and Dunmore later made 
rather detailed statements concerning the same event and neither al- 
176 luded to the presence of the elder Goodrich. Also, although Bartlet 
later stated his father was given command of a tender "about the Month 
of March," it was "to go on an Expidition to Ocacock," North Caro- 
177 lina. More significantly, in a post-war memorial, John, Sr., him- 
self, did not make reference to the incident. On the contrary, he 
clearly stated that after Baltimore, his next activity for Dunmore was 
to go to North Carolina, which, as will be seen, he did, in command of 
the Lilly. 178 
William's objective was twofold. The first involved a nocturnal 
visit to the family plantation at Nansemond to bring off slaves and 
livestock. In this, he was only minimally successful, regaining pos- 
session of only two slaves. 
In response, the Virginians took quick action. The remaining 
Goodrich slaves were to be "secured" and their livestock sold at pub- 
lic auction. Though still in bondage, the two blacks who were re- 
claimed could consider themselves lucky. The fate of some remaining 
slaves was to be transported by the rebels to labor in the mines in 
the interior. These were probably the lead mines in Fincastle County 
(present day western West Virginia and Kentucky) to which other loyal- 
ist slaves, including one of Sheddon's, were sent. 179 
The second part of the excursion offered more reward. Per 
Dunmore's orders, William was to intercept a large merchantman, the 
Molly, known to be coming down the Bay with a considerable cargo of 
flour and wheat. In fact, this was the same ship the Samuel and the 
Edward had found aground and tried to take at the mouth of the Patap- 
sco. William was more successful, taking his first prize in the con- 
flict. Several weeks later, the rebel press credited John, Sr. with 
the capture of the Molly, but far more reliable sources, including 
testimony from Dunmore and William himself, indicate Billie was re- 
sponsible. John, Sr. if actually present in the Lilly, seems to have 
been nothing more than a bystander acting in his usual capacity as a 
pilot. 180 
Within a few days of the tenders' return, John, Sr. was actually 
in command of the Lilly. Acting under Dunmore's orders, he sailed for 
the North Carolina Outer Banks where he was to act as pilot for the 
naval tender Fincastle, Lieutenant John Wright, then attempting to 
procure provisions. Upon John, Sr.'s arrival, a very interesting se- 
ries of events, with regards to his conduct, would be played out. 181 
On April 14, James Buchanan, half owner of the schooner Polly 
and her cargo of Indian corn, staves, and headings, aground on the 
swatch at Ocracoke Island, watched what he thought was a pilot boat 
approaching. Much to his chagrin, the vessel in question turned out to 
be the armed sloop Lilly fresh from detaining the sloop Two Brothers 
at Ocracoke Inlet. Without hostility, her master, John Goodrich, Sr., 
asked to examine the Polly's papers, and upon doing so, informed Bu- 
chanan the schooner was a lawful prize. Goodrich did not, however, 
take possession of her, nor did he disarm her crew. He merely related 
that his superior, Lieutenant Wright, would arrive that evening and 
deal with the matter. 182 
As stated, Wright appeared that evening, finally putting a prize 
crew on the M y  which promptly plundered her. That same night, an- 
other vessel, a sloop, passed by. Interestingly, while his crew clam- 
ored to give chase, John, Sr. let her go. He sympathetically reasoned 
that because she was known to be persecuted for not conforming to the 
Articles of Association, she could not load a cargo and so, was empty. 
This failure to pursue brought Wright's wrath down on John, Sr. the 
following morning. There was apparently no love lost between these two 
men. Years later in his post-war memorial, John, Sr. still saw fit to 
criticize Wright, referring to his "intemp ce. and imprudent Conduct". 
In addition, at some time while the Polly was still aground, the pilot 
told the lieutenant he thought she should be released. Old and not 
valuable, she was not worth the trouble of getting off the shoal. 183 
At some point, probably on the 15th, Goodrich hailed a third 
vessel, the sloop Friendship. Asking for and examining her papers, he 
simply told her master, Abraham Adderly, to report to Wright who would 
decide the matter in the morning. On the 16th, the Fincastlq departed 
with Adderly's craft and the Two Brothers, leaving Goodrich behind 
with the Polly. A fourth unidentified prize also remained which, given 
the lack of any reference to her being taken by Goodrich in a wealth 
of documentation, was probably one of two seized by Wright, referred 
to in John, Sr.'s confession. Accounts differ, but either adverse 
winds, tides, or weather, prevented Goodrich from getting over the 
bar, forcing him to remain another night. 184 
As noted, John, Sr.'s conduct at Ocracoke was interesting and 
suspicious. This was because of its general passiveness. He was never 
hostile with or put a prize crew on either of the two vessels he 
stopped in Buchanan's presence. In fact, he passed on all responsibil- 
ity to Wright. Furthermore, he let one vessel escape, and attempted to 
have another one set free. Quite telling is the fact the cargo of lit- 
tle value on the Polly consisted of Indian corn. In other words, she 
carried provisions, the very thing Goodrich had been sent to help pro- 
cure. These are not the actions of a man actively and whole-heartedly 
waging war against the King's enemies. Nor does this reflect the con- 
duct of a greedy man. These are the actions of a man who is doing just 
enough to put on a creditable front to get him through a distasteful 
situation he wants no part of, but has no choice in. 
It must be noted that about two months later, the owners of the 
Two Brothers entered a claim against the Goodrich estate for recom- 
pense for this vessel which was wrecked after leaving Ocracoke. Refer- 
ring to the actual capture they stated: 
John Goodrich of Virginia in an armed Sloop called the Lilly with 
force and Arms violently seized and took possession of the said 
Vessel and Cargoe with her Crew and having taken out their Captain 
put on board a prize Master and some Mariners and ordered her to 
Sea under Convoy of a certain Lieutenant Wright [ . ] 
In fact, some of Goodrich's men did serve as prize crew on the Two 
186 Brothers. Obviously, this conveys a somewhat different impression of 
John, Sr.'s behavior than does Buchanan's account. Buchanan, however, 
was present, so his testimony concerning John, Sr.'s conduct carries 
greater weight. As to the violent nature of the capture by force of 
arms, this simply does not jibe with how Buchanan, a rebel third 
party, viewed both his and Adderly's seizure. In addition, in both Bu- 
chanan's and Adderly's situations, they were not even boarded. Good- 
rich merely directed the masters to bring their papers to the Lilly 
187 for examination. Also, by the owner's own account the Two Brothers 
was not under way when taken, negating any need for force to bring her 
too.ls8 All in all, the report of the Two Brothers' owners does not 
ring true. Consequently, one of two assessments can be made of these 
comments. It is entirely possible the Two Brothers' owners were 
greatly overstating their case, or, giving them the benefit of the 
doubt, to them, even without actual physical violence, the simple act 
of an armed vessel merely taking possession of theirs constituted a 
violent act undertaken with armed force. 
The next day, in the pre-dawn hours, with only a small ad hoc 
crew on board that included George Blair, the Lillv was approached by 
four or five boatloads of armed rebels intent on retaking the prizes 
and capturing the tender. Caught by surprise as the boats pulled 
alongside, John, Sr., trapped and in self-defense, committed his first 
real hostile act against the rebels. He gave his crew the order to 
fire on them. There was not time, however, for his crew to respond as 
the rebel boatmen climbed aboard to take possession. Because of Good- 
rich's command, a Captain Harney leveled his gun at John, Sr. and 
pulled the trigger. The story of John Goodrich, Sr. should end here 
with all events discussed so far perhaps warranting only a minor foot- 
note in history. But, Harney's piece flashed in the pan. Goodrich and 
his crew then seem to have submitted with minimal resistance, if 
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any. 
A short time later, James Anderson, another boarder, heard Good- 
rich to say, "he was a prisoner and that he had been so harassed on 
Both sides he did not value his life. "lgO These are not the words of a 
man who has whole-heartedly committed himself to a cause. At the very 
least, these are the words of a very unhappy man caught in the middle 
who would prefer to have nothing to do with either side but cannot es- 
cape their grasp; a man forced from the rebel cause he once supported, 
but as yet unwilling to embrace the crown fully. 
As a prisoner, John, Sr. was taken first to New Bern and then 
Halifax, North Carolina, during which time he was confined in shackles 
and suffered unpleasant jail conditions. At Halifax, depositions were 
taken from individuals present at Ocracoke, and John, Sr. made a con- 
fession. In it, he candidly recounted his activities with Dunmore, in- 
cluding his participation in the Baltimore raid and the cruise to 
North Carolina. He went on to say Dunmore never ordered him to take up 
arms nor do anything that he would construe as base. In conjunction, 
he declared he served Dunmore, because he was obliged to do so. 
Dunmore had dismissed a death penalty resulting from the powder inci- 
dent, and he had a considerable amount of Goodrich's property under 
his control. Of interest is the fact that Goodrich attributed the 
prizes taken at Ocracoke to Wright. In light of his conduct, this was 
technically correct. At the end of the month, John Goodrich, Sr. "a 
most notorious Tory," was sent to Virginia to face charges. 191 
During early April, either Bridger or William assisted the Gov- 
ernor in another way. One of them supervised the construction of a 
galley rowing sixteen oars and intended to carry fifty men, six three- 
pounders, and twelve swivels. 192 
Later that month, while his father was beginning his captivity, 
Bridger was again cruising in a tender. On April 21, he appeared off 
Hobb's Hole (Tappahanock) on the Rappahanock River. There, he chased a 
New England schooner loaded with corn upstream and took her. Upon re- 
turn, however, the prize ran aground. On the 23rd, the local rebels 
set out in four sailing boats to retake the Yankee. With the enemy 
craft closing on him, Bridger abandoned the prize, but not before at- 
tempting to burn her. Two of the rebel boats maintained the chase, and 
coming up with the tender, commenced a vicious little action with 
small arms at close quarters. This lasted fifteen or twenty minutes 
before the tender broke it off. Reports of loyalist casualties vary 
between 3 and 8 men out of a crew of twenty-four. This high loss of 
perhaps one third of the compliment reflects the intensity of the 
fight . 193 
Once again, Bridger had displayed his brash personality. At some 
point during the operation, he boasted he would capture General Lee, 
all the rebel armed vessels, and be up the river within two weeks. 194 
An irate Landon Carter referred to Bridger as a "Pirate" and a "Vil- 
lain," "detestable in the Eyes of heaven. "Ig5 
The Hobb's Hole raid was noteworthy because of another partici- 
pant, Richard Dale, destined to be John Paul Jones's first officer in 
the famous fight between the Bon Homme Richard and H.M.S Serapi., a 
distinguished naval captain in his own right later in the revolution, 
and one of the first United States naval captains of the New Republic. 
Even more interesting, however, is the fact that having already been a 
rebel officer in the Virginia State Navy, at this particular point 
Dale was sailing and fighting with his old school chum, Bridger Good- 
rich. Dale's presence with the loyalists reflects the confusion and 
indecision of at least some about taking a political stance. At the 
beginning of the war, Dale was the senior officer on a brig owned by 
Thomas Newton. By early 1776, he was a lieutenant in the Virginia 
Navy. Captured by a British tender, while held prisoner, his old 
friend, Bridger, visited him, and "After much solicitation, and many 
plausible and seductive arguments," Dale was won over. For his ef- 
forts, Dale was severely wounded in the head during the fight at Hob- 
b's Hole. While recuperating, he had time to reflect and came to the 
decision "never again to put himself in the way of the balls of his 
country." As will be seen, however, Dale's convictions remained shaky 
for a while longer. 196 
During this same month, another future loyalist privateersman, 
William Picket, was active. Earlier, Picket was a merchant captain in 
Sheddon's employ. As such, he was undoubtedly known to the Goodriches, 
and at this time, he commanded a sloop-rigged pink owned by them. 
Cruising off the Virginia Capes, he was involved in bagging a French 
sloop carrying arms and munitions to the rebels. 197 
During this time as well, Robert Sheddon experienced additional 
problems with the rebels. At some point in late March or early April, 
in a vessel attempting to reach Dunmore, he was pursued by a party of 
rebels intent on his capture, and submitted only after being fired on 
several times. On April 3, at Great Bridge, he was brought before the 
Commissioners of Norfolk who were investigating suspected loyalists. 
Sheddon must have been a truly persuasive individual, because once 
again he talked his way out of a tight situation. The jury found him 
"not guiltyw of "being an enemy to Americaw and he was "honourably ac- 
quitted. w198 
Despite this verdict, other rebels were not so easily convinced 
of Sheddon1s innocence. On April 11, General Charles Lee ordered Shed- 
donls apprehension yet again. At some point, probably during the 
fourth week of the month, he was retaken and sent first to Suffolk and 
then Williamsburg to be investigated.''' 
John, Jr. experienced difficulties too. Although the cir- 
cumstances surrounding his apprehension remain a mystery, by April 30, 
he was in custody in Williamsburg. On that date, after posting 52,000 
bond to the Committee of Safety, he was released under the recogni- 
zance of his father-in-law, William Harwood, with instructions to re- 
port before the committee on the first Monday of May and not to have 
any contact with Dunrnore or any other loyalists. 200 
Between April 28 and May 2, the rebels struck again. Under or- 
ders from Charles Lee, they burned and destroyed the houses, ware- 
houses, vessels, and other property of Goodrich, Sheddon, and Neil 
Jamieson, at Portsmouth, and seized their considerable stores of salt, 
molasses, and other valuable commodities needed by the Virginians. 201 
Even leading Virginia rebels thought this act was too much. Edmund 
202 Pendleton rebuked Lee for exceeding his authority. During the con- 
flagration, John, Jr.'s wife and child were forced to flee for safety 
and seek sanctuary with Dunmore. On May 3, the Committee of Safety 
granted leave for Harwood to retrieve his daughter and grandchild un- 
der a flag of truce. 203 
As directed, John, Jr. appeared before the committee on May 6. 
The only action taken against him at that time, however, was to con- 
fine him under guard as a "suspected Person" to his room at a Mrs. 
204 Coke's in Williamsburg. On May 26, without any additional proceed- 
ings, John, Jr. was again released on bond into the custody of his fa- 
ther-in-law with instructions to appear again on June 3. 205 
While these events were transpiring with other family members, 
John, Sr. and George Blair were forced to walk from Halifax, North 
Carolina, to Williamsburg, where they had arrived by May 6.206 John, 
Sr., at least, endured the trek handcuffed, and like a trophy, he was 
displayed "at each public place thro which he pass'd to every Mark of 
agonizing Ignominy and Insult."207 At the Virginia capital, both were 
confined in the jail with other suspected loyalists including Robert 
~heddon.~O* On May 7, William managed to pass a message through the 
lines via a flag of truce notifying his father several changes of 
clothing and some money were being sent. William also conveyed that 
Margaret was so upset over his capture that she was quite ill. As soon 
as she recovered, however, she would come to be with him, foregoing 
the safety and security of Dunmore's fleet. 209 
News of John, Sr.'s capture spread. Indicative of what an infa- 
mous cause c&l&bre he had become is the fact his being taken prompted 
210 reports and comments from North Carolina to Pennsylvania. Upon hear- 
ing the news, at least one individual, Josiah Parker, went out of his 
way to dig up more evidence against ~oodrich.~ll Parker can perhaps be 
best described as a rabid zealot, firebrand, and hatchet man, liter- 
ally. He was responsible for torching the property of Goodrich and 
others at ~ortsmouth.~~~ In fact, he had relished his role in this un- 
dertaking so much that upon receiving his orders from General Lee, 
through Colonel Muhlenburg, to destroy Goodrich's and Sheddon's build- 
ings, he promptly wrote back pointing out that Lee had failed to men- 
tion Jamieson, and that he, Parker, thought that loyalist's property 
was worthy of the same attention.213 When planning an attack on 
Dunmore's fleet the day before, Parker was asked what to do with To- 
ries found on the vessels. Illustrating his complete hatred for loyal- 
ists, he responded, "damn them, Tomahawk them all and throw them over 
Board, and give yourself no further trouble about them. "214 Of addi- 
tional interest is the fact that he, too, was from Isle of Wight 
County, was a member of the Committee of Safety, and was involved in 
the inquiry there into John, Sr.'s conduct at least to the extent of 
carrying the committee's report to the Convention. 215 
Parker sought out James Eastwood, the Goodrich captain who com- 
manded William's sloop when bringing in the powder and skippered the 
same when John, Sr. was attempting to go to St. Eustatia. Eastwood 
told Parker about how Dunmore had intimidated John, Sr., the negotia- 
tions between the two about retrieving the powder and money, and the 
circumstances of Goodrich's capture by Jones's tender at Ocracoke in 
November. It seems unlikely any of this was news to the rebel powers, 
and if it was, it was in keeping with the facts already established. 
Parker, however, claimed Eastwood conveyed something else; that Good- 
rich had acted as a spy for Dunmore, both in late October and when on 
parole during very late November and December. " [ A ]  better pimp they 
not have got, for his diligence, at last Convention, made Dunmore es- 
teem him as his first favourite. "216 
In fact, this accusation borders on the absurd. As to Goodrich 
playing the spy in October, he only had roughly two weeks to do so 
during which he was involved with far more pressing matters and cer- 
tainly not in a physical position to obtain intelligence. The only 
thing he could have divulged to Dunmore, and perhaps it was what 
Parker was referring to, was the nature of the gunpowder transaction. 
As to the period of his parole, Parker referred to Goodrich's "dili- 
gence, at last Convention." This initially seems to convey the impres- 
sion John, Sr. regularly attended that group's assemblies and passed 
on information learned at them. Upon reflection, however, if this is 
what Parker intended to convey, he was guilty of a serious fabrica- 
tion. To begin with, it seems most unlikely that a man whose activi- 
ties were under suspicion and close scrutiny as of December 11, would 
have dared or even been able to play such a game. Furthermore, all in- 
217 dications are that he remained at the Nansemond plantation. It was 
the four voyages from there to Dunmore that in part aroused suspicion. 
Even if he had been in Williamsburg, it could not have been for any 
duration. The travel time of four round trips from there to Nansemond 
to Norfolk and back would account for a considerable amount of his 
whereabouts. 
Parker's account was penned in a letter to his superior, General 
Lee, who must have passed it on to the committee set to investigate 
~ o o d r i c h . ~ ~ ~  That body cornered Eastwood and had him give a sworn depo- 
sition concerning John, Sr. Confirming that Parker's accusations of 
spying were false is the fact that Eastwood's deposition, while reit- 
erating everything Parker claimed to have been told in even greater 
detail, mentions nothing about spying, when it would seem likely this 
was what the committee would have been most interested in hearing 
about. Furthermore, when the time came, none of Eastwood's testimony 
would be cited as evidence against John, Sr., nor was any other evi- 
dence brought forth that he had been involved in such activities. 219 
As of May 13, John, Sr. was preparing his defense. At that time, 
having heard that Captains Wright Westcoat [Westcott] and Laban Gof- 
fagen were in the capital, he requested both be present at his trial. 
Barring that, he desired they be detained until depositions could be 
acquired from them. There is no evidence the rebels complied with this 
request. 220 
On May 16, yet another blow was struck the family. The Committee 
of Safety ordered the Isle of Wight plantation sold.221 Shortly after, 
although already under lock and key, Goodrich was deemed dangerous 
222 enough to warrant being restrained even further with irons. By one 
account, he was chained immobile on his 
Margaret arrived on May 29, with the smaller children. Evi- 
dently, she thought she would actually be able to stay at the jail 
with her husband. The rebels quickly made it clear, however, that 
would not be allowed. She could only visit, and after initial contact, 
she could not leave Williamsburg. 224 
In early June, probably on the 4th, John, Sr. petitioned the in- 
vestigating committee. Stating he was heartily tired of the "Confine- 
ment & Damn,d Irons" which he had endured for sixteen days, he de- 
sired, even welcomed, the commencement of his hearing. He wished to be 
able to defend himself against "the many false Aspertions, Laid to his 
Charge, by Envious Informations and Representations." He added that he 
felt his actions were as "Little Offensive to his Countryn as could be 
for a man in his situation. Then, pointing out he had had a great deal 
to lose in the beginning, he had, in fact, lost almost everything. To- 
wards the end of the petition, concerning his affiliations, he of- 
fered, "I took a warm & Early Part which Involved me in Lord Dunmores 
Hands I am by his Means now in Your hands or in Other words Discharged 
from the Obligation I was bound to him In.n225 
This petition is particularly intriguing, because of the phrase 
" many false Aspertions ... by Envious information and representations." 
It recalls to mind the "many Malicious Enemys." Like nMalicious," "En- 
vious" conveys a personal element, and as such, the two words share a 
certain affinity. This is quite possibly another allusion to there 
having been personal enemies in the rebel camp who did not wish the 
family well. As will be seen, all indications are the committee denied 
John Sr. a hearing of any kind. 
About this time, word circulated that John, Sr. was to be sent 
upcountry to the interior for imprisonment. Seriously upset over the 
226 news, Margaret, on June 5, petitioned the rebels not to do this. Her 
petition was tabled.227 Of note is the fact the Convention minute book 
for that date originally stated, "Two petitions of Goodrichs Read", 
228 but the "two" is suspiciously marked out. The more complete "Pro- 
229 ceedings" only mention Margaret's. One historian suggests the second 
230 was John, Sr.'s request for a hearing. If so, the deletion of the 
reference would support that his request was ignored. 
On the following day, the Convention directed a committee to in- 
vestigate the conditions of the jail. This facility was undoubtedly 
not the most enjoyable place to spend time under any circumstance, but 
overcrowding, bad ventilation, summer heat, poor sanitation, and bad 
food created an unpleasant and unhealthy environment for its resi- 
dents. On June 7, the committee reported this and the fact John, Sr. 
had been suffering a slight fever for three days. They feared it would 
worsen and become "putrid." Consequently, it was ordered that Goodrich 
be released from his shackles and sent under a "strong guardn to a 
more suitable place to recover. On June 10, he was returned to the 
jail. 231 
Assigned to investigate John, Sr. was the Committee of Privi- 
leges and Elections, whose twenty-one members included such notables 
as Patrick Henry, Robert Carter Nicholas, Richard Bland, Henry and 
232 Richard Lee, Archibald Cary, and Dudley Digges. On May 7, this 
standing body had been vested with judicial powers to examine sus- 
233 pected enemies of the state. "The legislature, not the court, would 
234 sentencew John, Sr. On June 11, Henry presented the group's findings 
to the Convention. After recounting in detail evidence of John, Sr:s 
activities with Dunmore gleaned from Goodrich's own confession and the 
depositions of James Buchanan and James Anderson, all taken in North 
Carolina, Henry stated the Committee's resolution which was adopted by 
the Convention. "Resolved that the said John Goodrich is guilty of 
bearing Arms against this Colony and is also guilty of aiding and as- 
sisting the Enemy by giving them intelligence contrary to and in con- 
tempt of an Ordinance of the last C~nvention."~~~ 
The nature of the testimony and consequent resolve are curious 
for several reasons. To begin with, only three documents, recorded at 
the same place and time, were used. More significantly, none of these 
statements came from witnesses speaking on Goodrich's behalf, although 
he had asked for such support. Most significantly, there is no refer- 
ence to any recent testimony from John, Sr. taken since his arrival in 
the capitol, despite his request for a hearing. In conjunction, there 
is evidence the Committee actually arrived at its conclusion at least 
as early as June 5. It was probably a leak of their decision that 
prompted Margaret's petition of that date. If this is accepted, and if 
John, Sr.'s petition was written on June 4, then a very interesting 
picture of the situation develops. 236 
The nature of the testimony actually cited in combination with 
John, Sr, having yet to be heard at a time coinciding approximately 
with when the decision against him was made supports two things. John, 
Sr. was not allowed witnesses on his behalf, and he was not even al- 
lowed to speak for himself and testify in his own defense. In fact, it 
is quite likely John, Sr.'s petition was written, because of this very 
thing. If Margaret had received word of the Committee's decision, it 
is safe to say she conveyed the news to her husband. Consequently, 
John, Sr.'s petition may well represent a last desperate effort to be 
heard, written in response to news of the resolution. In turn, this 
would explain why the petition was ignored. The decision had already 
been made and there was no point in acknowledging Goodrich. In any 
case, the only recorded instance of members of the investigating Com- 
mittee ever personally confronting Goodrich was when, in his presence, 
the confession taken in North Carolina was read.237 
Despite the fact there was no accusation or evidence offered of 
spying, the resolve clearly stated John, Sr. was found "guilty of aid- 
ing and assisting the Enemy by giving them intelligence." This must 
refer to his conduct as a pilot, a role Goodrich freely confessed to 
238 and the main activity that was held against him. In such a capacity, 
guiding naval vessels and tenders in search of rebel shipping and pro- 
visions, he most certainly offered important intelligence. He was not, 
however, privy to or divulging the colony's state secrets. 
As punishment, the rebels confiscated the remainder of Good- 
rich's estates, making provision from their revenue for the care of 
the prisoner, Margaret, and the youngest children. John, Sr., himself, 
was ordered under heavy guard to detention in Charlottesville. Re- 
flecting some sense of decency, the Conunittee allowed him the use of 
one of the goaler's personal rooms in order to regain his health be- 
fore making the journey. As of July 2, there was still enough concern 
about his physical condition that the Committee of Safety directed a 
doctor to examine him and report on his condition. It was not until 
July 22, that the Council of State finally ordered him taken to the 
interior. 239 
With matters concerning John, Sr. under control, the Virginians 
again turned their attention to John, Jr. Though he had been directed 
to report to the Committee of Safety on June 3, there is no evidence 
anything transpired at that time. On June 14, however, the Committee 
told him to appear on June 21. They also, issued summons for two men 
to appear and give evidence at John, Jr.'s examination. 240 
On the 21st, the Committee met, considered the accusation that 
John, Jr. was "inimical to the rights of American, and decided his 
fate. There being no evidence against him or forthcoming witnesses, 
they dropped the charges. They maintained, though, that he remained 
under "general suspicionn and should post E1,000 bond not to give in- 
telligence to the enemy or assist them in any way. On the same day, 
the Convention concurred with the Committee and ordered the oath ad- 
ministered to Johnie. 241 
On June 25, with father-in-law Harwood vouching for 
him, John, Jr. promised future good behavior and was discharged on pa- 
role. Still a suspect, though, as directed, the Committee attempted to 
administer the oath. John, Jr. refused to take it. The only response 
was to order him disarmed.242 
The situation of John, Jr. is of note. It seems he was suspected 
of guilt merely by association. He was a Goodrich. The circumstances 
of his confinement and examination, however, tend to support the fact 
that he never committed himself to Dunmore's service. The rather re- 
laxed nature of his captivity (the fact he had been allowed to go 
about armed shows just how lax) clearly indicates he was not viewed as 
a dangerous enemy of the colony as were his father and brother-in-law, 
and no evidence was ever tendered against him. The only thing that 
could really be held against him was that in the end, when all else 
was said and done, he refused to take the oath. His actions following 
his release further support that he was at least attempting to main- 
tain a neutral stance. Although Bartlet would later refer to John, Jr. 
as prisoner in Virginia, and he would eventually leave the colony and 
go to New York, there is no evidence of any overt efforts to escape 
his lax security during the time he remained, and his departure went 
~nmentioned.~'~ All indications are that he was content to sit on the 
sidelines with his family and avoid involvement one way or the other. 
Even after he left the colony, he does not seem to have been overly 
active with the British. To date, only a single reference has been 
found to John, Jr. having invested in a privateer which, in light of 
the numerous references pertaining to the involvement of other family 
members, tends to indicate his participation was comparitively mini- 
244  
mal. So, with his acquittal, the story of John, Jr. is really at an 
end. For this Goodrich family member, profit was certainly not a guid- 
ing motive. 
While events played out for John, Sr. and John, Jr., affairs 
were not going well for Robert Sheddon. On June 10, Patrick Henry had 
245 presented the Committee's findings on his conduct. They really had 
nothing substantial in terms of specifics to offer as evidence against 
him, citing only his general contact with Dunmore, his attempt to es- 
cape capture, and that he "was generally thought about Norfolk to be 
In fact, it was maintained Sheddon had actually aided re- 
bel Wills Cowper and others by warning them that Dunmore was intent on 
their capture. Still, the resolve was to confine Sheddon on parole to 
parts of Surry County at least ten miles from the James River with in- 
structions not to give intelligence to the British or help them in any 
way. The next day, the place of confinement was changed to an area of 
Dinwiddie County at least ten miles from the Appomattox River. Sheddon 
was allowed fifteen days to get his affairs in order and arrive at the 
designated location. 247 
It is doubtful Sheddon bothered to comply with the Convention's 
resolves. At a later date, he simply stated that after being held 
prisoner for several months (April, May, and June), he escaped to re- 
join Dunmore with whom he remained. In another account, although he 
incorrectly stated he was captured in February or March, he mentioned 
being held captive for fifty days. This span conforms fairly well to 
the period from when he was taken in April to just after the Commit- 
tee's resolution. In essence, it would seem Sheddon took advantage of 
the fifteen day grace period to rejoin the Governor. His activities 
for the duration of the campaign remain a mystery. He would, however, 
go to Bermuda and be heard from again. 248 
During this same period in June, related events were transpiring 
in Northhampton County on the Eastern Shore. There, at some point dur- 
ing the first week of June, Bartlet, having sailed from the Caribbean 
with a cargo of produce, small arms, gunpowder, sugar, and sail cloth, 
was captured in a small armed vessel at Cherrystone Tried be- 
fore the Northhampton County Court for being "inimical to the Rights & 
250 Liberties of America," he was found guilty. An appeal to the Vir- 
ginia Council of State proved unsuccessful. On July 24, that body up- 
held the verdict of the county court and sentenced Bartlet to parole 
in the town of New London, Bedford County. The guards transporting him 
were directed to hurry in order to catch up with the party escorting 
John, Sr. and so travel together. 251 
To believe the Goodriches were badly treated, even innocent, is 
to accept the unthinkable. Virginia's revolutionary leaders were human 
and capable of making grievous errors in judgment, if not worse. Ed- 
mund Randolph, at least, admitted as much. Following are his comments 
on the matter replete with masterful double entendre and cryptic ref- 
erence. 
Virginia committed but few errors in the selection of men to 
whom she committed her interests. But she was not equally fortu- 
nate in the repudiation of a father and his three sons, of the 
name of Goodrich. They were so original and happy in their genius 
of shipbuilding that from the construction of vessels adapted to 
all the waters of this colony, many cargoes escaped capture and 
relieved the most urgent wants of the navy and of the people. But 
upon a doubt whether upon some occasion they had acted correctly, 
they were suspected of being unfaithful to the country and forced 
into the condition of enemies. ... Fertile as revolutions generally 
are in character equal to every growing necessity, Virginia never 
repaired the loss which she sustained in these men. ... Whether 
they were guilty or not of the first imputations was decided by 
the voice of the public, according to the temperament of him who 
judged. But a cloud may suddenly envelop well-disposed and capable 
men, which they may not easily pierce, or which if lessened is 
never wholly dissipated. They may be forgiven, and the attainder 
of their reputation may be proclaimed to be unjust, but the suspi- 
cion infects every struggle toward full and delicate confidence. 
The cause of these men I pretend not to perfectly understand or to 
advocate. But it is a superfluous function of history to warn a 
republic to avoid temerity in condemning, without the highest 
proof, her servants wh~~~until the hour of darkness shone with 
luster in her service. 
Upon reading this, one gets the distinct impression something remained 
unsaid. In essence, there is the feeling Randolph was privy to addi- 
tional information, but, for whatever reason, thought it best to keep 
his own council and say no more. 
Many of the particulars necessary to fully explain and under- 
stand the Goodrich's situation will probably never come to light. 
Still, analysis of events and personalities shows that they were 
treated quite shabbily by their fellow Virginians, and indications are 
that a darker, personal element lay behind this. The complex sequence 
of events in which they were caught had the affect of transforming 
them from rebels to arch loyalists. Family members were given little 
choice in their decision to side with the British. 
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CHAPTER 5 
"THE LITTLE TENDERS HAVE HAD GREAT SUCCESS:" LOYALIST 
OPERATIONS IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY REGION, 1776' 
For Dunmore, as May, 1776, progressed, the Rebels increased 
their hold on Norfolk and Portsmouth and a major attack on the fleet 
appeared imminent. Consequently, on the 22nd, after destroying a nun- 
ber of small and worthless vessels and quantities of goods, the gover- 
nor began the evacuation of the harbor. Sailing up the Bay, the fleet 
arrived off Gwynn's Island on the 26th. There, amidst the mounting 
losses and squalor due to smallpox and gaol fever, the group fortified 
and prepared for the rebels. 2 
During this time and until Dunmore gave up his attempts at main- 
taining control over Virginia, tender activities continued, involving 
a fair number of craft manned by a substantial number of loyalist 
crewmen. Although these mariners suffered losses both in vessels and 
personnel, they were nevertheless effective, continuing to disrupt re- 
bel trade and provide other services for the governor. 
During May and June, tenders accompanied the navy as far as 
Delaware Bay for blockade duty. There, on May 2, the prize brigan- 
tine/schooner turned tender, Betsey, was seized after being cut off 
and trapped in a river by rebel row galleys and the Continental Schoo- 
ner Wasp. Though under naval command, her former master, future priva- 
teersman Thomas Slater, was still on board as part of the crew. During 
the action, the naval personnel abandoned the Betsey, allowing Slater 
217 
to resume command with the assistance of two black loyalist mariners 
who also remained. All three were captured.3 
Following his capture, Slater attempted to defend his actions by 
claiming he had been coerced into serving the British, and after re- 
gaining control of his vessel, was actually trying to flee them when 
4 taken. His explanation fell on unsympathetic ears, and he was impris- 
5 oned at Philadelphia. As with other loyalist captives, his accomrnoda- 
tions were less than satisfactory, prompting him to formally protest 
the bad food, absence of bed and bedding, over-crowding, lack of 
money, and minimal clothing. At the time he penned his complaint, he 
6 had been ill for ten days. After nine months in the Philadelphia jail, 
the rebels put Slater in irons and sent him to Baltimore. Upon arrival 
there, the shackles were removed, and Slater took advantage of the 
situation to make his escape. Free, he made his way to New York where 
he would join the future ranks of privateersmen at that port. 7 
Late in May, Dunmore's raiders were joined by a "tall slim, gal- 
lows looking fellow," Maryland pilot and shipowner Joseph Wayland, 
Jr., destined to become one of the most feared privateersman on the 
8 Bay. A strong supporter of the King with a serious dislike of the re- 
bels in his region, Wayland first made contact with Dunmore while car- 
rying provisions to the fleet. He then joined the governor on a regu- 
lar basis in the capacity of pilot and commander of a tender. 9 
Although there is nothing known about the resulting foray, on 
June 10, Captain Hamond ordered Lieutenant Wright of the Fincastle to 
undertake a raid. He was to take [Bridger] Goodrich, then in the sloop 
Lady Susaq, run up the Rappahanock River, destroy rebel galleys and 
other craft collecting there, and "otherwise to annoy the enemy. "I0 
The tenders performed other services in addition to raiding. 
Some were sent to the Eastern Shore of Maryland to bring off loyalists 
and gathered "between fifty and Sixty."ll There having been no room 
for more, in late June Dunmore dispatched four more tenders and a na- 
val vessel to collect others left behind.12 This flotilla, which Way- 
land accompanied, also took the time to do a little raiding in the 
area of Hooper's Straits, Maryland. From Hopkin's Island, they took 
sixty head of cattle, two young men, and "every thing else that was 
valuable. "I3 
Although in mid-March a tender's crew had plundered a plantation 
overseer's house, with this foray, the raiding took on a new, more se- 
rious complexion. Kidnapping, along with the wanton pilfering and de- 
struction of private property, entered fully as a new element. Worse, 
matters had become personal. One loyalist took the opportunity to 
carry out a vendetta, carrying off a William Roberts, a number of his 
slaves, and a considerable amount of other property. Loyalists also 
burned the home of another rebel, Samuel McChester. 14 
In the later half of this same month, one of the Goodrich broth- 
ers undertook a successful cruise. As to whether it was Bridger or 
William, however, remains unrecorded. In any case, at some point prior 
to the 23rd, one of them seized a French West Indiaman coming in to 
trade with the rebels. 15 
Illustrating the degree of notoriety the Goodriches had achieved 
by this time was an erroneous account concerning one of the family 
members. The rebels reported one of the brothers was en route to New 
York when, in a ship to ship duel with the rebel privateer Tyranz 
nicide, he was killed and his vessel taken. The news was important 
enough to be conveyed to the rebel headquarters at New York from which 
it was relayed to Virginia. Another more detailed account seems to 
have reached that colony by a different route. There, the news was 
heralded in both Purdie's and Dixon and Hunter's ViruinAa Gazettes. 16 
Obviously, many rebels wished the intelligence was true, and must have 
been disappointed upon finding it otherwise. 
On July 9, having erected two batteries of artillery on the 
mainland opposite Gwynn's, the rebels commenced a severe bombardment 
of the island and anchorage. Having thoroughly disrupted Dunmore's po- 
sition, the rebels planned an assault for the following day. First, 
however, three tenders covering the intervening waterway had to be 
overcome. These vessels consisted of the naval sloop-tender Lady Char- 
lotte under a Midshipman Thomas, the loyalist schooner Lively, John 
--. 
Forsyth, and the loyalist sloop Lady Stanley, William Younghusband. 
After playing on these vessels with two six-pound field guns, the re- 
bels, in about thirty canoes, attacked across the haven. This forced 
the Lively's crew to abandon their position and ground their schooner 
up a creek on the island. There, they put a torch to her before making 
their escape. The crew of the Lady Charlotte held out a tad too long 
before attempting to burn her and taking to their boats. The pursuing 
rebels were in time to put out the flames and take a few prisoners. 
Little is known about the role of the Lady Stanley in this engagement. 
Rebel sources state she was poorly armed and offered no resistance. 
British sources state she was burned during the defense of the island. 
With their position under fire, the loss of three tenders, numbers 
greatly reduced by disease, and no suitable supply of water, the Brit- 
ish decided the island was no longer tenable. On July 11, they moved 
to a new base of operations, St. George's Island at the mouth of the 
Potomac River. 17 
At St. George's, once again a threatening rebel force began to 
collect on the mainland opposite, and the supply of water proved in- 
18 sufficient. On July 22, to obtain additional water as well as raid, 
tenders accompanied naval vessels up the Potomac. After filling water 
casks, skirmishing with the enemy, and burning the house of a rebel 
colonel, the expedition pushed up-river to the vicinity of Mount 
Vernon where a shore party brought off three of George Washington's 
19 servants. On the 27th, the squadron returned to St. George's in time 
to assist in fending off an ill-advised rebel attack.20 
By this time, though still within close proximity to the main 
force, some tenders seemingly acted independently. As of July 15, Way- 
land was cruising off Smiths Island, Potomac River. There, having al- 
ready taken a sloop belonging to Joseph White and another craft, Way- 
land took the boat of Moses Yell. According to Yell, Wayland wanted 
the mast from his boat to replace one on the sloop which he intended 
to turn into a tender with four four-pounders and twelve swivel guns, 
"to guard the Islands and keep the Shirt Men from going on to abuse 
the Inhabitants." Before this could be done, however, Wayland received 
orders from Dunmore to rejoin the fleet, with the result that after 
burning the sloop and second prize, he returned the boat to Yell who 
only suffered the loss of some clothes and about forty shillings. 21 
Despite the ugliness of some loyalists' conduct, both Yell's ac- 
count and another left by Joseph Mariman, Yells' mate, show Wayland's 
actions to have been not only gentlemanly, but even kind and consider- 
22 ate. Mariman stated: 
they [Wayland] then asked him [Mariman] from whence he came, and 
what he had in, his answer was they had Plank and Tar, they were 
from Potomack loaded in Hunger river and bound to Potomack again. 
Wheeland then asked this Deponent if he did not belong to the 
fleet; this Deponent askld what fleet? they answered the English 
fleet, this deponant answered he did not, he then asked him, who 
he was for, either the Country or the King, this deponant told him 
he did not choose to intermeddle with either side, he then asked 
him how many men he had on board, this deponant told him there was 
but one person besides himself, he then asked him, this deponant 
if he were a tory or not, he then told him he could not tell, the 
said Joseph Wheeland then told him he belonged to the English 
fleet and he must go along with him, he then asked him if he was 
willing to stay with the fleet, he then told him the said Wheeland 
no, for he had a wife and children, and wanted to get home as soon 
as possible, the said Wheeland said he would not detain any person 
that had a family against their will, but if they had no family 
they should not goe, he then asked him for some victuals for he 
was very Hungry. He then ordered him to get in the Canoe with the 
Mulatto fellow Lazarus and go up to the three Schooners that lay 
in the Creek, and tell some person to give him some victuals, and 
while he was giving orders, there came two other persons in a 
Canoe with a Case of Gin 6 Rum and gave him a dram. 23 
22 1 
Although Wayland was fast earning a reputation in the northern 
part of the Bay, time was already running out. In late July, Wayland, 
in a small schooner with three other men, was taken in a creek off 
24 Hooper's Strait by a party of thirty rebels. Stripped of his clothes, 
he was sent to Annapolis where the Council of Safety confined him on 
25 
charges of supplying Dunmore's fleet and burning White's sloop. On 
September 10, the investigating committee reported its findings, and 
on the 12th, they sentenced Wayland to imprisonment in a log jail at 
Frederick, Maryland, until he paid for White's vessel and posted bond 
2 6 for good behavior. As of October 28, he was still naked in the jail 
at Annapolis where he feared for his life daily, and having no money 
to purchase new clothes, he requested those taken from him be re- 
turned.27 At some point, Wayland's father secured his release by post- 
28 ing bond and paying damages. Shortly after, however, new charges were 
leveled, and Wayland was again imprisoned. This time, he would remain 
so, often chained hand and foot, for four years. While in captivity, 
the rebels burned his house, forcing his wife and children, who barely 
escaped the conflagration, to survive on the charity of friends. 2 9 
Also in July, William Goodrich reemerged. His specific activities 
between taking the Molly and this time are unknown beyond his having 
30 
commanded a tender. Billie had made his joining Dunmore somewhat con- 
31 ditional on the Governor's supplying him with a suitable vessel. Al- 
though it took a while for Dunmore to address the issue, at some point 
during the month he sent Goodrich, now in the Ladv Susan, to Bermuda 
32 to purchase an eighteen-gun brig. Had William been successful, such a 
vessel would have added some serious weight to the Governor's posi- 
tion. As it was, no such vessel was available, and young Goodrich de- 
33 
cided to give up and return home. Three days out at six a.m. on July 
27, a strange sail was sighted to windward, and the Lady Susan went to 
investigate. Too late, William discovered her to be the sixteen-gun 
Continental Brig Lexinqts, Captain John Barry, and about nine a.m., 
the hunter became the hunted. By noon, the two vessels were within 
range of each other, and a running fight commenced, the L e x i n m  with 
her bow chase guns in play, and Billy replying with a three-pounder 
firing from a cabin window and occasionally with the after battery 
guns when he yawed a bit to bring them into action. By 2:30, the -, 
ingtoq managed to come up with the Lady Susan, at which time, being 
horribly outgunned and outmanned, William struck his colors. 34 
As prisoners, William's crew received the option of remaining so 
or joining the rebels, and much to Billie's disgust, seven of the ten 
white crewmen (the eight black seamen were not offered the opportu- 
35 
nity) chose to switch sides. One of these men was Richard Dale who 
36 entered as a midshipman on the rebel brig. Seemingly, despite his 
earlier promise to himself after being wounded, it required one more 
cruise and action on a loyalist vessel to persuade him fully. Despite 
the fact Dale's conduct could only be described as highly treasonous 
by the standards under which the Goodriches had been judged, his ac- 
tions never appear to have been questioned. As for William, despite 
the general rebel opinion of family members, he was warmly greeted by 
37 Barry and well treated while in his custody at sea. He was carried to 
Philadelphia. There, treated as "a theif or a RobberR rather than a 
prisoner of war, his deposition was recorded, and he was placed in 
close confinement in the state prison where he was not allowed to 
speak to anyone. 38 
For Dunmore, by the end of July, the situation at St. George's, 
and with the fleet in general, had worsened. Sickness had taken its 
toll on manpower. There was no reliable source of water and there was 
a general lack of other necessities for what, by then, amounted to 
1,000 loyalist noncombatants representing hundreds of families, in ad- 
dition to troops and seamen. Furthermore, rebel opposition, in the 
form of both warships and militia, increased regularly. The island was 
simply no longer a suitable base for operations. 39 
In addition, the naval personnel, while sticking it out, were 
heartily tired of raiding, a form of warfare they considered beneath 
4 0  their dignity. Also, shepherding the civilian fleet diverted ships 
4 1 
needed elsewhere. Even worse, naval personnel, already limited in 
number and suffering the same effects from sickness as everyone else, 
were required to assist in manning the numerous civilian craft due to 
42 a general shortage of mariners. In light of a11 these factors, making 
the outlook bleak at best, Dunmore decided at last to release his grip 
on Virginia. On August 5, the fleet cleared the Virginia Capes. Upon 
doing so, it split into groups bound for Halifax, St. Augustine, Eng- 
land, Bermuda, and the West Indies. 4 3 
Of the Goodriches, only Bridger remained at large. Nothing spe- 
cific is known of his activities between early June and the time the 
loyalists departed, but affairs were about to catch up with him. There 
are also few details regarding his capture first reported on September 
4 4 16 and again on September 18. Having assumed command of the prize 
ship Molly during the evacuation, Bridger was, by one account, under 
4 5 orders from Dunmore to carry 15,000 bushels of wheat to Halifax. An- 
4 6  other source indicates his destination was Bermuda. Wherever he was 
bound, Bridger was taken by Captain Nicholas Biddle in the Continental 
Brig Andrew Doria and carried to Philadelphia where he joined William 
4 7 in prison. There, the brothers endured hardships similar to other 
confined loyalists. In November, Billie formally complained to the 
President of the Continental Congress that some money he had received 
had been taken from him, leaving nothing to send to his parents or 
with which purchase necessary articles such as winter clothing for 
4 8 himself and his brother. In December, the two were sent to Baltimore. 
Upon their arrival on the 21st, Congress ordered the brothers to be 
imprisoned in the jail. They were to receive only provisions and arti- 
cles of absolute necessity while awaiting the Congress's pleasure. All 
the Goodriches were accounted for under lock and key. Rebel mariners 
and merchants could rest easy, at least for a while. 4 9  
It is impossible to determine exactly how many tenders sailed 
for Dunmore during 1775 and 1776, and of these, how many were owned, 
commanded, and/or manned by loyalists. Nor is it possible to arrive at 
the precise figure of how many loyalists served on such vessels. 
Still, all indications are the numbers were fairly considerable, and 
some respectable minimum figures can be derived. Whatever the numbers, 
these "base" and "deluded wretches," "scoundrelWs, "Marauders," 
"Paracides," "barbarianWs, "renegades," "Banditti," "miscreants," 
"VillainWs, "pirates," and "hell-hounds, (so styled by the rebels) 
with widely varied backgrounds and motives, caused serious trouble for 
the revolutionaries and inflicted considerable damage to their trade. 
Seventeen vessels have been identified as tenders commanded and 
manned by loyalists. Vessels and/or captains not cited previously were 
the sloop Lord North, Charles McDonald, the sloop Lady Gower, John 
Wilkie, the sloop Lady Auqusta, Lowes, and a schooner, Hugh Miller. 51 
There was also the Governor's flagship, the Dunmore, commanded by 
52 James Lowes. Then, there was a troopship Dunmore (possibly the same 
vessel), under John Buchanan and the prize turned storeship, Molly, at 
53 
one time commanded by James Ridley. In addition, there were the 
schooner Fanny, and sloops Lord Howe and Edward, under contract to the 
Governor from Bartlet Goodrich. Finally, though under naval authority, 
the Edward, the brigantine/schooner Betsey, and the sloop Fincastle 
(after the transfer of command from Robert Stewart to Lieutenant 
Wright) had at least some loyalist personnel aboard.54 
There were undoubtedly other tenders with loyalist associations. 
At a time in early May after three of the seventeen had been captured 
or lost, and at least one other, Bartlet's, was elsewhere, the rebels 
reported a total of twenty-one in the harbor at Norfolk alone. One of 
these was the Fincastle, then under naval command, and probably a few 
others were under naval control as well. Still, after taking these 
vessels into account, and the fact others, both loyalist and naval, 
were undoubtedly at sea, the figure indicates an even greater number 
of loyalist tenders were under Dunmore's authority. 55 
Of the seventeen vessels, the type, in terms of rig, is known 
for fifteen. Clearly indicating a preference for small, fast, easily 
handled vessels, suitable for close inshore employment, there were ten 
56 
sloops (one a pink) and five schooners. The small size is further in- 
dicated by the armament carried by nine of the sloops, two schooners, 
and one of the untyped vessels. Apart from the Stewarts' atypical 
sloop, relatively heavily armed with between eight and ten cannon, and 
the radically polarized untyped vessel and one of the schooners with 
57 
only small arms, all mounted between two and six carriage guns. The 
known weight of metal of these weapons was light, all being only two 
58 
or three-pounders. At least three of the sloops and one schooner car- 
59 
ried swivel guns as well, numbering six per vessel where known. The 
60 
same schooner also mounted a cohorn. In keeping with this basic 
trend, a reference to an unidentified tender (perhaps one already in- 
cluded in the count) describes her as mounting two carriage guns and 
61 twelve swivels. Also, late in the campaign, Wayland planned to fit 
out a prize sloop with four four-pound carriage guns and twelve swiv- 
els. 62 
A word is in order on the relative sizes of the various types of 
vessels in terms of tonnage. For sloops, twenty to twenty-five tons 
was considered small, forty to fifty tons was medium, and vessels up 
to one-hundred tons were large. Schooner sizes roughly mirrored those 
of sloops. Comparatively larger were brigs. Sizes for this type ranged 
from thirty or forty tons to one-hundred and eighty tons, with exarn- 
ples in the sixty to one-hundred ton range being typical. Snows gener- 
ally averaged slightly larger than brigs with ninety to one-hundred 
and twenty ton versions being the norm. Ships were larger yet, and 
with tonnage running from forty to four-hundred tons, they offered the 
widest differences in size. One-hundred to two-hundred and fifty-ton 
ships, however, were the more common. 63 
Compared to regular men-of-war, the crews of these vessels were 
rather diminutive as well. Still, a respectable number of loyalist 
mariners served on them. The compliments of eight of the seventeen are 
known with numbers ranging from a schooner with roughly ten men to a 
64 
sloop with as many as twenty-four. In addition, at the lower end of 
65 the scale, there was a sloop with eleven men. Towards the higher end 
were an unidentified tender and John Collett's, both with sixteen sea- 
66 
men. In between were two sloops, each with fifteen crewmen and an- 
other with fourteen. 67 
Two additional figures exist for the crew of the sloop Lady SUI 
san. In June, when under Bridger Goodrich's command, her compliment 
-
was twenty men. In late July, with William Goodrich as captain, her 
crew consisted of nineteen men. These numbers are not included in the 
eight for the following reasons. The sloop with twenty-four men was 
that commanded by Bridger at Hobb's Hole in April. Though unidenti- 
fied, this vessel was probably the Lady Susan which Bridger is known 
to have been in command of shortly after. Consequently, in all subse- 
quent calculations, erring on the side of caution in an effort to 
avoid duplicating crews, the three figures will be considered to rep- 
resent the same crew on the same tender. Furthermore, for ease of dis- 
cussion, this vessel will be referred to as the Lady Susan. Accepting 
these three figures represent the crew of the Lady Susan at different 
periods, then it is interesting to note that the size of her compli- 
ment actually decreased a bit over time. The first and more serious 
reduction, from twenty-four to twenty, may well reflect the casualties 
sustained in the Hobb's Hole fight. The second decrease, however, from 
twenty to nineteen, is really of little, if any, consequence. 68 
Regarding the other tenders, generally, it is safe to say the 
crew of one vessel does not overlap with that of another thus dupli- 
cating the number, In other words, for the most part, the figures rep- 
resent distinctly separate bodies of men. The tenders in question ap- 
pear to have stayed in service for the duration or until captured at 
which time there was no exchange of prisoners. There is, however, one 
exception that needs to be taken into account. This involves the men 
of the Lively. Though lost at Gwynn's, her crew managed to escape. 
Having done so, it seems likely they entered on other vessels, perhaps 
other tenders. Consequently, again erring on the side of caution to 
avoid a duplication of crews, in the following calculations a multi- 
plier of sixteen rather than seventeen tenders will be used. 
Accepting these figures offer a representative sample, working 
with an average number of twenty-one men for the &dl Susan, an aver- 
age crew size of fifteen men can be derivedS6' This average coincides 
neatly with the mid-range figures in the sample, showing they are not 
skewed. If the average numbers are projected by multiplying by six- 
teen, then no less than 240 loyalists served on these tenders. 
In addition, there are figures for three captured but unidenti- 
fied tenders, two of which had a combined number of about fifty men, 
70 and the other, eighteen. Though the figure of fifty is not exact, for 
the sake of this study it will be used to represent the total number 
of men on the first two vessels. It need be noted that being unidenti- 
fied, they might be the same as vessels already included in the seven- 
teen. They are not, however, the same as the three vessels with the 
largest crews, the two with the smallest, or the Fincastle (when com- 
manded by Stewart), the Lively, or the Lady Stanley, for which the 
crew sizes are not recorded. These eight tenders were taken at other 
71 times and places or were not taken at all. Furthermore, given there 
were obviously more than seventeen loyalist tenders total, it seems 
highly unlikely the three vessels in question were the same as the 
three of the nine remaining for whom crew size has been reported. 
Whether they represent duplicates or not, one thing is clear. Consid- 
ering the additional figures all date to the later half of July, when 
compared to the proportionately greater number of small crews to large 
at an earlier date, they reflect a higher ratio of larger compliments. 
In other words, the crew sizes of loyalist tenders appear to have gen- 
erally increased late in the period. Of course, this trend supports 
that an additional number of loyalist mariners joined Dunmore as the 
campaign progressed. Perhaps the figures reflect an influx of indi- 
viduals from Maryland as the Governor's fleet moved up the Bay. 
If the three unidentified vessels were the same as three others 
included in the seventeen, but for which the crew sizes have not been 
counted, the average number of sailors per tender late in the period 
rose to seventeen. This is actually a conservative figure considering 
later, larger crew sizes are averaged with smaller ones from earlier. 
In essence, if the crews of an earlier date conformed to the trend of 
increased size, the resulting average would be even higher. When ex- 
trapolated by multiplying by sixteen, a total figure of 272 men is de- 
rived. If the three tenders were additional vessels, then the average 
of seventeen multiplied by nineteen, the new number of representative 
vessels, results in a total of 323 loyalist seamen. 
Supporting the median figures and an increase in crew size is an 
alternative approach. Of the eleven tenders with known crew size (in- 
cluding the three unidentified vessels), for four, the figures predate 
the evacuation of  orf folk." Two more are from the time of the occupa- 
tion of Gwynn's ~ s l a n d . ~ ~  Four represent the weeks in Maryland waters. 74 
For the crew representing the Lady Susan, there are figures for all 
75 three periods. The averages for both the first and second periods are 
sixteen men per vessel. While slightly higher than the earlier fifteen 
men per tender, the figure is, nevertheless, close. This figure of 
sixteen is also slightly skewed upwards, because the smallest crew re- 
corded actually falls within the third time frame, where, when aver- 
aged in, actually still skews that average down. The average crew size 
for the last group is nineteen men per vessel. All in all, these fig- 
ures are both comparable with those established earlier and reflect an 
increase in crew size. 
An additional figure can be added to the totals. The compliment 
of the Governor's flagship, the Dunmore, consisted of thirty-one indi- 
7 6 
viduals. When this is added to the lowest number derived, a total of 
271 men is obtained. When added to the highest, a total of 354 is ar- 
rived at. Also, three additional figures exist, representing partial 
crews of four loyalist tenders. These can not be added to the numbers 
just stated because all four vessels have already been factored in 
with the seventeen when discerning the averages. They do, however, ac- 
count for known, documented crewmen. In July, Mariman, as Wayland's 
prisoner, claimed seeing parts of the crews of three schooners, in 
all, about twenty men, ten of which, after deleting the ten from Way- 
77 land's crew already counted, can be added in. In addition, roughly 
seven loyalists can be identified on the Lilly, and the seven slave 
7 8 
mariners belonging to the Stewarts can be added as well. Finally, 
Captains Miller, Picket, Forsyth, McDonald, Younghusband, and Robert 
Stewart can be factored in. The bottom line is that actual known crew 
members on loyalist warships totaled 250. Exclusive of the crew of the 
D u ~ p q g  (technically not a tender) and five of the captains who are 
the sole representatives of five obviously larger crews, 214 loyalists 
remain associated with only twelve of at least seventeen and quite 
possibly twenty tenders. This figure conforms well to the averaged and 
projected figures which, though admittedly rough, safely and conserva- 
tively support that no less than about 275 Tory mariners saw active 
duty on loyalist commanded tenders with Dunmore, and quite possibly as 
many as 325 served on such craft. 
These figures do not include those loyalists who served on the 
twenty additional identified tenders, active at different times, under 
direct naval command.79 There were only six naval vessels that spent 
any time in the Virginia theater assisting Dunmore. While the crews of 
these six were relatively large, they were of a finite number required 
for the effective and efficient handling of the vessels. Only so many 
could be spared for duty on auxiliary craft. At the same time, naval 
personnel were increasingly reduced by illness. Sickness aboard the 
Otter was described as "epidemick, " and many died." The logs and jour- 
nals of these vessels contain a number of references to sailors who 
had "Departed this life. "'l Hamond was particularly concerned about 
82 personnel losses due to the sicknesses that ravaged the fleet. Other 
mariners certainly became casualties or were taken prisoner. Crewmen 
were at a premium; so much so that Hammond was quite worried at one 
point upon hearing Squire intended fitting out an additional tender 
83 for the Otter, believing it would weaken her compliment too much. The 
situation was dire enough to warrant the occasional transfer of crew- 
84 
men from one naval vessel to another to make up differences. To make 
up the losses and man their auxiliary craft, the navy supplemented 
their crews with local talent. Unfortunately, figures indicating to 
what degree loyalists were relied on are lacking. Still, there are 
some references supporting that they were employed. The crew of Sla- 
ter's Betsey were pressed as were two men from another merchantman and 
three from a third.B5 The Fincastle, when under naval command, still 
relied on the services of seven local mariners, and there were two 
blacks who were not naval personnel on the Betsey with Slater at the 
86 time of her capture. The sloop-tender Edward also had some black sea- 
men aboard during the Baltimore expedition as did the m and another 
87 
of the Otter's tenders. Slave John King spent time on H.M. Sloop a n 3  
88 Fisher before being returned to his owner, John Goodrich, Sr. All in- 
--
dications are that a fair number of additional loyalists served on na- 
val vessels at this time. 
This leads to another related topic. A high proportion of some 
loyalist crews and the total number of loyalist sailors as well, were 
black. Of the combined crews on the Baltimore foray, twelve to four- 
B 9 teen were Negroes. Later, four were on the Edward when she was cap- 
90 tured, and there were six on the Samuel when she took the Molly. At 
least five served between the Hawk and another of the =Leg's tend- 
91 ers. In April, the twenty-four man crew of Bridger Goodrich's tender 
was described as being comprised mostly of slaves, and later, there 
were eight blacks with the Lady Susan when ~aptured.~' The mulatto, 
Lazarus served with Wayland, and the slave Caesar acted as pilot on a 
tender. 93 Then there were the Stewart's seven slave mariners and the 
94 two men who served on the Betsey. George Mills ran away to serve at 
95 sea as well. Three or four blacks made up a part of the Lilly's small 
96 crew when John Goodrich, Sr. was taken. One of the two tenders of un- 
known type had a crew of sixteen including two Negroes, and in the 
other, Collett's, fifteen of the sixteen men were of that same race. 97 
Finally, there were no less than twenty-five serving on the Dunmore, 
men and women. 98 
When added up, no less than eighty-two black mariners are ac- 
counted for. It is, however, impossible to derive a solid percentage 
of black to white seamen on loyalist tenders. The available figures 
are simply too few, small, varied, and unrelated. Efforts to attain 
such a figure were made from nine different angles, two of which 
proved so convoluted they are of dubious value. As to the other seven, 
first, the total number of actually accounted for loyalist mariners, 
266 (including thirteen known to have been on naval tenders plus John 
King, Caesar, and George Mills), was compared with the total number of 
known black mariners. Next, the total number of loyalist sailors on 
loyalist commanded vessels, 250, was compared with the total number of 
blacks, sixty-eight, serving on like craft. For the Samuel, the fig- 
ures fifteen and six were used. These represent the total compliment 
on the Baltimore raid and the six blacks reported on her a little over 
a week after her return from that operation. Then, the same was done 
after deleting the six white and twenty-five black crew members on the 
flagship, Dunmore. She was not technically a tender, and the high ra- 
tio of blacks in the crew tends to skew results. Following this, the 
percentage of Negroes relative to the entire compliment was examined 
for five vessels for which both figures are established. This entailed 
seventy-six whites and thirty-two blacks. Finally, the total number of 
blacks, forty-two, known to have made up parts of the crews of seven 
tenders, was averaged to achieve a number of six per vessel. This fig- 
ure was, in turn, compared for three median crew sizes, fifteen, sev- 
enteen, and nineteen, derived for loyalist tenders. The results, were 
31%, 278, 20%, 42% 40%, 35%, and 32%, receptively. Clearly, this of- 
fers too wide a spread to tell anything definite, but all figures do 
indicate the ratio of blacks to whites was fairly high. Of course the 
percentages, as indicated by specific numbers, varied considerably be- 
tween vessels, but it seems safe to say that overall, perhaps one 
third of the total number of loyalist mariners serving Dunmore were 
black. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine how many of these 
blacks were free men and how many were slaves. Furthermore, of the 
slaves, it is impossible to discern how many were runaways taking ad- 
vantage of Dunmore's proclamation, and how many served under the con- 
trol of their owners simply because they were slaves. The only refer- 
ence found to a free black was Pompey White, captured on the ~dward." 
Three of his crewmates, however, were slaves, and the general evidence 
supports a high percentage of other blacks were still or had recently 
100 been in bondage. Certainly John King and Caesar were slaves as were 
the Stewart's seven men, two on an unidentified loyalist tender, at 
least some on Collett Is, and three on the naval tender, Per- 
haps slaves Mike, Harry, and Aberdeen, who shared the Williamsburg 
jail with their owner, Goodrich, were the same blacks taken on the 
102 Lilly. "Thomas Saunders, John Lucy, John Pomp, Samuel Sawood, Jack 
Masson, Charles Mills, Chance, and JefferyIW captured on the Lady Su- 
103 
san, were slaves as well- This last vessel and crew are noteworthy, 
-
because it appears Dunmore purchased four men specifically for service 
104 
on her. Only George Mills, Aaron, and Johnny, can be confirmed as 
105 runaways, although there were undoubtedly others. In any case, 
Dunmore's reliance on black personnel was repugnant in the extreme to 
the revolutionaries. Concerning the Governor's policy, one rebel 
called it "Damned, infernal, [and] Diabolical. "Io6 Another stated: 
"Hell itself could not have vomited any thing more black. "lo' Despite 
such viewpoints, black mariners with Dunmore seem to have performed 
the same yeoman service many would on loyalist privateers later in the 
conflict . 
Many loyalists, at least in the maritime community, appear to 
have been of an opposite mindset regarding blacks. They do not seem to 
have been bothered in the least by the idea of black sailors, or serv- 
ing alongside them. Others with Dunmore were apparently little trou- 
bled by associating with blacks as well which offended rebel proprie- 
ties. Arriving at Gwynn's, the loyalists, "on their evening after 
landing amused themselves with a promiscuous ball, in which a certain 
spruce little gentleman opened with one of the black ladies. ,108 
Furthermore, considering the situation, loyalists must have 
known the possibility of losing their slaves was very real, but re- 
taining possession of them does not seem to have been a high priority. 
109 In fact, the Stewart brothers would free their slave mariners. This 
is not to say all these loyalists viewed blacks as equals. In an ac- 
count of his capture, William Goodrich failed to acknowledge the eight 
slaves with him as full crew members.'1° Still, the practice of relying 
on black tars would be widely embraced by loyalist privateersmen, es- 
pecially on vessels with southern and West Indian affiliations. 
Actually, even less is known about the backgrounds of the white 
loyalist crewmen. Though serving before the mast, James Gilchrist of 
Norfolk, with associates such as St. George Tucker, undoubtedly fell 
111 into the category of gentleman adventurer. Fifteen white crewmen 
taken on two tenders in December were referred to as "Americans. "112 
Another reference concerns the crews of three schooners under Way- 
land's command in July. A captive reported encountering about twenty 
of these individuals who he described as all "Country born" but one. 113 
These two sources tend to support the conclusion that the majority of 
the mariners with Dunmore were natives, but the reference to one man 
of foreign birth does indicate the possible presence of an occasional 
mercenary outsider. As with the blacks, it is also apparent that at 
this time, not all white seamen acted on their own free will or were 
firm in their political convictions. As noted, some on naval vessels 
had been pressed. Most telling is the fact that when given the oppor- 
tunity, seven of the ten white crewmen on the Lady Susan opted to join 
the rebels. While perhaps some made this decision to avoid imprison- 
ment, it would appear there was a mercenary tendency or considerable 
indecision among Billie's sailors as well. Dale certainly had some 
trouble making up his mind. 
Other Tory seamen, however, were clearly strong supporters of 
the King. Of the eleven men comprising Bartlet's crew at the time of 
seizure, only one protested his captivity, and was allowed to go 
114 free. Gilchrist, though unhappy with the state of affairs in general 
and his own situation in particular, was nevertheless resigned and 
stalwart in his convictions. After a two month cruise on the Fincas- 
tle, he wrote: 
-
I assure you I am heartily wearied of this Life of amphibious War 
fare, & could I find out where to be more at ease I shou'd not be 
long in making my Choise - But alas! all the Continent is in the 
same ruinous Condition & as for great Britain I cannot think of 
going there - Every thing save the Book debts which canny2 be col- 
lected, is lost - But I hope yet to live to see the Day. 
Marmaduke Mister was another loyalist mariner whose political opinions 
and solid stance are known. Mister was one of Wayland's crewmen at the 
time Moses Yell was briefly held captive. Yell recounted a conversa- 
tion he had with this seaman. 
Mister ask'd this Deponant who he was for, whether King or Country 
this Deponant answer'd he was Friend to every person who behav'd 
well the afsd Mr then commanded in the King's Name to tell him the 
Truth this Deponant then told him he was born in this Country and 
had a Right to defend his Liberty, Mister then said what these 
damnld Rf12els call Liberty I call Slavery, h so the people will 
find it. 
While many of these loyalist tars seem to have acted in a volun- 
teer capacity, thus reflecting their sincere political stance, those 
mariners signing articles on vessels which Dunmore had officially 
117 taken into government service received pay. While the amount for the 
118 
ratings is unknown, Captain John Forsyth received t 0 . 4 . 6  per day. It 
seems unlikely, however, that the prospect of wages was a serious in- 
centive overriding personal ideologies. On the contrary, the opposite 
must have been true. In essence, it is doubtful the pay for common 
seamen amounted to much, and if money was a consideration, a mariner 
could make an equivalent sum elsewhere with less hardship and risk. 
The tenders known to have been commanded and manned by loyalists 
suffered relatively heavy losses. Ten were captured or destroyed in 
action with the rebels. The circumstances, however, of the loss of 
seven are known and of interest. Only one was taken in a ship-to-ship 
action. The other six were all seized because they had become trapped 
(two were aground) in waterways or harbors, in which they were taken 
by parties from shore. An eleventh was wrecked and her crew captured 
after making it to Land. In other words, the known situations of 
losses do not reflect an inability or unwillingness to fight. Rather, 
it seems these men had the common sense to realize that discretion was 
the better part of valor. 119 
These losses were, however, more than balanced by the effect the 
tenders had on the rebels. One effect was to force Virginia and Mary- 
land to spend considerable time, effort, and money to create their own 
120 
navies to meet the threat and protect commerce and coastlines. In 
turn, these efforts diverted manpower and materials that might have 
been better used elsewhere. In November, 1775, with matters heating up 
in Virginia, Richard Henry Lee emphasized the need for a rebel naval 
121 force in the Bay. By December, although not constituting a formal 
navy, militia under Richard and James Baron were sailing armed vessels 
122 out of Hampton, Virginia. A t  the same time, the Convention consid- 
ered a proposal to establish a regular naval force to protect shipping 
and repulse enemy raids. On January 11, 1776, the resolution passed.123 
While Virginia considered its proposal in December, Maryland 
purchased a merchantman to convert into a man-of-war. Named the De- 
fence, she would be ready for sea by March, in time to help ward off 
124 Squire's attempted attack on Baltimore. In the interim, while the 
two colonies prepared their nascent seagoing forces, the rebels in- 
tended that vessels of the Continental Navy, authorized by Congress 
125 in October, would fill in. A Continental squadron was, in fact, or- 
dered to the Bay to confront Dunmore, but, having sailed in February, 
it never reached there, opting instead to raid New Providence in the 
126 Bahamas. Virginia and Maryland were on their own. Of course, build- 
ing a navy takes time, and neither state was in full swing by the time 
Dunmore gave up his hold on the region, and Dunmore's fleet certainly 
maintained naval superiority throughout the period of its presence. 
Yet, the gradual build-up and very presence of the rebel warships was 
a deterrent to Dunmore's movements and activities. Late in the cam- 
paign, Dunmore, himself, said the rebels "have actually drove all our 
Tenders up to the Fleet", and Captain Hammond did "not think it safe 
to trust one of His Majesty's Sloops alone in the ~a~."'~' 
Given their propensity for raiding ashore, the tenders occupied 
the attention of Virginia and Maryland rebels in another way. Untold 
numbers of men in militia and colonial military units were required to 
focus their energies on attempts to foil loyalist aggression. Of 
course, this expended even more manpower, funds, and materials. 
Most importantly though, for roughly a year, British and loyal- 
ist craft thoroughly disrupted the trade of the two colonies and at 
128 times, brought it to a complete standstill. In general, the loyalist 
and naval tenders1 effectiveness was confirmed by Dunmore's reports. 
As early as January 9, 1776, he reported that the blockade was working 
129 
well enough to drive up prices in Virginia. On February 15, he com- 
mented that the tenders brought in prizes from New England daily. 130 
These vessels had come for cargoes of flour and grain for the rebel 
army. Their loss prevented them from supplying that force with needed 
131 provisions. As of early March, the Governor reported tenders had 
taken or destroyed nearly thirty prizes.132 The tenders' success im- 
pressed Hamond as Even the rebels admitted, "there were so 
many tenders crusing upon the coast ... that it is almost impossible for 
any vessel to escape them. 
As with the numbers of tenders and crewmen, it is impossible to 
assess the total number of prizes taken by loyalist associated ves- 
sels, but again some respectable minimum figures can be determined. A 
total of twenty-five prizes can be credited to specific loyalist com- 
manded and manned tenders acting either independently or in consort 
135 
with naval vessels. In conjunction, the Samuel and Edward (the lat- 
ter being Goodrich owned with loyalist crewmen) seized four or five 
additional prizes at the mouth of the Patapsco on the Baltimore expe- 
dition, but they were quickly retaken.136 One of these was the ship 
Molly, later captured again by William Goodrich and included in the 
count of twenty-five. The Edward also seized at least one prize on her 
137 138 
own. Also, the -castle with loyalist crewmen took three more. A 
rebel newspaper account lists eight additional prizes which do not 
match any of those already mentioned or any known to have been taken 
139 by the navy. Then, the Goodrich owned Lord Howe while under naval 
command captured six more either by herself or while in consort with 
140  
other naval vessels. Also, a list of prizes condemned and sold under 
the authority of Dunmore's admiralty court includes five vessels whose 
141 captors are not listed or known. As mentioned earlier, this is a 
problematic document requiring some care when using. Still, it is 
fairly good (though not infallible) in denoting those prizes taken by 
naval vessels or their tenders. Consequently, it is possible these 
five were taken by loyalists craft as well. A problem, however, re- 
mains with including these in the count. Some might represent dupli- 
cates of others already factored in. Finally, unidentified tenders 
142 seized at least four more rebel vessels. In any case, tenders with 
loyalist affiliations took at least forty-six enemy bottoms and possi- 
bly as many as fifty-five. To put this in perspective, by comparison, 
143 the navy can be firmly credited with another fifty-two. In addition, 
there is a reference to another prize sloop taken by the navy, but it 
is possible she is a duplicate of one included in the fifty-two.14' A 
final prize was run aground by the navy during the course of the 
chase, could not be got off, and so, only her cargo was seized.145 When 
totaled, at least 102 prizes are known to have been take by Dunmore's 
forces. If the six treated as possible duplicates were not, and the 
vessel that ran aground is included, then the total rises to 109. Of 
the loyalist associated prizes, only six or seven, inclusive of the 
three or four on the Patapsco, are known to have been recaptured by 
146 the rebels. Of the loyalist tenders' forty-six prizes, the type is 
known for thirty-four. These included one brigantine, two brigs, two 
147 ships, twelve schooners, and seventeen sloops. Two of these were 
French.14' The possible additional five on Dunmore's list consisted of 
149 one brig and four sloops. The only prize for which a value is known 
is the sloop Libert~ taken by Forsyth. Dunmore, himself, purchased her 
at auction for £295. In terms of the number of vessels taken, loyalist 
mariners under Dunmore took their toll of enemy shipping. 150 
These men also made their mark seizing important cargoes of pro- 
visions, textiles, medicines, munitions, and arms, necessary for the 
rebel war effort. In turn, there can be little doubt these commodities 
were put to good use by their captors. Of the forty-six prizes, the 
cargoes are reported for twenty-two (exclusive of the recaptures). Two 
151 
were in ballast. Four more carried shipments which, although proba- 
bly valuable as prize goods (one was loaded with tobacco, another, 
logwood and mahogany, and a third, molasses and coffee), do not fall 
within the category discussed, and at this point their loss could not 
152 have had much effect on the rebel economy. As to the remaining six- 
teen, five carried provisions consisting of Indian corn, corn, flour, 
wheat, bread, cider, cheese, potatoes, and pork.153 By one account, the 
cargo of one of these, the ship  moll^, consisted of 1,900 barrels of 
154 flour and bread and 5,000 bushels of wheat. By another, her lading 
155 was 838 barrels of flour and 15,000 bushels of wheat. Either figure 
represents a considerable loss. One of these same vessels also trans- 
ported barrel staves, necessary for the proper storage of food and 
156 supplies. Another prize was in the process of running in a large 
shipment of medicines when taken, and yet another had a small quantity 
of the same.15' The latter of these and two more carried textiles. 158 
159 These same three also transported gunpowder as did four others. Two 
of these last four carried arms as well, and one shipped saltpeter and 
su1f~r.l~~ All told, loyalists were involved in seizing at least 535 
barrels and seventy-four half barrels of gunpowder on these prizes as 
well as 315 stands of arms.16' The rebel press reported the loss of 
three additional vessels bringing in munitions and weapons whose sei- 
162 zure is attributed to loyalists. While failing to state the amount 
of gunpowder, the account does offer the remarkable figure of 5,000 
163 stands of arms being taken. Losses of this nature indicate loyalist 
mariners put a serious crimp in the rebel war effort. These, however, 
could not compare with the damage loyalist privateers would do later. 
Perhaps of more significance is the fact that Loyalist mariners 
had begun to prove their value in a conflict involving a querre de 
course. While the Royal Navy, then and later, would often hold a dim 
and skeptical view of loyalist potential at sea, at least some naval 
officers who served with provincial mariners at this time came to es- 
teem their worth. Some strong loyalist/navy bonds were established, 
especially with Squire and Hamond, that would last in the years to 
come. 
During 1775 and 1776, a significant number of loyalist mariners 
showed their support of government by coming forth to serve on a rela- 
tively large number of tenders. For their efforts, they lost a large 
proportion of vessels and crews. At the same, however, they seriously 
disrupted rebel trade by seizing a larger number of their merchantmen. 
Furthermore, some of the prizes shipped materials specifically needed 
by rebel military forces. Through this and forcing the Virginians and 
Marylanders to take measures to counter their operations, the loyal- 
ists negatively affected rebel war aims. 
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CHAPTER 6 
"ZEALOUS TO BECOME USEFUL:" THE LOYALIST PRIVATEERS 
OF THE NEW ENGLAND MARITIME REGIONS' 
It is not surprising that New England, given its strong maritime 
culture, produced a number of loyalists who would become privateers. 
The area can be neatly subdivided into two distinct maritime regions. 
Massachusetts Bay and the Gulf of Maine, with Boston as the key port, 
constituted the upper New England region. Long Island Sound and Narra- 
gansett Bay (inclusive of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard) with New- 
port, Rhode Island as the main port, comprised the lower portion. 
The men of both New England areas fit the broader composite view 
of loyalists, but exhibit regional variation with the Chesapeake loy- 
alists and even among themselves. The New England loyalist primarily 
came from coastal, urban environments, and demographically, there was 
a correlation between open support and a British presence. In Massa- 
chusetts and Rhode Island, the merchants and mariners dominated over a 
smattering of individuals from other backgrounds. In Connecticut, how- 
ever, there was a higher percentage of men from other walks of life. 
Among the men of both the upper and lower regions, there was a high 
percentage of native born and a minimal amount of ethnic and racial 
representation. Despite the fact some of these men supported pre-war 
anti-British protest, there is no evidence of equivocalness among 
them. At the same time, there is evidence indicating neutral behavior 
by some. Motivational factors were typically varied, and a large num- 
ber suffered some form of abuse at the hands of the rebels. Signifi- 
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Figure 3: The Upper New England Maritime Region. 
cantly, a many of these men acted in a variety of capacities other 
than as privateers to support the British, which reflects their seri- 
ous level of commitment. It should be noted that research has failed 
to identify any loyalist privateers from New Hampshire. It would be 
very surprising, however, to find that colony produced none, espe- 
cially from Portsmouth. 
The upper New England merchants and mariners who would become 
privateers were primarily from coastal urban areas. From the Boston 
merchant class came Frederick William Geyer, Joseph Taylor, Samuel 
Rogers, George Leonard, James Anderson, Alexander Brymer, Nathaniel 
Coffin, Philip Dumaresque, and Francis Green. Sandwich produced mer- 
chant Samuel Perry. Brymer was agent for Robert Grant of London, con- 
tractor for provisions for the British fleet in American waters. Leon- 
ard dealt in grain. Some of these Bostonians, Geyer for instance, were 
exceedingly wealthy. Others were well educated. Green and Taylor were 
Harvard graduates. 2 
On the Maine coast, Falmouth (Portland) produced merchants Rob- 
ert Pagan and his brothers, William and Thomas, partners in Pagan & 
Co. Robert Pagan was a popular young immigrant from Scotland who main- 
tained business ties there. In addition, he operated a large store, 
traded in lumber, and built vessels for sale in Europe. 3 
As noted, a number of loyal skippers hailed from the region as 
well. Those from Massachusetts, though still from within the Boston 
area, were more demographically dispersed than the merchants. William 
Gallop, master of a vessel making runs to North Carolina and the West 
Indies, was the only identifiable mariner from Boston proper. Antill 
Gallop, however, was from Cambridge and Jacob Rogers resided in Char- 
lestown. In addition, William Lewis came from Lynn, Issacher Woodbury 
hailed from Salem, and Ebenezer Hathaway was from Freetown. Perry, of 
Sandwich, was a mariner as well as a merchant. The maritime expertise 
of Antill Gallop, Lewis, Woodbury, Hathaway, and Perry is deduced from 
the fact that all five later commanded privateers. That merchant 
George Leonard later commanded a squadron of privateers indicates he 
possessed a very strong maritime background too. 4 
On the Maine coast, a small concentration of loyalist mariners 
existed in Pownalborough (Wiscasset). These included Charles Callahan 
(sometimes Callaghan), Edmund Doharty, and Nathaniel Gardiner. That 
these men were qualified seamen is apparent from their later roles as 
pilots and privateer captains. Also, mariners Thomas Wyer and Thomas 
Ross of Falmouth supported the royal cause, as did Richard Pomeroy of 
Medumcock (Friendship). In light of the later services he performed at 
sea as a pilot and prize master, it is apparent that Zebedee Linnekin 
of St. Georges was an experienced mariner as well. 5 
A few men from upper New England destined to become privateers 
were public officials. Joseph Goldthwaite held what must have been the 
exceedingly popular post of Barracks' Master in Boston. In the same 
city, Coffin served in another enviable position as the last Receiver- 
General and Cashier of his Majesty's Customs. Gardiner had been a mag- 
istrate in Rhode Island prior to moving to Maine. Wyer was a customs 
officer at Falmouth. Finally, Antill Gallop acted as High Sheriff of 
Middlesex County. 6 
Other occupations were represented. In addition to being sea- 
farers, Callahan and Linnekin were farmers. Jacob Rogers possessed 
3,000 acres in New Hampshire. Henry Cowe owned and operated a one- 
hundred acre "plantation" at Wexton, sixteen miles from Boston. His 
later role as a prize agent, indicates Brymer may have possessed some 
legal training. 7 
Four of these men had at least some prior military or naval ex- 
perience. Green had served in the French and Indian conflict, and 
Goldthwaite went by the title "Major," indicating a military or, at 
least, militia association. Jacob Rogers spent time as a lieutenant in 
the Royal Navy until court-martialed and forced to resign in 1773. 
Then, there was Dumaresque who may well have been the same Philip Du- 
maresque who commanded a privateer out of Boston during King George's 
War. If not, he was undoubtedly a close relative, and therefore, had 
some association with the activity. The Dumaresque family was associ- 
ated with naval affairs in another manner. The son, Philip Jr., was a 
Royal Navy officer. 8 
Between a number of these men there were family or business ties 
that may have affected their decision to remain loyal. Taylor and Sam- 
uel Rogers were business partners as were Coffin and Anderson. Ander- 
son had strong entrepreneurial ties with a Scottish firm, and as 
shown, both he and Coffin did business with Jamieson in Virginia. The 
Pagan brothers had strong business affiliations with Scotland as well, 
and Brymer was agent for a London contractor. Their wives being sis- 
ters, Robert Pagan and Wyer were related by marriage. The Geyer and 
Coffin families, too, were linked in the same manner. Finally, it 
would seem likely there was some blood relationship between William 
and Antill Gallop. As will be seen, if these upper New England men 
were not known to each other at this point, many would soon become so. 9 
Conforming to the established loyalist profile, but in contrast 
to loyalists of some other regions is the fact that a higher percent- 
age of upper New England privateers were native born. Of the thirteen 
whose place of birth is known, six were colonials. In fact, some, such 
as Geyer, Leonard, and Coffin, emanated from well established fami- 
10 lies. Seven men, Cowe, Callaghan, Anderson, Brymer, and the Pagans, 
were immigrants. Cowe was from St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. Callaghan 
hailed from Ireland. The others were Scots, conforming to the estab- 
lished view that this ethnic group dominated the loyalist immigrant 
element in the region. This immigrant figure is, however, skewed up- 
ward by the fact that three of the men represent a single family. 11 
Apart from a handful of Scots, minorities, both ethnic and ra- 
cial, were minimally represented. With few exceptions, the surnames of 
most of these individuals suggest that they were of English extrac- 
tion. Dumaresque, however, suggests the strong possibility of some 
French ancestry. Callahan indicates an Irish background. Known racial 
minorities were represented only by Henry Cowe who described himself 
as a mulatto. Although he did not specifically say so, all indications 
such as property ownership support that he was a free man. 12 
It need be noted that in the pre-war era, at least a couple of 
these men were sympathetic to the rebel cause and even supported it. 
Green was "an avowed enemy to the pretended unlimited power of Parlia- 
mentary taxation," who lived in "hope of an honorable compromise, 
without recourse to arms. w13 In 1774, Robert Pagan backed the non- 
importation of tea. 14 
Of course, the Boston area constituted the very apex of revolu- 
tionary activity during the opening months of the conflict. This, in 
conjunction with the strong, countering, British military presence, 
either forced people to declare for the King or made them feel safe 
about doing so. For the most part, the Boston area merchants and mari- 
ners for whom there is relevant information made their position known 
15 early, joining the British. Taylor, however, initially displayed con- 
duct indicating a desire to maintain a passive loyalist stance. Almost 
immediately after the opening shots, he departed for ~n~1and.l~ Geyer 
17 did the same. Cowe also must have adopted a passive or neutral posi- 
tion, and he must have been adept at it. He did not leave his home un- 
til 1778.18 
An established and accepted historical pattern for loyalist ac- 
tivity indicates the further away one was from the action and a Brit- 
ish military or naval presence, the need, desire, and/or urgency to 
declare decreased, and neutral loyalists were more in evidence. This 
trend is evident among the future privateersmen of upper New England. 
Though all in question would become very active, there was an increase 
in the number of neutral or passive loyalists proportionate to the 
further away one was from Boston. Perry, of Sandwich, Massachusetts, 
did not leave until September, 1777." At Falmouth, Wyer seems to have 
managed an unobtrusive, if tenuous, existence until the town was 
burned in October, 1775. The Pagans did the same, though Robert's and 
Thomas's support of the King was evident as early as May, 1775. Still, 
the brothers initially did not wish to become embroiled and did their 
best to avoid matters. Stating that he wanted no part of being in a 
country destined to be in a state of rebellion, Robert applied for 
permission to pack up everything, and leave with his family. His re- 
quest was denied." 
Further afield on the Maine coast, there is evidence of even 
greater neutral behavior. While decidedly loyal at heart, there were 
those who were not overly eager to take up arms, and seemingly content 
to passively sit out the war if not provoked. Callahan was such a per- 
son. He only became actively involved with the British after being re- 
21 peatedly "drafted" by the rebels. Linnekin, on the other hand, bought 
his way out of rebel service, paying a fee of £30. Even though he also 
refused to take the rebel oath, this seems to have bought him some 
time as well, because he did not join the British until after their 
occupation of the Penobscot region in June, 1179.~' 
As elsewhere, a high percentage of these men suffered various 
forms of abuse for their opinions. Interestingly, despite his politi- 
cal leanings, Green was the victim of mob violence. Wyer was repeat- 
edly fined and then ultimately suffered a lengthy imprisonment for not 
subscribing to the rebels. Anderson lost two vessels to the rebels 
while carrying supplies to the British at Boston. The majority lost 
heavily in terms of real estate, fixed capital, personal property, 
shipping, and merchandise. 23 
A particularly personal manner in which the conflict affected 
these loyalists was the disruption of their families. In fact, amongst 
privateersmen, indications are that there was a higher rate of this 
form of incident in upper New England than in most places. Wyer, Ross, 
and Linnekin were forced to leave their families behind for a time, 
and in the case of Linnekin, after he left, the rebels took possession 
24 of his farm and turned his family out. Ultimately, Robert Pagan was 
25 able to send his to Barbados. Goldthwaite's wife was arrested and 
kept under guard despite ill-health. Even after her poor physical con- 
dition was acknowledged and measures were taken to accommodate her, 
she remained under the control and watchful eye of a committee of cor- 
26 
respondence. Finally, although seemingly well cared for, Leonard's 
infant son was held in Boston for at least a large part of the war. 27 
Of note, and reflecting the degree of their loyalty to the 
crown, is the fact that several of these men, William Gallop, the Pa- 
gans, and Wyer, suffered significantly at the hands of the British, 
yet their beliefs remained unshaken. On a voyage to St. Croix early in 
the conflict, Gallop "was obliged to take Bills on Philadelphia for 
his Wages and Adventure." To receive payment, he was required to go to 
that city. There, he bought 2/3rds of a vessel and while carrying a 
load of provisions in her to the British at New York, he was taken by 
H.M.S. Roebuck. The cargo was confiscated and distributed through the 
fleet. Shortly after, adding insult to injury, Gallop's vessel was 
wrecked and lost as a result of his having been detained.*' 
As a resident of Falmouth in October, 1775, Wyer lost a house, 
merchandise, and a vessel in which he had interest when that place was 
burned by the ~ritish." The Pagans, one of whom attempted to keep 
British naval Lieutenant Henry Mowat from firing on the town, lost 
heavily as well. A house and a store, the largest in town, went up in 
flames. The Pagans' misfortunes did not, however, end here. Robert's 
experiences serve as a good example of the ill-effects the Prohibatory 
Act could have on a loyalist merchant. One of his vessels had sailed 
for the West Indies prior to receipt of news about the Act. When word 
did arrive, fearing the vessel would be seized, resulting in a total 
loss, Pagan forwarded instructions that she be sold for considerably 
less than her actual value in an effort to salvage something of the 
venture. Then, finally managing to extricate themselves, the family 
sailed for Barbados on a second vessel, where, upon arrival, it, too, 
was seized by the British under the Act's authority. 30 
While the Massachusetts Bay/Gulf of Maine Region produced a num- 
ber of privateersmen (undoubtedly far more than are discussed here), 
and a fair number declared themselves for the King at an early date, 
with the exception of Pomeroy, there is no indication any of the men 
mentioned actually took up arms at sea until much later in the con- 
31 flict. In fact, very little is known about aggressive loyalist activ- 
ity at sea in the region up to the evacuation of Boston. Given the 
fact there was a decent Royal Navy presence in the area, it is possi- 
ble that not too much reliance was placed on local talent. Yet, loyal- 
ist armed vessels did exist. This is evident from one of the most in- 
triguing yet frustrating statements encountered in the course of doing 
research for this study. On January 26, 1776, Lt. Governor Thomas 
Oliver notified Lord Dartmouth that after receiving the approval of 
Major General William Howe and despite the fact he did not have the 
authorization to do so, he had been issuing letters of marque to mer- 
chantmen sailing to the West Indies. Howe was of the opinion these 
vessels would not only serve to distress the rebels, but might also 
help supply the garrison. Exactly how many and to whom these were is- 
sued remains a mystery. 32 
Only one loyalist, George Sibbles, can be identified as being at 
sea in the service of the Crown at this time, in this area. Unfortu- 
nately, little is known about his background. Still, circumstantial 
evidence points to his having had a New England affiliation. He first 
appears in that area, and his early activities are centered there. 
Furthermore, the owners of a privateer he later commanded were all 
Boston men. In any case, as of November, 1775, he commanded the sloop 
General Gage. Armed with eight carriage guns and swivels, she has been 
-*- 
variously described as a dispatch vessel, armed vessel, and tender. In 
fact, she was purchased at Boston in 1775 by the army's Quarter Master 
Department with the initial intention of using her as an armed trans- 
port and convoy escort. As will be seen, her role expanded over time. 
As her skipper, Sibbles holds the distinction of being the first loy- 
alist known to command an armed vessel in ship-to-ship action against 
the rebels. 33 
On January 25, 1776, off Boston harbor, Captain John Manly, com- 
manding the Continental Schooner Hannah with six four-pounders and ten 
swivels, seized two merchantmen carrying supplies and provisions to 
the British. Having finished putting a prize crew on the second cap- 
ture, Manly saw three additional vessels come into view. These proved 
to be the Genera1 G s s  and two provision transports she was escorting 
from Halifax. The two captains and their vessels squared off. Sibbles, 
undoubtedly intent on protecting his two charges and perhaps with an 
eye to retaking Manly's second prize aggressively approached. Manly, 
clearly intent on maintaining his prize and possibly hoping to snap up 
yet another, moved to meet him. A brusque little action ensued lasting 
about half an hour, and ending in what can best be described as a 
draw. The engagement ceased when the Hannah ran low on cartridges and 
the General Ga* turned for Boston. Both vessels had succeeded in 
their primary goal of covering the vessels in their care or possession 
while failing to acquire any additional ones. Regardless of the out- 
come, Sibbles's status as an aggressive fighter rises in light of the 
fact that Manly had conducted his operation within a relatively short 
distance and in plain view of a number af British warships, not one of 
which made an effort to assist the beleaguered transports. Sibbles 
would soon be heard from again. 34 
The Narragansett Bay and Long Island Sound coastal areas of 
Rhode Island and Connecticut produced a significant number of loyal- 
ists privateersmen, too. In Rhode Island, all such individuals for 
whom there is relevant information emanated from the merchant and 
mariner classes. The former group included Joseph Durfee, Ezekiel 
Lewis, Thomas Wickham, a Mr. Pain, Samuel Whitehorne, Mathew Cozzens 
(variously spelled Cozens or Cozzins), Samuel Pearce, Thomas Hazard, 
Nicholas Lechmere, and the Wanton brothers, Joseph Jr. and William. 35 
Stanton Hazard, master of a vessel in the African trade, Francis I'an- 
nes (often anglicized as fans), and a Captain Crendall represented the 
36 seafaring element. Finally, there was a Mr. Whipple about whom rela- 
37 tively little is known. He was, however, a shipowner. Because of 
their later activities at sea, Durfee as a pilot, and Thomas Hazard 
and Cozzens as privateer captains, it is evident these men possessed 
considerable maritime experience in addition to their other skills. 
Finally, young Jacob Eckstein, though referring to himself as a land- 
owner, must have been an adept seaman as well to become the naval 
lieutenant that he did.38 
Figure 4: The Lower New England Maritime Region. 
Lechmere is the only one in the group who held a public office. 
He had the dubious honor of being Officer of the Customs in 1765 dur- 
ing the Stamp Act crisis. Though not office holders themselves, the 
Wanton brothers possessed serious political connections. Their father, 
Joseph, was Governor elect for the colony. 39 
Existing data points to a very high percentage having been na- 
tive born, urban dwellers, which conforms to the established view of 
Rhode Island and New England loyalists in general. Of the eight for 
whom place of birth is known, Eckstein, Whitehorne, Durfee, Pearce, 
the Wantons, and both Hazards, all were colonials. Of the eight for 
whom place of residence can be established, six, Cozzens, Durfee, 
Lechmere, Whitehorne and the Wantons came from Newport, while Eckstein 
and Whipple were from Providence. 40 
For Connecticut, data exists concerning the occupation of four- 
teen individuals, and typically, the merchants and mariners constitute 
a majority. James Hayt Jr., Fitch and Samuel Rogers, Nathaniel Hub- 
bard, and John Taylor all identified themselves as merchant/mariners. 4 I 
John Ketchum was master of a vessel in the West Indian trade, Jesse 
Hoyt, a shipowner, was in the merchant service, and Bemsley Peters and 
Neil McNeil referred to themselves as merchants. Peters owned at least 
one vessel as well, and the fact McNeil and Hoyt later commanded pri- 
vateers supports the notion that they, too, were mariners of some 
4 2 skill. Charles Thomas later stated he spent the war involved in mari- 
time operations. This in conjunction with his command of a privateer 
4 3 indicates he was a mariner also. Finally, although his exact occupa- 
tion is not stated and he lived inland, Thomas Smith's later post as 
an officer on a privateer marks him as a man used to the sea, too. 44 
Despite their majority, the merchants and mariners did not domi- 
nate as fully as elsewhere in New England. Accepting the small sample 
as representative, there is evidence of a sizable proportion of lands- 
men emanating from Connecticut. James Hait, Joseph Hait, and Samuel 
Miles were landowners, and Hubbard and Peters described themselves as 
landowners in addition to being merchants. Philo Sandford was a 
farmer. Finally, the professional ranks were represented by surgeon 
Joseph Clarke. No references have been found to public office holders 
from Connecticut becoming privateers. 4 5 
Connecticut privateers fit the image of loyalists in general 
from the colony and from New England with regards to place of birth. 
Information on the seven who stated where they were born indicates a 
commanding percentage were natives. Six were born in the colony. Tay- 
lor was a Scot who had arrived as recently as 1768. 4 6 
As to place of residence, in a broad sense, Connecticut priva- 
teers conform to the general view of loyalists in that they were pre- 
dominantly coastal and urban. At the same time, they conform to the 
accepted perception of Connecticut loyalist in particular, which is, 
in fact, a departure from demographic patterns elsewhere. This is to 
say that although there were small enclaves of the King's supporters 
in Norwalk and Stamford, no specific urban locale can be defined as a 
hub of regional activity. Then again, taking matters of residence a 
step further, the Connecticut privateers also diverge to a degree from 
the pattern for Connecticut loyalists in general. In the colony, loy- 
alists as a whole were scattered along the entire coastal area with a 
somewhat greater density in the southwestern corner. This increase 
might be proportional to the nearness of New York, the ultimate center 
of loyalist activity and the base of a large British military and na- 
val force. In any case, with one marginal exception, all Connecticut 
privateers for whom place of residence is known emanated from the 
rather limited span of southwestern coastal area between the Stamford 
and New Haven areas. Within this zone, density increased the further 
west one went. Hubbard and both Haits lived in Stamford. Hayt, Hoyt, 
the Rogers, and Ketchum hailed from Norwalk. Thomas Smith was from 
Ridgefield. Clarke came from Stratford. Sandford dwelt near New Haven, 
as did Taylor who lived in Branford. The only individual to depart 
from this pattern was Miles who came from New Milford, further north, 
but still in the very western part of the colony. 4 7  
There is no direct evidence of business affiliations between the 
men of either Rhode Island or Connecticut. In the case of Rhode Is- 
land, despite this, given that a fair number of these men resided in 
Newport and were in the same occupations as merchants and mariners, it 
seems likely that at least some of these individuals were at least fa- 
miliar with each other. The fact that William Wanton, Lewis, Wickham, 
Lechmere and Pain later invested in a privateer together while still 
residing in Newport suggests the possibility of long-standing acquain- 
48 tance. Having been transported together after arrest, there can be 
little doubt Joseph Wanton, Jr. and Lechmere knew each other. Family 
ties were in evidence. Of course, the Wantons were brothers. In addi- 
tion, it would seem likely that Thomas and Stanton Hazard were linked 
to the prominent Rhode Island family of that name and so, were related 
in some manner. 
In Connecticut, the demographically scattered nature of the men 
discussed precludes concluding that there may have been business and 
social ties between most. There were, however, family groups. Fitch 
and Samuel Rogers were, of course, brothers. In addition, it would 
seem likely that James and Joseph Hait bore some family relationship 
with each other. 4 9  
Of all the individuals from this region, only three can be dis- 
cerned as having had prior martial experience. Clark had served as a 
surgeon in a provincial regiment during the French and Indian War. 
More specifically, Joseph Wanton, Jr. had been interested in priva- 
teers during the same conflict, and Hayt had actually commanded one. 50 
No racial minorities have been detected among the region's pri- 
vateers. The very English surnames of the majority supports that eth- 
nic minorities from the region were minimal as well. Only Eckstein and 
I'annes bear names reflecting ancestry other than British. I'annes is 
of note in that he is likely a representative of the Portuguese commu- 
nity in Rhode Island. 
As to religious minorities, it is somewhat surprising that no 
firm evidence has been found linking the Hart family, especially 
Isaac, to the activity. The Harts were leading merchants in Newport's 
Jewish community, and family members had been seriously involved in 
privateering during the French and Indian War. At that time, Isaac was 
a partner with Joseph Wanton, Jr. in at least one such venture. During 
the Revolution, the family (in particular, Isaac) was decidedly loyal- 
ist. Yet, no substantial evidence has associated this group with pri- 
vateering during that time. Additional research might prove other- 
51 
wise. 
With regards to abuse at the hands of the rebels, the situation 
was somewhat unique for the denizens of both Rhode Island and Con- 
necticut. In the former colony, specifically in Newport, this was due 
to the fact that during 1775 and 1776, while the rebels controlled the 
inland areas, a relatively strong British naval presence, dominating 
52 at sea, kept Newport under its guns. This put Newport in the position 
of being somewhat of a no-man's land in which people of opposing po- 
litical leanings were able to co-exist, however uncomfortably, until 
that port was occupied by the British Army in December, 1776. Troops 
would remain until October, 1779. Their presence may account for the 
comparatively fewer and less severe examples of persecution there. 
Still, these were instances. 
The Wanton family was the focal point of considerable harass- 
ment. Though the brothers' father, Joseph, was Governor elect, the re- 
be1 dominated assembly refused to swear him in. In turn, Joseph, Jr. 
was arrested and sent under guard to Providence when he refused to 
take the rebel oath.53 Lechmere accompanied Wanton for the same rea- 
54  
son. Whitehorne's stance was strong enough that he was forced to flee 
with his family and go into hiding in the country until the arrival of 
British troops at Newport. 55 
Perhaps one of the most interesting examples of persecution con- 
cerned Stanton Hazard. As far away as Point Petre, Guadeloupe, while 
on a voyage, he was forced to endure the indignity of an extra-legal 
drumhead interrogation at the hands of a group of ten New England cap- 
tains who felt he had broken the Articles of Association. This group 
of captains went so far as to convey their suspicions and findings to 
the Rhode Island General Assembly. Hazard would have something to com- 
miserate about with his future employers, Sheddon and Goodrich. Later, 
in October, 1777, the rebels seized Hazard's sloop. 56 
As elsewhere, the privateersmen of Rhode Island initially re- 
flected various levels of commitment. Despite Joseph Wanton Jr.'s 
treatment by the rebels, initially, he was actually quite sympathetic 
towards them and attempted to maintain a middle-of-the-road position. 57 
His brother, William, when pressured had fewer scruples about taking 
the oath when tendered. This submission resulted in post-war censor- 
ship when the Claims Commissioners viewed his action as the "Speck in 
that Loyalty which destroys all its  lustre.^'^ Quite the opposite of 
Joseph, Jr. was Lechmere. As Officer of the Customs during the Stamp 
Act problems, fearing for his life, he was forced to seek refuge on a 
naval vessel. Since that time, Lechmere had made his unswerving sup- 
59 port of government well known. That Whitehorne was actually forced 
into hiding at an early date when others were still managing to co- 
exist says he must have been very open in his support of the King as 
60 
well. The fact that Pearce left the colony relatively early, as did 
Whipple, foregoing Newport in the process, indicates their strong sup- 
61 port of royal government also. On the other hand, while the Royal 
Navy's presence undoubtedly helped in allowing them to remain, it 
would seem likely that at least some Newport loyalists were initially 
passive, thus further accounting for their ability to remain in their 
homes until the British Army's occupation. 
In Connecticut, the treatment of loyalists was markedly differ- 
ent in terms of both volume and severity. Several of the men in ques- 
tion, McNeil, Thomas Smith, Joseph Hait, and Sandford were forced to 
flee the colony. Sandford was in trouble for aiding a British officer. 
Smith was declared an enemy of the state. Hait must have clearly en- 
deared himself to the rebels in that he was forced to flee as early as 
January, 1775. McNeil was mobbed, abused, and insulted several times, 
then jailed, tried, and acquitted for treason before departing in fear 
of his life. 62 
In fact, there was a high rate of incarcerations among Connecti- 
cut loyalist privateers. Peters was imprisoned for treason as well. 
Hayt, Fitch Rogers, and Hubbard were jailed too, Rogers several times. 
Hayt had also been jailed earlier on suspicion of smuggling tea, and 
adding insult to injury, in conjunction with his last confinement, the 
mob seized his vessel and plundered his trade goods and personal be- 
longings. Joseph Hait's imprisonment was made all the worse by the 
fact he successfully managed to reach the refuge of Governor Tryon's 
ship at New York only to be turned out due to a lack of room and told 
he would have to fend for himself. After being mobbed and abused, Hait 
was jailed for thirteen months. He and Peters ultimately escaped. Hub- 
bard posted bond and subsequently gave leg-bail. How exactly the oth- 
ers achieved their freedom is unknown. 63 
Ketchurn's experience with the rebels is noteworthy. In his case, 
in addition to mobbings and insults, the rebels kept him from doing 
business. Consequently, he finally decided to pack up and leave. 
Ironically, even though it would seem the rebels had achieved their 
intent, Ketchum found himself in even greater trouble for his efforts. 
His vessel and her contents were confiscated. It was evidently a no- 
win situation for John Ketchum. 64 
In light of the treatment received from the rebels, it is evi- 
dent that in general, the men from Connecticut were firmly committed 
in their political stance from an early date. Charles Thomas would 
later boast that whe never wavered in his attachment to his King." 
This, in turn, reflects a break in the established historical view of 
loyalist actions in that in an area that was relatively calm and re- 
mote from a protective British presence, individuals were far less 
passive than elsewhere. Certainly, the nearness of New York may ac- 
count for some of this confident behavior, but New York was not that 
close, a secure British influence did not extend into Connecticut, and 
the British did not even begin to establish a firm grip on the city 
until the summer of 1776. In fact the only passive exception was Sam- 
uel Miles who admitted attempting to keep a low profile. In his ef- 
forts to avoid involvement, like Linnekin in Maine, he too, hired a 
substitute to serve in his stead with the rebels. Regardless, he could 
not put off the inevitable for long. He left for New York in the Fall 
of 1 7 7 6 . ~ ~  
Almost all of these men, both from Rhode Island and Connecticut, 
suffered in another way. They, too, lost heavily in terms of real es- 
tate, personal property, shipping, trade goods, and livestock. There 
are, however, indications that the people of Newport suffered somewhat 
less, incurring losses primarily in real estate only, having time to 
ship off other goods and possessions, because of the British occupa- 
66 tion. 
Furthermore, several suffered affronts from the British as well. 
British troops destroyed a distillery on which Whitehorne held the 
mortgage. The Wantons lost a vessel to the British. With Eckstein, 
whatever crops and livestock the rebels failed to take from his estate 
the British seized. 
As with their possessions, the Newport loyalists had time to ex- 
tricate their families when they left. This, unfortunately, was not 
always possible for Connecticut loyalists. Rivaling upper New England 
in numbers, McNeil, Joseph Hait, John Taylor, and Ketchum were all 
forced to leave their families behind and remain separated from them 
for some time. 68 
For the Long Island Sound and Narragansett Bay region, there is 
even less evidence of early loyalist activity at sea. Only one tanta- 
lizing reference has been found, and it is questionable. On October 6, 
1775, a rebel report mentioned a privateer brig being with the British 
squadron off Newport. The log books of the naval vessels that were 
present, however, make no reference to such being in company. The only 
reference to a brig is to the naval vessel Bolton. At the same time, 
however, the logs do refer to the presence of several tenders which 
remain unidentified in terms of both name and type. So, the possibil- 
ity exists that a privately owned and manned vessel was acting as a 
tender to a British man-of-war. Of course, if such a craft existed, 
she could not have been a true privateer, because no one was issuing 
even extra-legal letters of marque at that time. Then again, it is 
just as possible the recorder was mistaken in his identification alto- 
gether. 69 
From this point, discussion of individuals from the Upper and 
Lower New England regions will be merged for the sake of clarity and 
convenience. Most of the men from the Boston area remained in that 
city until the British evacuated it in March, 1776. At that time, they 
began their refugee odyssey that would take many at New York. Coffin, 
Dumaresque, Green, and Rogers departed for Halifax and then went to 
New ~ork.~' Geyer, who actually departed in 1775, left for Halifax, 
too, and then spent some time in England before returning to the colo- 
nies to also take up residence in New ~ork.~' From that port, Samuel 
Rogers left for England, while partner Joseph Taylor relocated yet 
72 
again to take his place in that city. Leonard turned up in New York, 
73 too, following a spell in Halifax and then Newport. Other Massachu- 
setts loyalists who found their way to New York were William Gallop, 
Lewis, Cowe, Anderson, and Goldthwaite. Also, Hathaway at least oper- 
ated in the New York area74 
Several Boston area men relocated elsewhere. Woodbury went to 
Halifax and remained.75 Brymer left for Halifax as well, and though he 
would later sometimes refer to himself as based in London, and there 
are hints he may have spent some time in New York, all indications are 
that he was predominantly associated with the Nova Scotia port for the 
7 6 
remainder of the war. Perry moved to Newport where we lose track of 
him. 77 
Among the loyalists on the Maine coast, those further south at 
Falmouth, Wyer, ROSS, and Robert and William Pagan, made their way to 
New York. Wyer, however, upon escaping from jail went first to Annapo- 
79 lis, Nova ~cotia.~' Thomas Pagan ended up in Bermuda. Those residing 
further north, Callahan and Doharty, opted to relocate to Halifax, and 
8 0 there are indications Pomeroy turned up there as well. After his 
81 
stint in New York, Ross, too, went to Halifax. With the British occu- 
pation of the Penobscot region, in 1779, a number of upper New England 
Loyalists decided to move yet again and take up residence there. This 
group included Robert Pagan, William Gallop, Wyer, Pomeroy, and Do- 
harty. Late comer Linnekin also sought refuge there. Gardiner at least 
operated in the region although there is evidence he may have later 
been based in New ~ o r k . ~ ~  
In lower New England, the situation differed, mainly because of 
the unique situation of Newport. Evidence indicates most Rhode Island 
loyalists, the Wantons, Whitehorne, both Hazards, Durfee, Cozzens, 
Lechmere, Pain, Ezekiel Lewis, Wickham, I'annes, and Crendall, re- 
mained in that port during the British occupation. Of this group, the 
Wantons, Whitehorne, the Hazards, Durfee (after a spell in England), 
and Cozzens are known to have arrived in New York. Having left ear- 
lier, Pearce was already there. Eckstein went there as well. 83 
New York was also the destination of choice for Connecticut loy- 
alists. Of the fourteen individuals whose place of refuge is known, 
James Hayt, Jr., the Rogers brothers, James Hait, Hubbard, Clarke, 
Ketchum, Joseph Hait, McNeil, Thomas, HOyt, and Miles went there. 
Sandford also spent time in that port before leaving for England and 
joining the crew of a privateer there. John Taylor also spent time in 
New York as well as in Canada and the West Indies. Thomas Smith served 
on a privateer operating in New York waters. In fact, only two men 
from the whole lower New England region are known not to have gone to 
New York. Lechmere departed for England and Whipple went to Antigua. 84 
Upon reaching their various destinations, a large percentage of 
these men from both upper and lower New England involved themselves in 
activities other than privateering, reflecting a desire to aid the war 
effort. A fair number served in a military capacity in loyalist mili- 
tia or provincial units, generally holding commissions as officers. 
This group included Joseph Taylor, Anderson, Hayt, Fitch Rogers, 
Clarke, William Wanton, Joseph Taylor, McNeil, Durfee, Pearce, and 
85 Hathaway. Others served in a naval capacity. Ketchum commanded an 
government vessel, Eckstein served as a lieutenant on a naval galley, 
Joseph Hait was a lieutenant in the Armed Boatmen, and John Taylor was 
86 a naval volunteer. William Gallop, Linnekin, Callahan, Durfee and 
87 Hoyt all served as pilots for the navy. Wyer was in the transport 
89 service.88 Linnekin also served on a tender. Cowe spent time on a 
armed government vessel.g0 There was involvement in other activities as 
well. Miles and Leonard were employed by the commissary department and 
91 Doharty did government work of some nature. Hayt was a cashier to the 
92 Barracks' Master and a clerk in the Travel Department. Joseph Hait 
carried dispatches and did intelligence work for Governor Tryon, and 
93 
was captured and imprisoned twice more for his efforts. Finally, a 
few of these men held public office. At Halifax, Coffin was appointed 
a magistrate and Brymer ultimately attained a seat on the council. 94 
While at Newport, Joseph Wanton, Jr. was Superintendent General of Po- 
95 lice. At New York, Durfee held the post of Superintendent of Small 
Craft while William Wanton acted as Purveyor to the H~spital.'~ 
As to the privateering activities of these men, Coffin, Geyer, 
Green, Goldthwaite, all three Pagans, Anderson, Lechmere, the Wantons, 
Durfee, Dumaresque, Ezekiel Lewis, Wickham, Pain, Pearce, Whitehorne, 
Joseph Taylor, Samuel Rogers (Massachusetts), John Taylor, Brymer, and 
97 Whipple became owners. Involved in no less than twenty cruisers, 
98 Pearce was a major figure in the activity. Stanton Hazard, I1annes, 
Hayt Fitch and Samuel Rogers, Wyer, Crendall, Jacob Rogers, Antill 
Gallop, William Lewis, Ketchum, Hoyt, Thomas, Callahan, Doharty, Gar- 
diner, Woodbury, Ross, Pomeroy, Cozzens, and McNeil, became captains. 
Thomasls, Gardiner's and Hoyt's craft operated with the Associated 
99 Loyalists. Perry, Thomas Hazard, and Hathaway each owned and skip- 
100 pered privateers, and Eckstein owned and served on such. Leonard 
owned and commanded a small squadron comprising seven privateers, plus 
101 
auxiliary craft. Sandford acted as a purser, and Thomas Smith was an 
102 
officer on a cruiser. Peters was Captain of Marines on a private 
103 man-of-war. William Gallop, Cowe, and Hubbard are known to have 
spent time on privateers, but the capacity in which they served in un- 
104 105 known. Linnekin served as prize master on such a vessel. Finally, 
Joseph Hait, James Hait, Miles, Clark, and again, Hubbard, were mem- 
bers of the Associated Loyalists, and Leonard served on the Board of 
that organization. 106 
Having established the identities and backgrounds of these indi- 
viduals and examined their experiences, motivations, and levels of 
commitment, an assessment can be made of them as a group. In both re- 
gions, they were primarily comprised of native-born men of English 
heritage. While the merchant and mariner classes made up the largest 
proportion, these men still reflected a cross-section of established, 
respectable colonial society in terms of occupational and socio-eco- 
nomic background. Their motivations and experiences, with regards to 
persecution, can be viewed as typical for men who became privateers. 
Their general lack of equivocalness combined with their other efforts 
in support of the war show these men to have been highly dedicated to 
their course of action. 
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CHAPTER 7 
"IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE UNHAPPY DISSENSIONS:" THE 
LOYALIST PRIVATEERS OF THE DELAWARE BAY 
AND NEW JERSEY MARITIME REGION 
The mid-Atlantic coastal area of New Jersey and Delaware Bay, 
with Philadelphia as the region's key port, also produced its share of 
loyalist privateersmen. Background information exists for forty-nine 
of these individuals from the three colonies comprising the region, 
New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. While data concerning some of 
these men is limited and sketchy, it is sufficient to show that while 
the mid-Atlantic loyalist privateers conform to the broader image of 
loyalists in general in terms of diversity, they nevertheless exhibit 
some significant regional variation in relation to privateers else- 
where. Most noticeable is the fact that while there were a consider- 
able number of mariners from the area, the number of merchants who 
would become involved in privateering was proportionately smaller in 
comparison with other regional groups. At the same time, there was 
also an increased ratio of men representing other occupational back- 
grounds. Although a strong urban element existed, and the majority 
could claim coastal status (though marginal in some instances), there 
was also a high proportion of men from rural environments. There is no 
evidence of racial involvement, and ethnic presence was minimal. In- 
formation on place of birth shows a mix of native and foreign born for 
the region as a whole, but significant variations between the colonies 
comprising it. Another notable aspect of these men that departs from 
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Figure 5: The Delaware Bay and New Jersey Maritime Region. 
the norm elsewhere, is that there was a high instance of not only neu- 
tral behavior, but equivocal as well. Also, although there are exam- 
ples of rebel affronts, they were not as widespread as in other areas. 
One characteristic of the region's privateers in which deviation 
from other regions is apparent is occupation. With fifteen individuals 
representing all three colonies, the merchant element which would be- 
come involved in privateering, while still substantial in number, nev- 
ertheless constituted a comparatively smaller proportion of the known 
whole and was not as significant a factor as in other areas. The men 
of this group included William Luce and John Stites of Elizabethtown, 
New Jersey, William Burton of New Brunswick New Jersey, Edmund Seaman 
of Hackensack, New Jersey, Thomas Crowell of Monmouth County, New Jer- 
sey, Joseph Shoemaker (brother of noted loyalist Samuel Shoemaker), 
Benjamin Booth, and David Sproat of Philadelphia, William Caldwell of 
Union Township, Pennsylvania, James Rankin of York Township, Pennsyl- 
vania, Nehemiah Field, Samuel Edwards, and Levin Turner of Sussex 
2 County, Delaware, and Jacob Caulk of Newcastle County, Delaware. Mer- 
chant Thomas Skelton hailed from New Jersey as well, but his exact 
place of residence is unknown. 3 
The already comparatively diminished presence of the region's 
mercantile faction should probably be lowered even more. There are in- 
dications that Burton's, Rankin's, Field's, and Edwards' involvement 
in trade was either a secondary occupation or one they moved into af- 
ter being deprived of their usual sources of income due to the war. A 
document pertaining to their later privateering activities clearly re- 
fers to them as merchants, but in materials referencing their pre- and 
early war existences, there is no mention of such activities, and as 
will be seen, at that time, their efforts were directed elsewhere. 4 
While a proportionately smaller number of merchants is in keep- 
ing with the general, established loyalist profiles for New Jersey and 
Delaware, it is at odds with that for ~enns~lvania.~ There, mostly as- 
sociated with the urban center of Philadelphia, the commercial ele- 
6 
ments held a dominant place in the loyalists ranks. Yet, in contrast 
with other locales this group seemingly produced proportionately fewer 
privateers. This discrepancy may be accounted for by the fact that 
many of the merchants were Quakers, as such, were loath become in- 
volved in anything warlike. 7 
Another deviation is evident with the place of residence of 
these merchants. While the majority of men from New Jersey and Penn- 
sylvania were typically urban dwellers, a noticeable rural element ex- 
isted as well. This factor was even more in evidence in Delaware where 
all concerned were from such an environment. These rural merchants 
were in contrast with the merchant groups elsewhere who entered into 
privateering. 
On the other hand, and more in keeping with the scheme of 
things, evidence points to the region having produced a significant 
number of experienced seamen. Logically, the majority of Pennsylvania 
mariners were associated with the port and urban center of Philadel- 
phia. This group included William Austin, John Henderson (previously 
of Georgia), Jacob Getsheus (sometimes Gatcheus), William Raddon, John 
Papley, and Robert White. Gideon Vernon came from Providence Township, 
Chester County. Merchants Shoemaker and Caldwell were mariners as 
well. Finally, seafarer Samuel Saunders, if not from the colony, was 
undoubtedly from the region. He joined the British at Philadelphia. 
With regards to all but Getsheus, Henderson, Raddon, and White, marine 
skills are surmised on the basis that all later served as pilots or 
captains of privateers. 8 
With the mariners of New Jersey and Delaware, a unique situation 
is also encountered in terms of their environs. While still coastal, 
as one might expect, here, too, there was a strong rural element. This 
is actually in keeping with the nature of loyalism in general within 
9 both colonies, but it is atypical for privateersmen. A significant ma- 
jority of New Jersey mariners was concentrated in Monmouth County. 
Morford Taylor, Conrad Hendricks of Monmouth Township, and Philip 
White, Clayton Tilton, and Richard Lippincott of Shrewsbury, resided 
within its boundaries, as did Crowell who was a master mariner as well 
as a merchant. Luce, who was also a seafarer, and John Cox of Woolwich 
Township, Gloucester County, were the exceptions. Apart from Cox, 
Crowell, Luce, and Tilton the seafaring abilities of these men is 
again based on their later service as pilots, privateer captains, or 
ship's officers. 10 
Nine individuals constitute Delaware's identifiable contribution 
to the loyalist privateering community. Of these, at least six were 
skilled mariners. Little is known of the background of Joseph Hewes 
Burton other than that he was from the colony and clearly possessed 
seafaring experience given his later command of a privateer. As to the 
other men, Levin Turner, William Milby, Edwards, and Field were all 
from Sussex County, and the last three were pilots. Milby also owned 
and skippered a merchantman, and Field was master of a trading vessel 
as well. There was also Jesse Turner. His place of residence is un- 
known, but he is often mentioned in association with Levin Turner, 
suggesting some family relationship between the two, and they were 
therefore, probably from the same locale. Both Jesse's and Levin's ex- 
pertise as seamen is derived from the fact both later commanded priva- 
teers. Finally, there are indications that Jacob Caulk either owned or 
was master of a vessel. 11 
The rural background of these men is further emphasized by the 
fact that no less than six of the New Jersey and Delaware mariners, 
Field, Milby, Edwards, Taylor, Cox and Hendricks, and two of the mer- 
chants, Stites and Burton, referred to themselves as being farmers or 
substantial landowners. In fact, in the case of all but Cox and Stite, 
working the land is emphasized as the primary occupation. Cox is of 
note for the fact that while distinctly referring to himself as a pro- 
fessional seaman, he also mentions having cleared seventy-four of his 
one-hundred and eighty-three plus acres, indicating he was at least 
contemplating a career change to the more staid existence of a farmer. 
Three additional N e w  Jersey privateers were specifically tied to the 
land. Northurp Marple of Gloucester Township possessed several estates 
one of which was comprised of three-hundred acres of undeveloped land. 
Joseph Williams of Shrewsbury, Monmouth County, possessed a modest es- 
tate. Elijah Groom of Middlesex County raised livestock on his fa- 
ther's farm. In Pennsylvania, Gideon Vernon was a landowner, too. In 
fact, the data available on him indicates his estate was his primary 
12 concern. 
Taking this a step further, various levels of rural wealth were 
represented by this group. Taylor, with four-thousand acres, and Mar- 
ple clearly were men of substance. Burton described his eighty-four 
acres as fit for the life-style of a gentleman. Representative of more 
middle-class, yeoman farmers were Field, Edwards and Milby. Groom, it 
would seem, represented the lower end of the economic spectrum. 13 
The high rate of agrarian occupation is, in turn, reflective of 
another unique aspect of the region's privateers. There was a compara- 
tively high rate of non-mercantile and non-maritime oriented individu- 
als. White, clearly qualified as a seaman, was actually a carpenter by 
profession. Jacob Bostwick of Newcastle County, Delaware, was also a 
carpenter, and there are indications Caulk, too, could add that skill 
to his growing list of occupations. In the same vein, Daniel McDonald 
was a joiner from Philadelphia. John Connel of Chester County, Penn- 
sylvania, was a school master, and Daniel Coxe of New Jersey was both 
a barrister and an attorney. Princeton graduate Jonathan Odell, resi- 
dent of Burlington County, New Jersey, was the rector of churches at 
Burlington and Mount Holly. He was also a missionary for the Society 
of the Propagation of the Gospel. 14 
Four men from the region held public office. William Morris was 
High Constable at Philadelphia. Rankin served as a member of the Penn- 
sylvania Assembly. Robert White acted as a Warden of the Port of 
Philadelphia. William Franklin was Governor of New Jersey. 15 
Several additional men can be linked to these colonies but addi- 
tional pertinent, background information is limited. Aaron White, 
Philip's brother, was probably from Monmouth County, New Jersey as 
well. Charles McClain, Charles McBride, William Ryan, and James Thomp- 
son came from Pennsylvania. Indications are that John McDonald came 
from that colony as well. If not, the fact he joined the British at 
Philadelphia supports he was probably from the region. Finally, there 
was William Caulk of Newcastle County, Delaware. 16 
Demographic concentrations can be ascertained. In New Jersey, a 
pattern similar to that in Connecticut can be discerned. The majority 
of individuals were concentrated in the coastal areas of the four 
counties closest to New York City, Monmouth, Middlesex, Essex, and 
Bergen. A few more were scattered in Gloucester and Burlington Coun- 
ties across the Delaware River from Philadelphia. In other words, con- 
centrations exist close to spheres of British influence. In Pennsylva- 
nia, the vast majority of the men in question hailed from Philadel- 
phia. These patterns are in keeping with those for Loyalists in gen- 
17 
era1 from both colonies. Delaware is of note because of the rela- 
tively large number of mariners from Sussex County. In addition, sev- 
eral additional men came from Newcastle county. 
Data on place of birth is best for New Jersey. There, Luce, Wil- 
liams, Philip and Aaron White, Cox, Tilton, Stite, Hendricks, Groom, 
Lippincott, and Well were natives, while Burton had only recently ar- 
rived from England in 1772, and Skelton had come from Jamaica in 
1771." This dominance of natives over immigrants is in line with the 
19 
view of the colony's loyalists in general. Similar information for 
Pennsylvania is extremely limited. Rankin was the only identifiable 
native. Caldwell was from England, and Henderson, Sproat, and Robert 
20 White were Scots. Sproat had arrived in 1760. Though hardly a repre- 
sentative figure, the fact four out of five men were immigrants does 
2 1 comply with the established view of Pennsylvania loyalists. Nothing 
is known about the birth places of any of the Delaware men. 
As elsewhere, there existed family and professional ties between 
some of these men. The Caulks were brothers, as were Philip and Aaron 
White, and if the Turners were not, they were, in all likelihood, re- 
lated. Lippincott and the Whites were brothers-in-law. Having joined 
the British together, it is evident Sussex County pilots Field and Ed- 
wards maintained at least a professional relationship, and it would be 
surprising to find they were not associated with Milby. 22 
Somewhat surprisingly, especially in light of Philadelphia's 
cosmopolitan order, among the region's loyalist privateers, no evi- 
dence of racial minorities has been discerned, and apart from a few 
Scots, that for ethnic minorities is very minimal. With the exception 
of Getsheus, the majority of surnames suggest English ancestries. 
The region does, however, offer a rare glimpse of the religious 
affiliations of three men. Ode11 was Anglican. Williams and Shoemaker 
were Quakers. 23 
Only one individual, Crowell, has been identified as having 
prior experience with privateering. During the Seven Years War, he 
commanded a cruiser out of New ~ o r k . ~ ~  
The region is unique in that no other area produced as many 
identifiable privateers who were initially passive or neutral. This is 
very much in keeping with the established view of the nature of loy- 
alism in general in at least New Jersey and Pennsylvania where such 
trends have been ascertained. One historian has attributed the number 
of passive loyalists, and as will be seen, equivocal ones as well, to 
the fact the people were, by nature, generally peaceful or politically 
25 
moderate. In conjunction, the region exemplifies the effect a British 
military presence could have fostering a sense of security that al- 
lowed individuals to confidently and openly declare their loyalty. 2 6 
Of the forty men for whom it is known when they declared for the 
British, only five, Caldwell and Morris of Pennsylvania, and Odell, 
Burton, and Luce, of New Jersey did so in 1775. In fact, Luce is re- 
ported to have been the first man in New Jersey to oppose the rebel- 
lion. Burton, reflecting an impulse to avoid the developing situation, 
left for England upon hearing news of the fight at Lexington. While 
this act clearly defined Burton's loyalist sentiments it also marked 
his initial desire to avoid trouble and maintain a state of neutral- 
27 ity. 
Of those remaining, based on what is known of them, twenty-four 
can be classified as initially passive or neutral. In New Jersey, six 
men, all from eastern counties, did not declare themselves until 1776, 
and in all but one instance in which a more specific date is known, it 
coincides with the establishment of British control over nearby New 
York or their consequent occupation of the colony. Hendricks made his 
position clear earlier in the year.28 Williams and Coxe did not join 
the British until 1777, and Cox did not join them until 1778. Coxe's 
response to affairs is of interest. Despite the fact he was not in the 
rebel's good graces, rather than join the British when they arrived in 
1776, he opted to remove to rebel-held Philadelphia instead.29 In Penn- 
sylvania, the men in question were even slower to make their position 
known. It was not until at least 1777 that another nine men joined the 
30 British at Philadelphia. Papley did not declare until December, 1778, 
long after the British had evacuated the region, and it was 1780 when 
31 Daniel McDonald sided with the King. In Delaware, Milby did not con- 
firm his position until May, 1776, and Bostwick and the Caulk brothers 
were not open loyalists until 1781. 32 
In addition to having the highest rate of initially passive pri- 
vateers, the region is also noteworthy for having the most equivocal. 
Again, this is in keeping with the nature of loyalism in general for 
33 the area. All of the eleven remaining men began the war openly sup- 
porting the rebels in one way or another. In turn, the majority came 
from Pennsylvania. Rankin's situation is of note and also somewhat 
confusing. Initially, he must have maintained a degree of support for 
the British in light of the fact that at some point in 1776 he was in 
trouble with rebel powers for speaking his mind. At that time he for- 
mally confessed "that he had publicly misrepresented and personally 
insulted the Whig Committee of York." Asking to be forgiven, Rankin 
promised "on the faith and honor of an honest man, to respect the Con- 
tinental Congress and behave as a good citizen." That same year, he 
both served in the Pennsylvania Assembly and held the rank of colonel 
of rebel militia. There is, however, some contradiction between his 
activities in that by one account he resigned his colonelcy after 
hearing of the Declaration for Independence, indicating a break with 
the rebels at that time, but by another, he maintained his seat in the 
assembly until October of the same year.34 Whatever the exact sequence 
of events, it is apparent Rankin suffered a degree of equivocalness. 
35 Robert White was a member of the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety. In 
Philadelphia, as late as January, 1777, Sproat was acting as a busi- 
ness agent - for rebel naval vessels. He joined the British at New 
York shortly after. 36 
Stites, Lippincott, and Shoemaker also served in rebel military 
units. Stites took the rebel oath of association and both he and Lip- 
pincott trained with the New Jersey militia. To Stites' credit, when 
push came to shove, he refused to actually present a musket at British 
troops. Lippincott joined the British in October, 1776. Shoemaker ac- 
tually held a commission as an officer in the rebel army. The Declara- 
tion of Independence evidently gave some of these men reason to recon- 
sider their position and marked a turning point in their dissidence. 
The account of Rankin having resigned his commission over the matter 
has already been noted. Shoemaker did the same upon hearing of the 
colonies' intention. Obviously for such men, a complete break from 
England was going too far. 37 
Two men, McBride and Edwards were in the Pennsylvania State 
Navy. McBride served on a galley. Edwards commanded a small patrol 
vessel, but perhaps to his credit, he was dismissed, because the re- 
bels thought little of his zeal and attention to duty. He joined the 
British in August, 1777, and McBride deserted and changed his alle- 
giance at some point during the occupation of Philadelphia. 38 
Getsheus, Field, Raddon, and Robert White each commanded mer- 
chantmen in rebel service. Of interest is the fact that like the Good- 
richs, Getsheus and Field were contracted to procure and transport 
arms and munitions for the rebels. In the course of this undertaking, 
Getsheus was captured and confined in the Whitby prison ship. Those 
who worked for his exchange deemed him a "very honestw master. Raddon 
and White, too, were captured and lost vessels to the British. After 
escaping, Raddon took command of a rebel letter of marque, and later, 
he was captured again in a third vessel. Field adopted his pro-British 
stance in August, 1777, and Getsheus did the same at some point during 
that year. White joined the British at Philadelphia in 1778. When Rad- 
don went over is unknown, but it was no earlier than April, 1777. 39 
Of interest is the trio of Milby, Field, and Edwards. All were 
yeoman farmers and pilots from Sussex County Delaware, and all joined 
the British. In fact, after serving the rebels, Field and Edwards 
crossed over together. The unanswerable question is whether or not 
these men also shared some common motive for joining the British. One 
possible hint is that early in the war, Edwards was among a group of 
pilots who presented a petition of grievances to the Continental Con- 
gress. They maintained that existing rules governing pilotage were un- 
fair. To the detriment of the pilots at the mouth of the Delaware Bay, 
Philadelphia pilots legally received preferential treatment having 
priority to operate on the bay and river. This and his lack of enthu- 
siasm for commanding a rebel vessel indicates that Edwards was not 
happy. 4 0 
Generally, because of the moderate nature of the people in com- 
bination with the area's initial remoteness from the scene of action, 
it appears the denizens of the region were able to co-exist until the 
arrival of the British brought the focus of activity to their door- 
steps and coaxed or forced a show of hands. This is supported by the 
fact that unlike other areas, in the early stages, the persecution of 
loyalists was comparatively minimal. Nevertheless, there were in- 
stances of avowed loyalists being persecuted, and when they occurred, 
they were serious. 
For his early defense of the loyalist position, Luce awoke one 
morning to find the mob had erected a gallows in front of his door. 
4 1 Sensibly intimidated, he fled to the West Indies. In October, 1775, 
an incriminating letter penned by Ode11 was intercepted and resulted 
in his arrest. Considered an enemy, he was arrested again in 1776 and 
confined to the limits of his parish. Then, on December 12 of that 
year, the crew of a rebel galley came ashore with the intent of secur- 
ing him dead or alive. In the ensuing house to house search, Well 
managed to elude his pursuers until his parishioners were unable to 
hide him any longer. At that point, he sought refuge within the Brit- 
42 ish lines. In Pennsylvania, in 1775, Caldwell was tried by the Com- 
mittee of Safety, perhaps facing Robert White while doing so. This re- 
sulted in his store's merchandise being confiscated. Worse, he was the 
recipient of a coat of tar and feathers. 43 
Persecution escalated when the arrival of the British drew peo- 
ple out. Several individuals were arrested, including Governor William 
Franklin. Hendricks was seized and tried several times, but he could 
not be convicted. Lippincott and Cox were apprehended for aiding the 
British, and then escaped. Milby was imprisoned twice, first for aid- 
ing the British and then when his vessel was taken by a rebel priva- 
teer. Although not actually jailed, Coxe, the recipient of abundant 
insults, thought the potentiality of incarceration real enough that he 
decided to flee. Crowell, Skelton (for associating with the British), 
and Sproat were also forced to depart their respective colonies. 4 4 
As in all areas, the stance these men took resulted in at least 
the majority losing considerably in terms of real estate, personal 
4 5 property, business, merchandise, livestock, and shipping. Also as 
elsewhere, families were split. Caldwell, Skelton, Philip White, and 
possibly Papley were forced to leave wives and children behind. In 
fact, as a result of a nocturnal visit to the Jersey shore, possibly 
to visit his family, White would be captured and brutally executed. In 
the case of Governor Franklin, his lengthy imprisonment effectively 
separated him from his wife. Distraught over the situation, she passed 
away, it is said, from a broken heart. 46 
Again at least a couple of these men suffered losses to the 
British. After Coxe fled his home, the British arrived and billeted a 
Hessian contingent in it. Apparently the structure did not fare well 
4 7 during their tenancy. With Milby, the ill-effects of the Prohibitory 
Act on loyalist merchants can again be seen. He, too, lost a vessel to 
the Royal Navy under the Act's authority. Adding insult to injury, 
when Milby put in a post-war claim for his loss, the British govern- 
ment rejected it on the grounds that he had not followed proper proce- 
4 8 dure. 
The destination of forty-six of these men is known. While a num- 
ber first spent time in Philadelphia during the British occupation, 
ultimately, after departing their respective colonies, all but two 
turned up in New York. This figure includes Luce who returned from the 
West Indies, and Burton who came back from England. The three remain- 
ing men were Bostwick, Jacob Caulk, and Daniel McDonald. The first two 
intended for New York, but the former was taken prisoner before arriv- 
ing, and Caulk decided rather quickly that privateering was not for 
him. Whether or not McDonald had actually been to New York before 
joining a privateer and being captured is unknown. 49  
At both Philadelphia and New York, a number of these individuals 
were involved in activities, other than privateering, that reflected 
their high level of personal commitment. In a naval capacity, Milby 
and Henderson acted as pilots, while Austin, as a master's mate, and 
50 Cox served on naval vessels. Sproat, Odell, as a chaplain, Williams, 
Groom, Lippincott, Tilton, Crowell, Luce, Hendricks, Connel, and 
Thompson all served with provincial commands or the British Army. 51 
52 Coxe was influential in raising the New Jersey Volunteers. Marple, 
Vernon, and Caldwell acted as guides for the British, and Caldwell and 
Groom conducted espionage activities. In fact, Caldwell was caught at 
one point and sentenced to be executed, but escaped.53 
Others acted behind the scenes conducting essential functions 
and performing public duties. In addition to their naval service, both 
Milby and Cox were involved supplying provisions to the British 
54 forces. At Philadelphia, Coxe was appointed Magistrate of Police, 
Morris was Coroner and a constable, Odell was Superintendent of the 
55 Printing Office, and Henderson was made Warden of the Port. At New 
York, Crowell became Warden of the Port, Burton and Sproat, succes- 
sively, held the post of Commissary General of Naval Prisoners, and 
56 Sproat also filled in as Commissary of Prisoners for the Army. Also, 
Odell acted as General Sir Guy Carleton's French and Spanish transla- 
tor while Coxe served as a peace commissioner. 57 
Then, there was the privateering activity of these men. Nine of 
these men invested in cruisers or letters of marque as owners. This 
group included Stites, Skelton, Seaman, Edwards, Field, Burton, 
58 Sproat, Booth, and Rankin. Fourteen, Cox, Philip White, Hewes Burton, 
Shoemaker, Getsheus, Raddon, Papley, Henderson, Jesse Turner, Robert 
White, Austin, Taylor, Vernon, and Lippincott commanded vessels. The 
last two did so with the Associated ~ o ~ a l i s t s . ~ ~  Caldwell, Crowell, 
Milby, and Levin Turner were both owners and skippers.60 Lesser offi- 
cers were represented by Hendricks who served as a Lieutenant, Ryan 
who acted as a Captain of Marines, and Saunders who was a pilot. 61 
Groom, Bostwick, the Caulk brothers, Connel, McBride, McClain, both 
62 McDonalds, Thompson, and Aaron White were crew members. New Jersey, 
like Connecticut, produced a number of men who would become Associated 
Loyalists. Two have been mentioned. Others were Williams, Marple, 
Luce, Morris, and Tilton. Coxe was on the Board of that organization 
and Odell served as Assistant Secretary. Franklin was President. 63 
As in the New England regions, indications are that the Delaware 
Bay and New Jersey privateers were primarily of British heritage and a 
large proportion were native born. Their varied occupational back- 
ground shows that at least many these men were established and re- 
spected. The high level of neutral behavior conveys that they were 
initially quite moderate in their political views. The high rate of 
equivocalness indicates that others were quite confused. Once they be- 
came active loyalists, however, their level of commitment, as exempli- 
fied not only by their privateering, but also the other roles many 
performed, was unquestionable. 
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p. 78. There is no specific reference to McBride serving on a priva- 
teer, but all evidence points to the likelihood of his having done so. 
First of all, he was captured at sea during 1779. The reference to 
this fact is found in Sabine who mentions a number of other men who 
were captured at sea, all of whom served on privateers and all of whom 
were seized that same year. The fact McBride was to be tried for trea- 
son indicates he was openly active against the rebels and not merely 
serving on a merchant vessel. This leaves only privateering or naval 
service, with the former being far more likely. Privateering would un- 
doubtedly have been the occupation of choice at a time when compara- 
tively fewer naval vessels were captured. 
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CHAPTER 8 
"EVERYMAN WHO KNOWS THE VALUE OF FREEDOM AND THE BLESSINGS OF 
A BRITISH SUBJECT:" THE LOYALIST PRIVATEERS OF THE 
SOUTHERN MARITIME REGION' 
The Outer Banks and Barrier Islands of North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia constituted the maritime region of the southern 
colonies. There, Charlestown was the key port with Savannah having po- 
tential as a significant runner-up. Background information is avail- 
able for only twenty-four individuals from the entire area, and much 
of what exists is sketchy and even tenuous. Furthermore, three of the 
men in question never actually sailed on a true privateer. With such a 
limited data base, it is sometimes difficult to say anything concrete 
about certain aspects of the southern coastal loyalist privateers. In 
other instances, enough information exists to be able to at least make 
suggestions, if not statements of fact, concerning the nature of these 
men relative to privateers elsewhere, and loyalists in general. The 
largest percentage of identified men were mariners. Merchants were 
present in a smaller ratio. In association there was a smattering of 
individuals from other occupations. Typically, these men were from ur- 
ban, coastal environments, but there is some evidence of a small back 
country element among them. There was a high percentage of foreign 
born and evidence of ethnic and racial involvement. Examples of neu- 
tral and equivocal behavior were minimal, and a number of these men 
individuals endured ill-treatment from the rebels. Finally, as did men 
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in most other locales, some of these southerners were active in roles 
other than privateering. 
This limited number of men is interesting in that at the same 
time, it is both non-reflective and reflective of loyalist privateer- 
ing in the region. The figure does not exemplify the state of affairs 
in that as in all the maritime regions discussed so far, clearly many 
more people were involved in the activity. At one specific point in 
1779, according to The Gazetteof the State, of South-Carolina, there 
2 
were at least six privateers fitted out in Georgia. Unfortunately, 
there is simply no information identifying the personnel or even the 
vessels. In fact, no privateer or commander specifically associated 
with Savannah is known by name. On the other hand, the minimal figure 
is clearly indicative of the fact that although Charlestown and Savan- 
nah were prime privateering ports, the activity was just not conducted 
there on anything like the same level as elsewhere, nor were men of 
the southern region as involved as those from the Chesapeake Bay, mid- 
Atlantic region, or New England. The region simply produced compara- 
tively fewer privateersmen. This is further supported by the fact that 
so far, in terms of actually being fitted out, commissioned, or based 
there, only seven privateers have been identified as being associated 
with Charlestown during the British occupation. 3 
To some degree, this lack of activity can be explained by the 
fact that once Savannah and Charlestown were occupied by the British, 
the reason for privateering in the area was largely eliminated. In es- 
sence, prior to the arrival of the British, loyalist privateers sailed 
from St. Augustine, just down the coast in East Florida, against the 
rebels operating out of the two ports in question. When those ports 
fell, the main cruising ground was greatly reduced, and the reasons 
for privateering in the immediate area diminished. Certainly, working 
the North Carolina Outer Banks was still an option, but it was a lim- 
ited one. Vessels could also operate from Charlestown or Savannah and 
cruise in more remote areas, but not with the same convenience offered 
by other ports. For instance, New York's proximity was better suited 
for operations against the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays, while St. 
Augustine, the Bahamas, and Bermuda remained better ports for cruising 
the West Indies or intercepting vessels arriving from outside North 
America. In the case of Georgia, limited activity might also be ex- 
plained by the fact that the relatively young colony had yet to estab- 
lish a significant maritime presence. As of October, 1773, only 
thirty-five vessels were registered there. 4 
Regarding occupation, again, in general, the diverse background 
of the loyalist spectrum is evident despite the small sample. At the 
same time, the presence of the merchant class is even less apparent 
here than in the Delaware Bay region. Only five individuals, William 
Lowther and John Boggs of Edenton, North Carolina, John Hamilton of 
Halifax, North Carolina, John Cruden of Wilmington, North Carolina, 
and Thomas Stringer of Savannah, Georgia, state that they were trad- 
5 
ers. The higher number from North Carolina is in keeping with the na- 
ture of loyalism in general in that colony. There, the merchants 
formed a significant element in the loyalist composition. Yet, despite 
their number, only a comparatively small minority seem to have become 
involved in privateering. Of fourteen merchants from the colony exam- 
ined while preparing this study, only the above five can be linked to 
the activity. 6 
Although the merchant class was weakly represented, this was not 
true of the mariners. A total of nine have been identified: Daniel 
Manson and John Macklin of Charlestown, Peter Bachop, William Finley 
(a local coaster whose name is spelled variously as Finlay and 
Findlay), Robert Schaw, Duncan MacLean, and William Giekie of South 
Carolina, John Lightenstone of Savannah, and John Dunlop, also from 
the Edenton area, North Carolina. Giekie and Lightenstone were both 
Royal Navy veterans and the latter had commanded a colonial privateer 
during the French and Indian War. Despite this, it need be noted that 
while both are important to the story, neither ever commanded an ac- 
tual privateer during the revolution. 7 
Qualifying comments concerning some of the others are also in 
order. Bachop is identified specifically with South Carolina on the 
basis of his seemingly close relationship with Henry Laurens for whom 
he commanded a merchant vessel.' In the case of Daniel Manson, there is 
reference only to a Captain Manson operating out of Charlestown. Dan- 
iel Manson was a shipbuilder and occasional shipmaster from Char- 
lestown whose return there during the British occupation coincides 
9 
with the appearance of Captain Manson. In the cases of MacLean and 
Schaw as well as Manson, these three privateer captains are only men- 
tioned in relationship to Charlestown during the British presence 
there. Therefore, it seems likely they were, in fact, from at least 
the colony if not the port. As with others, the assessment of some of 
these men's seafaring abilities is primarily based on their later com- 
mand of privateers. This group includes Macklin, Schaw, Manson, Mac- 
Lean, and Bachop. 10 
Trading and seafaring were not, however, the sole, or even the 
primary occupation of some of these men. As noted, Manson was a ship- 
builder. Macklin was the proprietor of a tavern and the London Coffee 
House in Charlestown, and Giekie owned a substantial plantation out- 
side the city. In North Carolina, Dunlop had tried his hand at tilling 
the land, but gave it up to return to the sea. Lowther was a justice 
of the peace. Though he was descended from a merchant/mariner family, 
Thomas Brown of Augusta, Georgia, was a planter and magistrate. The as 
yet unmentioned Josiah Martin, a relative of Samuel Martin of Vir- 
ginia, was the Governor of North Carolina. 11 
Another loyalist of note was John Collet (not the same John 
Collett encountered with Dunmore) from the Cape Fear region of North 
Carolina. There, he commanded Fort Johnston. Like Giekie and Lighten- 
stone, Collet would not be involved with true privateering. He was, 
however, a somewhat significant and certainly interesting character 
who was associated with loyalist mariners during the opening phases of 
the war. 12 
A final occupation of sorts is found among these southerners. 
Three slaves, representing a minority element, have been identified. 
Prior to his running away to join the British, Henry Brown had been 
owned by Samuel Thorpe of Blueford, South Carolina. Two other slaves, 
both named Ned, were owned by Hamilton, Hamilton put the two Neds on a 
privateer he had invested in, but apparently neither was overly 
thrilled about going to sea on a cruiser. Both jumped ship at an early 
date. 13 
There were also several men whose occupations are unknown. 
Mathew Varnum hailed from near Orangeburgh, South Carolina. A Mr. Mal- 
com, a Mr. M'Guire, and a Mr. Johnson were also from that colony. Sa- 
bert Oglesby was from Stoll Island, somewhere along the South Carolina 
or Georgia coast. 14 
For those whose place of residence is known, in the majority of 
cases, it was coastal and/or urban. There were, however exceptions. 
Orangeburgh, where Varnum lived, was about seventy-five miles inland. 
Coming from Augusta, Georgia, Thomas Brown qualifies as a back country 
denizen. In the case of the North Carolinians, there was a small con- 
centration in the Albemarle region which coincides with the estab- 
lished demographic pattern for the colony's loyalists in general. 15 
In keeping with the nature of southern loyalists in general and 
in contrast with the New England regions, there was a high percentage 
of foreign born, of which a commanding number were British including a 
16 heavy leavening of Scots. Of the ten individuals for whom place of 
birth is known, all'were foreign and nine were from Great Britain. 
Lowther and Macklin simply stated they were British. Manson and Thomas 
Brown were from England. Lightenstone was born in Russia of English 
parents. Stringer hailed from Ireland. Hamilton and Giekie were Scots. 
Dunlop is simply referred to as British as well. When he returned to 
Britain, however, he specifically went to Scotland, which in associa- 
tion with his name, supports the probability that he was from there 
originally. In addition, there can be little doubt that MacLean and 
MIGuire were of Scots or Scots/Irish lineage. Lowther had, by far, the 
longest tenure in the colonies, having arrived in the early 1750s. 
Dunlop, Lightenstone, and Giekie came between 1759 and 1763 during the 
latter part of the French and Indian conflict. The remaining three 
Britons for whom dates of immigration are known were very recent colo- 
nists. Stringer came in 1772, and both Macklin and Brown arrived as 
late as 1774. 17 
Non-British ethnic minorities were also present among these men. 
Collet was a Swiss, and there are indications of others. The spelling 
of Schaw's name tends to indicate a Germanic ancestry. Bachop has a 
French quality to it. Perhaps he was a member of the South Carolina 
Huguenot community. 18 
The sample is entirely too small and scattered to discern much 
in the way influential family or business ties. Having the same un- 
usual last name, it would seem likely that Peter Bachop was related to 
Adam Bachop of St. Augustine, another loyalist privateer captain to be 
discussed in a following chapter. At Edenton, North Carolina, it is 
apparent that if Lowther and Boggs were not business associates, they 
were certainly familiar with each other. Finally, Hamilton was 
strongly associated with the Scottish firm of John Hamilton and Co., 
Glasgow. 19 
Evidence of neutral or passive behavior is limited and re- 
stricted to North Carolina. There, the fact that Boggs did not depart 
for New York until 1777 indicates he was able to co-exist with the re- 
20 bels to a degree. Lowther's activities are of interest, reflecting a 
sincere initial desire to remain detached from affairs. In 1771, due 
to the regulator disturbances, Lowther thought it prudent to leave the 
colony and reestablish himself in New York. He dwelt there until 1776 
when increasing troubles again pressured him into questioning the wis- 
dom of his place of residence. Believing affairs had resumed a more 
stable character in North Carolina, Lowther removed his family and 
possessions to reside in that colony once again. He arrived only to 
find that his assessment of the political atmosphere was greatly in 
error. In September, 1776, deciding that perhaps New York was not so 
bad after all, especially since the British had secured their posses- 
sion of the city, Lowther again packed up his family and chattels, 
loaded them on a small, five ton decked boat, and set off on what must 
have been quite an odyssey. He did not arrive at his destination until 
June, 1777, and in the interim, had faced "many dangers." Unfortu- 
nately, this is all that is known about what must have been an adven- 
21 turous sojourn. 
More evidence exists for equivocal behavior, and every example 
of this form of conduct occurred in South Carolina where such conduct 
22 is considered to have been fairly common. Malcom, MIGuire, and John- 
son all served in the rebel 1st South Carolina Regiment before desert- 
ing and joining a loyalist privateer. Macklin held the rank of ser- 
geant in the Charlestown militia as late as 1778. To his credit, he 
somehow managed to avoid subscribing to the rebel oath during that 
time, and his forced departure from the colony was a direct result of 
his refusing to take it. 23 
As far as is known, the remaining individuals were committed to 
their support of the British relatively early in 1775 and 1776. Thomas 
Brown, Finley, and Cruden had cast their lot with the King by the end 
of the first year. Manson, Giekie, and Stringer had established their 
positions by the summer of 1776.~~ 
A number of these men underwent abuse in one form or another at 
the hands of the rebels. As elsewhere, a fair number lost considerably 
in terms of such things as real estate, personal property, and busi- 
ness.25 Because Cruden refused to subscribe to the Articles of Associa- 
tion, the rebels refused him the Rights of Free Men and boycotted him. 
Giekie was banned from returning ashore in Charlestown after carrying 
supplies to British vessels in the harbor. Manson was kicked out of 
South Carolina after a lengthy imprisonment and threats of execution 
as a felon, and Macklin was forced to flee the same colony. Accused of 
illegal trading, Finlay was hauled before the South Carolina Committee 
of Safety. We can only imagine the conversations of shared experiences 
he had with his future employers, Sheddon & ~oodrich.*~ 
Excellent accounts exist of the even greater trials undergone by 
Thomas Brown. Sabine agreed with a Mr. Simms in viewing Brown's expe- 
rience as a classic example of how a single act of persecution could 
radically transform a personality while serving no useful purpose 
other than to promote and buttress loyalist sentiments. By July, 1775, 
there was considerable agitation over the Articles of Association in 
upcountry Georgia. Brown had just been made a magistrate and so felt a 
logical obligation to do his duty and enforce the law in the name of 
his King. He viewed the Association as illegal, and in response, he 
was integral in establishing a counter-association. In the process, he 
emerged as a leading backcountry loyalist. Still, to this point, indi- 
cations are that while politically active he was not militant. 27 
On August 2, roughly one-hundred Sons of Liberty converged on 
New Richmond, South Carolina, a plantation where Brown was staying at 
the time, to force him to take the oath. Stepping out onto the porch 
to confront the mob, Brown, without giving offense, argued his passive 
position, diplomatically offering reasons why he could not take the 
oath. For instance, he maintained that submitting to the rebel oath 
would be an act contradictory to his oath as magistrate. The crowd 
grew impatient and declared that Brown simply could not remain neu- 
tral. He was either for them or against them, to which Brown replied 
that they could not deprive him of the privilege of his thoughts. He 
then went inside. Following this, the agitated mob began to call for 
the destruction of Brown's property. 28 
Clearly sensing that rational discussion was about to cease, if 
it was not already at an end, Brown prepared for the worst. He put a 
brace of pistols in his pockets and returned to the porch. Having sup- 
plemented his persuasiveness and obviously feeling a bit more authori- 
tative and in control, he demanded to know just what the rebels in- 
tended to do. They responded that they would physically drag him to 
Augusta and force him to sign the Articles. To this, Brown commented 
that if the mob felt so strongly about public liberty, then they 
should feel the same about private liberty and leave him alone. This 
retort had some effect. About half saw the logic in Brown's reply and 
departed. Unfortunately, the remaining half grew even more aggressive, 
threatening Brown as they did so. In turn, Brown gave them fair warn- 
ing of the consequences, and at that, perhaps as many as eight men 
drew their swords and lunged. Brown resorted to his pistols and fired. 
The first shot was a misfire. The second struck home, hitting the re- 
bel ringleader in the foot. Pressing their attack, the assailants 
wrested the pistols from Brown, but Brown was not done. Gamely drawing 
his sword, he proceeded to offer clear evidence that he was quite 
adept with a blade, keeping multiple attackers at bay for a time. The 
set-to ended when Brown was struck from behind with a musket butt 
which fractured his skull and knocked him senseless. 29 
The ordeal was far from over. Good for their word, the Sons of 
Liberty proceeded to trundle the seriously injured Brown to Augusta. 
There, they tied him to a tree and placed burning splints of wood be- 
neath his feet, and his hair was stripped off with a knife resulting 
in his actually being scalped in three or four places. Finally, he was 
tarred and feathered. By one account, Brown was made to recant and de- 
nounce his loyalist association. If so, it need be noted that he was 
insensible, due to the blow to the head, for the two days during which 
this supposedly occurred. It took Brown several months to be able to 
walk again, and the incident cost him two toes and a lifetime of se- 
vere headaches. All the Sons of Liberty seem to have accomplished for 
their efforts was the transformation of a man into one of the most 
feared and militantly resolute loyalists in the southern theater. 30 
At least a couple of these men also suffered at the hands of the 
British. When Lowther finally arrived back in New York, he found Brit- 
ish troops quartered in his relatively new warehouse. They would re- 
main there for the duration. 31 
Manson's story is more pertinent, reflecting further the trials 
suffered by loyalist mariners and shipowners under the mandates of the 
Prohibitory Act. Following the unsuccessful British attack on Char- 
lestown in June, 1776, Manson and his partner, William Begbie, decided 
to load their possessions and a cargo of rice on a schooner in which 
Manson then sailed for the West Indies. En route, the vessel was 
seized by the Royal Navy, carried into Jamaica, and condemned as law- 
ful prize. Manson returned to South Carolina, and in 1778, following a 
stint of imprisonment, he and Begbie sold off their holdings at a loss 
and purchased the ship Providence and brig Speedwell, with the intent 
of going to England. A passenger on the Providence?, Louisa Susannah 
Wells, left an excellent account conveying the concerns and tensions 
that arose at sea during efforts to avoid the rebels and French on one 
hand and the Royal Navy on the other. Despite the fact a special 
course was laid to avoid the British, the Providence had the misfor- 
tune to be seized not just by the Royal Navy, but by Captain James 
Reid, a man who even his fellow officers considered over-zealous in 
the pursuit of his duty seizing American vessels. 32 
Taken into New York, Manson began the long process of filing An- 
swer and Claim against Libel. Only "after a tedious and expensive 
suitn was the Providence restored to him, but it did him little good. 
Because of the trade restrictions, he could not depart with vessel or 
cargo and was forced to sell both at a loss. 33 
The Speedwell, perhaps misnamed, fared no better. She was taken 
by William Chambers (about whom we shall hear more) and the privateer 
Gavton. Chambers sent his prize into Kingston, Jamaica for libeling. 
During the court proceedings it came out that the Speedwell was, in 
fact, a recapture, having been seized earlier from British subjects by 
a rebel privateer. The court decreed she should be returned to her 
original owners. Some consolation may have been found in the fact Beg- 
bie and Manson were allowed to retain the seedwell's cargo even 
though they did have to undergo the ordeal of transshipping it. 34 
The destinations of these men were more varied than elsewhere. 
Cruden, Lowther, Boggs, and Hamilton went to New ~ o r k . ~ ~  Manson went 
there too although his intent had been to go to England. Thomas Brown, 
Varnum, Bachop, MacLean, MIGuire, Johnson, and Macklin removed to St. 
36 37 Augustine. Giekie went there as well before going to Britain. Henry 
38 Brown also went to Britain. Dunlop was so fed up with the rebels that 
he went to Scotland with the express intention of fitting out a priva- 
39 teer with which to harass them. Stringer's odyssey took him first to 
Halifax and then the West Indies before he ultimately arrived in Eng- 
land.40 Finley seems to have gone to Bermuda first and then New yorkS4' 
Ultimately, Cruden and Manson returned to Charlestown. 4 2 
Upon reaching their destinations, some of these men were in- 
volved in activities other than privateering. Macklin, Bachop, and 
Henry Brown served with the Royal Navy, and the former also spent time 
commanding a vessel in the provincial East Florida maritime force. 43 
Stringer acted with a military unit of some nature, Cruden was a pro- 
vincial colonel, and Thomas Brown commanded and Varnum served in the 
4 4 East Florida Rangers. Cruden also held the post of Commissioner of 
Sequestered Estates in South ~arolina.~~ Hamilton was truly an active 
loyalist. Enlisting as mere private, he rose to the rank of Lieutenant 
Colonel commanding the North Carolina Volunteers. In this capacity, he 
led his battalion through the various campaigns in the south. Seeing 
action at Savannah, Charlestown, Yorktown, and during Cornwallis's ad- 
vance through the Carolinas, Hamilton was wounded three times and cap- 
tured twice. 4 6 
As to their privateering activities, Lowther, Hamilton, Cruden, 
47 Thomas Brown, and Stringer became owners. Bachop, Macklin, Finlay, 
4 8 Schaw, Manson, and MacLean all commanded privateers. Dunlop seems to 
4 9 have been both owner and captain. Boggs was a captain of marines and 
50 Oglesby acted as a guide. Henry Brown, Malcom, M'Guire, Johnson, and 
51 Varnum served before the mast. Martin became a board member of the 
52 Associated Loyalists. Also, late in the war, Cruden suggested the 
founding of a group that appears to have been intended as a southern 
equivalent to Franklin's Associated Loyalists at New York. All indica- 
tions are that the proposal was rejected.53 
In each of the three rebellious southern colonies, a scenario 
played out that bore similarities to events in Virginia, although in 
no instance did affairs transpire on the same level. Governors Josiah 
Martin, William Campbell, and James Wright of North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia, respectively, each realized the need for a sub- 
stantial naval presence and desired that vessels be sent to assist in 
bolstering royal authority and maintaining control over the colonies. 
Like Dunmore, all three were eventually forced to take refuge on naval 
vessels, establishing floating pockets of resistance from which they 
directed operations. While a few loyalists commanded armed vessels un- 
der them, none of the three governors promoted the concept of a loyal- 
ist naval force. 
In North Carolina, as early as April 7, 1775, Governor Martin 
declared the Royal Government to be in a state of collapse. At the be- 
ginning of June, he fled the capital at New Bern and went to Fort 
Johnston on the Cape Fear River. There, he went aboard H.M. Sloop 
Cruizer, seeking safety and the assistance of the navy. 54 
The Outer Banks form a coastal barrier to mainland North Caro- 
lina. Key to this navigational obstruction was Ocracoke Inlet. At the 
time, it was the only passage through the Outer Banks that could be 
negotiated by anything but the smallest vessels. Thus, the inlet, like 
the Virginia Capes, acted as a funnel for all of North Carolina's 
maritime trade. It also served much of Virginia's, and it was particu- 
larly crucial to that colony as the only alternative passage at times 
when the capes were blockaded. Vessels entering through Ocracoke could 
sail through Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds to the Chowan River. Further 
up on this water course the Blackwater River branched off and led to 
South Quay, Virginia, where goods were unloaded, sent overland to Suf- 
folk, and reshipped on the Nansemond River. From there, cargoes could 
be carried into the James River for a variety of more distant destina- 
tions as far away as Maryland and Pennsylvania when necessary. Of 
course, when used in reverse, the same route allowed goods to be 
shipped from the interior as we11 ." 
Martin was clearly aware of the importance of Ocracoke Inlet, 
and it was, in part, to stop the influx of rebel war materials that he 
desired a substantial naval presence. In July, he stated the necessity 
of having at least three, preferably four, more warships to patrol the 
coast. These would certainly help bolster royal authority as well. Of 
course, the Royal Navy had no craft to spare at the time, and Admiral 
Graves communicated this fact to Martin in August. 56 
As July progressed, rebel forces threatened Fort Johnston. Be- 
cause the installation and garrison were deemed too weak to withstand 
an attack, all removed to H.M.S. Cruizer. Then, the rebels sacked the 
fort and burned the personal dwelling and other structures belonging 
to the commandant, Captain John Collet. With Collet we get a rare 
glimpse of a rather reprehensible loyalist. The rebels described him 
as "A pert audacious little scoundrel." Even his loyalist peers were 
uneasy about his over-zealous nature which he displayed in conjunction 
with an almost complete lack of tact. Accordingly, if not actually em- 
barrassed, other loyalists were duly concerned about his conduct. By 
one account, when the rebels served him with writs for debts, he 
treated them "with the shameful contempt of wiping his backside with 
them. "'' 
As early as October, Martin was noting the potential problems 
that would arise through an accumulation of prizes seized under the 
Restraining Acts in conjunction with the lack of a vice admiralty 
court. In particular, he pointed out that if prizes could not be rap- 
idly condemned, then, the officers responsible for seizing them might 
well be open to law suits. 58 
Martin's flotilla increased in size when, on November 12, H.M. 
Sloop Scorpion arrived, followed on January 2, 1776, by H.M.S. Syren. 
The Log of the latter mentions that in addition to the three naval 
vessels there were three other ships and two sloops present. On Janu- 
ary 10, Martin issued his proclamation calling on all loyal subjects 
to rally to the royal standard he was raising and assist in the resto- 
ration of government. In response, although their numbers were never 
anything like those in Virginia, over time, a number of loyalists 
joined the governor on vessels in the river. If during this time, Mar- 
tin caused any loyalist vessels to be fitted out, their identity has 
been lost to us. 59 
William Campbell only arrived to take up his post as Governor of 
South Carolina in June, 1775. By the end of that month, he was already 
pointing out the value of additional naval forces for his coast and 
suggesting such should be sent. Throughout the summer, he bemoaned his 
lack of warships until late August or early September when word ar- 
rived that rather than receive additional naval support, he would ac- 
tually lose H.M. Sloop Tamaq, his only naval vessel. As it turned out, 
the Tamar stayed on station, and on September 7, she was joined by 
H.M. Armed Ship Cherokee. On September 15, 1775, with the political 
climate clearly turning against him, Campbell departed the city to 
seek safe refuge on the Tamar in the harbor. 60 
On January 5, 1776, William Giekie undertook to supply the Brit- 
ish in the harbor with provisions. In doing so, he incurred the dis- 
pleasure of the rebellious citizenry who refused to let him return 
ashore. Having no alternative, Giekie remained with Campbell's meager 
forces. 61 
The following day, Campbell, accompanied by his small flotilla, 
departed Charlestown Harbor. The governor first sailed for Savannah. 
Then, leaving the Tamar and Cherokee_ behind, he left to join Martin on 
the Cape Fear River where he arrived on February 6. At some point dur- 
ing the voyage, Campbell acquired a schooner which he named the Lady 
Willie and personally fitted her out as an armed vessel. In all prob- 
ability she was commanded at this time by Giekie. Later, in August, he 
is known to have been her skipper, and there is no evidence to suggest 
he was not at this earlier time as 
Although the Royal Navy vessels operating off North Carolina had 
taken prizes earlier, there was clearly a jump in activity beginning 
in January and increasing in February as additional vessels began to 
arrive to augment the force. By March 1, eight prizes were reported 
with the British on the Cape Fear River. By March 20, the number had 
increased to "many prizes." During this period, the Lady Wil&l.m, re- 
ferred to as a tender, was active as a naval auxiliary vessel, and at 
least on one occasion, she took an active part in capturing an armed 
pilot schooner. 63 
The increasing number of prizes became problematic. For a time, 
rather than being able to utilize badly needed cargoes of captured 
provisions, Martin was forced to secure them under lock and key, be- 
cause there was no means to proceed legally against them. Finally, 
however, with no practical alternatives, Martin exceeded his authority 
and established a vice admiralty court to deal with the situation. In 
addition to the arguments that the existing court system was simply 
inconvenient and would hurt the navy's efficiency by draining off man- 
power, Martin offered a battery of shaky legal arguments to justify 
his actions, and even implied that he had received General Sir Henry 
Clinton's approval. In any case, the court was operational by the be- 
ginning of April. 64 
In mid-February, the naval force at Cape Fear was augmented with 
the arrival of George Sibbles and the Genegal gas from Boston. By 
this time, the rebels were referring to the General Gaue as a priva- 
teer, although she was operated by army's Quarter Master Department. 
In any case, on her passage south, Sibbles snapped up two prizes, the 
sloop Joseph, which with her cargo was valued at 51,295.3.7 (Pennsyl- 
vania currency), and the sloop charm in^ Sally, with a valuable mixed 
cargo of salt, dry goods, wine, spirits, sundries, and a small quan- 
tity of munitions. Of interest is the fact that the Joseph was skip- 
pered by none other than William Raddon. 65 
Collet, who had earlier gone to Boston, was returning to North 
Carolina as a passenger on Sibbles' sloop. During the voyage he fur- 
ther endeared himself to the rebels and undoubtedly embarrassed his 
British and loyalist associates even more by tactlessly declaring to a 
prisoner that concerning the rebels "he would kill man, woman, and 
child, reserving all the young ladies for his private pleasures.w66 
During March, Sibbles, with Collet aboard, raided the North 
Carolina coast. Their activities, which included burning the houses of 
two rebel leaders plus the dwellings of two pilots, were described by 
the rebels as piratical and larcenous. As in Virginia, loyalists were 
beginning to respond to ill-treatment in kind and affairs were taking 
a nasty turn. On April 29, after assisting a transport in distress, 
Sibbles set out on the more mundane mission of carrying dispatches to 
Halifax for Clinton. 67 
A month later, on May 31, Martin gave up his grip on North Caro- 
lina. Upon his departure, he and the naval vessels under his direction 
joined the ill-fated expedition against Charleston. Of note during 
that operation were the services performed by the Lady William. At 
Long Island, to the north of the city, she participated in the landing 
of British troops and was then stationed to cover their movements. On 
June 21, the William was engaged by rebel troops and field bat- 
teries on Sullivan's Island. The following day, during the main Brit- 
ish attack on the harbor defenses, she gave cover fire during the in- 
tended British amphibious attacks6' 
Georgia is generally accepted as having been the most loyal of 
all the rebellious colonies, and this would seem to be reflected in 
the fact that Governor James Wright was able to remain ashore longer 
than his colleagues to the north.=' During this time, he, too, fretted 
over the lack of a naval presence in his colony. For a long while, the 
only vessel he had to rely on was a "scout boatn commanded by John 
Lightenstone. One of Lightenstone's duties involved acting as a commu- 
nications liaison between Wright and the Navy when they finally ar- 
rived in the Savannah River. The scouting vessel was captured in Janu- 
ary, 1776. Of interest is the fact that despite a lack of naval ves- 
sels, Wright still took it upon himself to set up a vice admiralty 
court which was in operation as early as November, 1775. Not until 
February 11, did Wright go aboard a naval vessel, H.M.S. Scarboro- 
which had only recently arrived, joining the vessels that had just 
come with Campbell. On March 30, 1776, Wright released his grasp on 
his colony, and with Lightenstone, sailed from the Georgia coast for 
Halifax. 70 
As has been shown, early loyalist maritime activity in the three 
rebellious southern colonies was minimal, and consequently, its effect 
on the British war effort during the opening phases of the conflict 
was limited. In actuality, it was only on the North Carolina coast 
that loyalist mariners asserted any influence on affairs, and even 
there, the vessels were from other locales, inclusive of those sent 
there from Virginia under Dunmore's authority and discussed earlier. 
Furthermore, the vessels patrolling the coast were unsuccessful in 
halting rebel trade. Nevertheless, efforts to blockade the Outer Banks 
did involve loyalist vessels, and so, their presence was a factor in 
provoking a response from the rebels. That response involved the ex- 
penditure of time, money, and energy, and tied up materials and man- 
power in the defense of the coastline. In December, 1775, the Provin- 
cial Council of North Carolina authorized the purchase and fitting out 
of three armed vessels for the express purpose of protecting the col- 
ony's trade. Then, North Carolina and Virginia entered into a partner- 
ship to build two armed galleys at South Quay for the same purpose. 
Finally, in the spring of 1776, the North Carolina rebel government 
voted to raise five independent companies of troops to garrison the 
Outer Banks. 71 
In South Carolina and Georgia, early Rebel naval efforts were 
almost exclusively a response to Royal Navy activity. With the aban- 
donment of the three colonies by their governors and supporting naval 
contingents, the coastline and ports of the region were secure from 
any immediate internal threat. It would not be long, however, before 
St. Augustine would emerge as an important British base from which 
privateering operations could be mounted against Georgia and the Caro- 
linas. 
As in other regions, these southerners appear to have been mod- 
erate, established, respectable individuals. The combined merchant/ 
mariner element dominated occupationally. In association with the men 
of Virginia and Maryland, they indicate that southern privateers in 
general were more likely to be foreign born and incorporate racial and 
ethnic elements. There was a limited amount of neutral and equivocal 
behavior in combination with a fair number of instances of abuse. On 
the other-hand, minimal numbers, limited involvement in early naval 
operations, and the relatively small number of privateers that would 
later be associated with the region, indicates that these southern 
loyalists were less enthusiastic about privateering than their breth- 
ren to the north. 
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